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Introduction and overview 
 
Informal enterprises account for 72 percent of non-agricultural employment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 51 percent in Latin America, and 65 percent in Asia, using 
the definition of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2002). Other studies 
confirm the finding that informal entrepreneurs and workers in informal 
enterprises make up a significant proportion of the world’s workforce and gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Schneider et. al, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; OECD, 2002) 
and have significant potential for job creation (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; 
Mead and Liedholm, 1998). 
This means that government policies that affect informal enterprises have far-
reaching implications for economic growth, employment, and for factors 
influenced by these variables, such as inequality. However, there is little 
consensus as which approach to informal enterprises is most likely to promote 
specific policy objectives, such as economic growth, or the reduction or 
mitigation of inequality, or on how policy will affect the trade-offs between 
different objectives. The potential policy approaches range from focus on 
improving enforcement of rules and regulations with the aim of limiting the share 
of informal enterprises in the economy, to ‘turning a blind eye’ to informal 
activity, and to actively extending government support to informal enterprises and 
workers. Even among those who accept the need to support informal 
entrepreneurs, there is little consensus on the most appropriate tools. While 
microfinance is perhaps the most commonly applied, informal entrepreneurs 
could also benefit from other interventions, such as education and training, access 
to markets and inputs, or insurance.  
The lack of consensus on the appropriate approach is caused, at least in part, by 
the lack of rigorous empirical evidence on informal enterprises and the economic 
factors that determine their performance. Two fundamental questions, which are 
largely empirical in nature, underlie the debate: how much potential do informal 
firms have to contribute to economic growth, and employment creation? And, if 
that potential exists; what constrains prevent informal entrepreneurs from 
reaching their full potential?  
The contribution of the thesis is to investigate, using survey data, a number of 
questions about the constraints facing informal entrepreneurs. Although distinct 
questions are asked, and different contexts studied, the results, taken together, are 
all highly relevant to the fundamental questions outlined above. This thesis will 
therefore help strengthen the basis for informed policy among governments and 
international organizations, as well as contributing to the academic debate. 
 




The informal economy: the academic debate 
All modern societies have formalized arrangements to regulate economic 
activity,
1
 and it is almost inevitable that some activities will be conducted fully or 
partly outside of these structures. Conceptually, any such activities can be 
considered ‘informal’, and the entities carrying out these activities can be called 
informal enterprises. The International Labour Organization (ILO) (1993) notes 
that the informal economy consists of units (known as informal enterprises in this 
thesis) engaged in the production of goods or services. Their primary objective is 
to generate employment and incomes for the persons concerned, rather than for 
shareholders, and they typically operate at a low level of organization, on a small 
scale, with labour relations being based on informal or casual arrangements, often 
with family members, rather than formal contracts. Some informal activities, such 
as drug trafficking, are illegal – explicitly prohibited by legal frameworks. But the 
informal economy also includes activities that are, in theory, within the reach of 
the law. Nevertheless, enterprises carrying out these activities may remain part of 
the informal economy because access to formal arrangements is limited by 
barriers such as physical distance, ignorance, or lack of capital, poor 
implementation of rules and regulations, or because economic actors seek to 
avoid burdens such as tax or paperwork.  
Hart (1973) was one of the first researchers to discuss the informal economy in 
the academic economics literature, in the context of Ghana. The author argued 
that the existence of an urban informal sector is often a permanent feature of 
developing economies and identified a key question: “Does the 'reserve army of 
urban unemployed and underemployed' really constitute a passive, exploited 
majority”…”or do their informal economic activities possess some autonomous 
capacity for generating growth in the incomes of the”…“poor?” (Hart, 1973) In 
other words, is the existence of informal enterprises a side effect of market 
imperfections, or do they comprise a dynamic, creative sub-sector? This question 
underlies the policy questions highlighted above, and has been taken up in an 
ensuing lively academic debate, with seminal contributions including Moser 
(1978), de Soto (1989), Tokman (1989) and Maloney (2004). A related strand of 
the literature, summarized by Nichter and Goldberg (2009), has addressed the 
second policy question, investigating the specific constraints that prevent 
informal enterprises from growing and realizing their potential.  
This thesis follows in the footsteps of, and adds to, both strands of literature. The 
first chapter examines marginal returns to capital, because high marginal returns 
are an indication that informal enterprises do indeed have substantial potential to 
contribute to the economy. In addition, the evidence of the third chapter directly 
examines the contribution of informal enterprises to employment growth.  The 
thesis also examines the constraints to informal entrepreneurship in a variety of 
                                                 
1 Norms governing economic activity are observed in all human societies, even in ‘primitive’ or ‘tribal’ 
settings (Sahlins,1972). 




contexts and from a variety of perspectives. In the final chapter the thesis also 
traces some of the implications of informal entrepreneurship and the growth of 
small firms for the economy as a whole – specifically, wage inequality.  
An operational definition of informal enterprises 
In order to analyse informal enterprises, an operational definition is required. The 
operational definition of informal enterprises and the informal economy 
developed by the ILO (1993) is widely accepted. Under this definition, informal 
enterprises are defined as private enterprises that are unregistered or have a small 
number of employees, do not maintain a complete set of accounts and are not 
legal entities separate of their owners. The ILO definition also excludes 
enterprises that produce goods or services exclusively for use of the household, 
and enterprises in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing.   
This thesis follows the operational definition of the ILO as far as possible, but in 
some contexts a narrower definition is required in order to operationalize the 
concept. For example, the data used in Chapter 4 of this thesis do not allow us to 
distinguish strictly between formal and informal enterprises. In this chapter, 
therefore, we focus on micro- and small enterprises (MSEs). Although not all 
MSEs are informal, and not all informal enterprises are MSEs, the ILO guidelines 
explicitly refer to small size as a factor that can be used to identify informal 
enterprises, and there is, in practice a substantial overlap between the two 
categories. Hence, the findings of the analysis can be considered relevant to the 
overall theme of this thesis.  
It is important to note the distinction between informal enterprises, which are the 
focus of this thesis, and informal employment. Informal employment, following 
the ILO (1993) definition, includes own account workers employed in their own 
informal enterprises, employees of informal enterprises and workers in informal 
workers cooperatives. This thesis will contain findings relevant to these workers 
and therefore to the understanding of informal employment. However, there are a 
number of reasons why formal sector firms, including large ones, may choose to 
employ workers informally. These workers are also considered to be informally 
employed, following the ILO definition.
2
 The issues facing these workers, and the 
academic and policy questions related to informal employment, differ 
significantly from the issues facing informal enterprises. The issues of informal 
employment are therefore largely beyond the scope of this thesis, which is 
concerned purely with informal enterprises. 
  
                                                 
2 Following the definition of ILO (1993), employees are considered to have informal jobs if their 
employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labour legislation, income taxation, 
social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits. 




Informal entrepreneurs: constrained gazelles or deadweights?  
The academic debate on informal enterprises and entrepreneurs falls, roughly, 
into two schools of thought. On the one hand, researchers have argued that most 
informal enterprises are inefficient, with little potential for growth (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000). 
Informal enterprises can provide subsistence opportunities to workers with no 
other options. They may serve as a social safety net, and help households 
diversify their income sources to reduce risk. But the activities carried out by 
informal enterprises are unlikely to be productive enough to help workers or their 
households exit poverty (Maloney, 2004). 
In the extreme, one could argue that informal enterprises act like deadweights, 
holding back developing economies, and preventing workers exiting poverty. 
Several arguments underlie this position. Firstly, some informal economic 
activities, such as drug trafficking, are illegal because they have negative 
consequences in themselves. But even where activities are legal and have limited 
or no negative implications, the prevalence of informal enterprises reduces the 
size of the tax base, ceteris paribus, reducing government revenue. This can 
prevent governments improving and expanding service and infrastructure 
provision, and increase the tax burden for those enterprises which are formally 
registered. This makes it difficult for formal enterprises to compete, even if they 
are equally or more efficient, which stunts growth. There is empirical evidence 
that entrepreneurs in developing countries do see competition by informal firms 
as an important obstacle to doing business (Dinh et al., 2010). There are also 
feedback mechanisms at play: several empirical studies have found that lowering 
taxes would decrease the size of the informal sector (Ihrig and Moe, 2004; 
Saracoğlu, 2008).  
In addition, informal sector workers usually lack employment rights and access to 
benefits such as social security, sick leave and maternity leave. Wages are usually 
low, and child labour often common. These characteristics of informal enterprises 
can be seen, in themselves, as negative. They can also have negative effects on 
workers and the economy in the longer term if they prevent workers from 
building up their human capital and becoming more productive. 
Another school of thought has looked at informal enterprises from a more 
positive perspective. Some have seen informal enterprises as dynamic and 
flexible economic entities, driving innovation and economic development, along 
the lines of the numerous small firms and start-ups in Silicon Valley. While 
acknowledging the small size and low turnover of most informal enterprises in 
developing countries, this school of thought has nonetheless argued that, with the 
appropriate support, these firms may have the potential to be productive and to 
drive growth – that at least some informal firms are ‘constrained gazelles’ with 




potentially high returns to capital (Grimm et al., 2012; McKenzie and Woodruff, 
2006; Kremer et al., 2010).  
At the extreme, this school has argued that informal enterprises, with their 
creativity, dynamism and flexibility, are more efficient than formal-sector 
enterprises, particularly those which are fully or partially controlled by 
government. This line of argument has been particularly prevalent in the literature 
on command and transitional economies. In numerous cases small firms, often 
informal, played an important role in driving economic growth during the early 
years of transition and in preventing complete economic collapse as inefficient 
state-owned enterprises were wound down. The fact that most informal 
enterprises have failed to grow is seen by this school not as evidence of 
shortcomings within the enterprises, but as evidence of inadequacies in the 
supporting environment, including excessive interference by government 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). 
Constraints to informal entrepreneurs: access to capital isn’t everything. 
If at least some informal enterprises can be seen as ‘constrained gazelles’, the 
question arises what major constraints prevent them from expanding, employing 
more people, and contributing to economic growth. This question is closely 
related to the productivity and growth potential of the enterprises. If the main 
constraint could be addressed through relatively straightforward measures such as 
improving access to finance, then relaxing that constraint would reveal untapped 
potential for economic growth. But if the major constraints are intrinsic to the 
firms, or very difficult or expensive to tackle, such as lack of skills, or limits on 
the time the entrepreneur can devote to business, it could be argued that their 
growth potential is minimal.  
An overview study by Nichter and Goldmark (2009) of the most influential 
studies on firm growth in developing countries of the past 50 years identifies four 
key factors that are associated with low firm growth in developing countries. 
These are: firm characteristics (e.g. firm age, formality, firm size or access to 
finance), individual characteristics of the enterprise owner, head or workers (e.g. 
education, gender, or work experience), relational factors (e.g. value chains or 
social networks) and contextual factors (e.g. business environment). It should be 
noted that these constraints often interact with or influence each other. For 
example, individual entrepreneurs of a particular gender or ethnicity may have 
better access to social networks, which in turn gives them better access to finance. 
Or, conversely, firms that lack access to financial capital may find it difficult to 
build up social capital by providing gifts or entertaining guests. 
Firm Characteristics and Credit constraints 
Probably the most frequently studied and well confirmed firm-level constraint to 
informal entrepreneurs is lack of access to finance, due to credit market 




imperfections. Numerous studies have examined the role of credit constraints in 
hindering firms from expanding (Tybout, 1983; Dinh et al., 2010; Dollar et al., 
2005). The finding of high returns to capital in MSEs in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia confirms the presence of credit constraints in developing countries 
(Udry and Anagol, 2006; de Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). 
A recent stream of literature uses randomized experiments to analyse factors 
determining the success of MSEs, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
between firms. Most of these experiments suggest the presence of significant 
credit constraints. The experiments randomly allocate cash or in-kind transfers to 
informal or small enterprises and analyse the effects on the firms. Such 
experiments have been carried out in Ghana (Fafchamps et al., 2011), Sri Lanka 
(De Mel et al., 2009) and the Philippines (Karlan and Zinman, 2010). Most of the 
studies show a positive effect on profits of these transfers, suggesting that credit 
constraints are a significant issue.  
Poor access to credit is often connected with other firm characteristics. In 
particular, informal firms often find it harder to access formal credit markets than 
do formal firms. Also, the small size of most informal enterprises has been shown 
to hinder access. Bigsten et al. (2003) show empirically that small firms can be 
particularly badly affected by credit constraints. The authors use firm data from 
Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe and find that even though 
demand for credit in Africa seems low, success rates in loan applications for 
bigger firms are substantially higher than success rates for small firms. The 
findings show that 33 percent of all firms in the sample are credit constrained. 
However, only 10 percent of large firms are assessed as being credit constrained, 
compared to 64 percent of micro-sized firms. Further evidence confirms that 
young and small firms are particularly affected by capital constraints (Beck et al. 
2005; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989).   
Based on this literature, it is also reasonable to assume that there are substantial 
feedback effects between firm size and capital constraints: capital constraints 
influence the firm size distribution, by making firm expansion difficult. 
Theoretical and empirical work shows that credit constraints indeed skew the firm 
size distribution towards smaller firms and that the skewedness decreases with 
firm age (Cabral and Mata, 2003; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Dinh et al., 2010; 
Angelini and Generale, 2008).  
Individual characteristics 
Besides credit constraints and risk, individual characteristics of the individual 
entrepreneur or firm owner have been found to constrain informal entrepreneurs. 
One such characteristic is gender. Women actively participate in informal 
entrepreneurship, and women have been estimated to make up over half of 
informal entrepreneurs in developing countries (Mead and Liedholm, 1998). 




However, there is evidence that these female entrepreneurs find it difficult to 
grow their enterprises past the micro- level. Mead and Liedholm (1998), for 
example, found a significantly slower average rate of employment growth in 
female-headed than male-headed firms.  
Furthermore, evidence from randomized control trials (RCTs) shows that the 
impacts of grants or loans to entrepreneurs can vary depending on the gender of 
the entrepreneur receiving them (e.g. Fafchamps et al., 2011; De Mel et al., 2009; 
Karlan and Zinman, 2010; Mel et al., 2012). These results may be specific to the 
contexts where the RCTs were implemented, and they provide few insights into 
the mechanisms underlying the differing impacts. However, taken together, they 
suggest that either the constraints facing male and female entrepreneurs or the 
underlying productivity of their firms, or both, differ. Given the importance of 
informal entrepreneurship to the livelihoods of women and their households, the 
factors constraining female entrepreneurs are clearly worthy of further 
investigation. 
There is also substantial empirical evidence on the role of education for MSE 
growth. A number of studies have found that MSE owners and workers tend to 
have relatively low levels of education. The evidence regarding the impact of 
education on MSE growth is mixed (Teal and Söderbom, 2001; Mead and 
Liedholm, 1998). It seems to be the case that a country specific threshold needs to 
be reached before one can observe positive correlations between educational 
attainments and firm performance (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009; McKenzie and 
Woodruff, 2006). Also, education may interact with other individual 
characteristics such as gender (de Mel et al., 2009).  
Relational Factors 
Access to social networks has been found to have beneficial impacts on MSEs, 
but certain relational factors can also act as constraints to MSE growth. On the 
one hand, in the presence of market failures, social networks can help to 
overcome constraints related to transaction costs, contract enforcement, and 
regulations. For instance, Fafchamps (2000) shows that entrepreneurs in Kenya 
prefer to do business with clients they have already interacted with. Barr (1998) 
quantitatively analyses the effects of social networks using data from 
manufacturing firms in Ghana. The study divides social networks into innovation 
networks (mostly used by bigger firms) and solidarity networks, which are 
common for smaller firms. The author defines innovation networks as groups of 
entrepreneurs that exchange information, for example on market developments 
and new technologies, in order to enhance firm performance. This is contrasted 
with solidarity networks, within which the main purpose of information 
exchange, for example about client behaviour, circumstances and intentions, is 
not to increase productivity but to reduce uncertainty. The findings show that 
innovation networks have a significant positive impact on firm productivity 




whereas the impact of solidarity networks on productivity is marginal. On the 
other hand there is evidence that social networks can have negative effects on 
firm performance due to abusive demands of network members or forced 
solidarity (Luke and Munshi, 2006). Forced solidarity may hinder even 
potentially successful firms from accumulating and investing capital. Findings 
from informal firms in West Africa show that social networks within the city 
have positive impacts on factor use and consequently value added of informal 
firms (Grimm et al., 2010). This is in line with the findings of Fafchamps (2000). 
By contrast, social ties to the village of origin are found to have robust negative 
effects on value added (Grimm et al., 2010). 
Contextual Factors 
Business risk can be a major constraint to informal entrepreneurs, and can be 
considered a contextual factor, using the categorization of Nichter and Goldmark 
(2009).
3
 Cash flows, especially for young and small enterprises in developing 
countries are volatile. Risk-averse entrepreneurs may be reluctant to take the risks 
necessary to start capital accumulation. This may in turn prevent them from 
investing in new technologies that could boost efficiency (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, 1986). Also, when investments are partially irreversible, firms might 
require a ‘liquidity premium’ – a level of precautionary savings deemed 
comfortable enough for the investment (Fafchamps and Pender, 1997).  
Business risk is often related to institutional and governance constraints. This can 
make risk particularly high in developing countries, many of which have 
inadequate or poorly enforced legal arrangements relating to small-scale 
enterprises. As Fafchamps (1999) points out, ‘true business risk’ might be 
accompanied by ‘opportunistic’ or contractual risk if no proper contract 
enforcement mechanisms are in place (which is likely to be the case in 
developing countries). In particular, in a risky environment where contract 
enforcement is difficult, it is easy to claim inability to stick to the obligations 
agreed towards a business counterpart. The effect of intuitional weaknesses and 
corruption on firms has been quantified by Fisman and Svensson (2007) in the 
context of Uganda. The study finds that a one percent increase in the prevalence 
of bribery reduces firm growth by three percent.  The empirical evidence on the 
effects of risk on marginal returns to capital is mixed, however. Overall, the 
expected positive effects cannot be confirmed (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; 
de Mel et al. 2008; Grimm et al., 2011). 
MSEs can also be constrained by characteristics of the domestic market, both on 
the demand side (small market size), and on the supply side (difficulties in 
accessing inputs and technology). Evidence shows that a small domestic market 
                                                 
3 Some risks are firm or industry-specific. However many are a factor of the economic and institutional 
context. The lack of access to insurance or other measures to mitigate business risk can also be considered a 
contextual factor. 




and hence limited domestic demand, potentially combined with a low elasticity of 
demand for the particular products commonly produced by MSEs, can impede 
firms from growing (Lachaud, 1990). Recent empirical evidence confirms the 
importance of this constraint (Böhme and Thiele, 2012).  
Exporting evidently helps enterprises to overcome the small size of local markets 
(Bigsten et al., 2004; Diao et al., 2006). Empirical evidence from Asia and Africa 
shows that after entering the export market productivity increases occur, which 
can be largely attributed to the exploitation of scale economies (van Biesebroeck, 
2005).  Firms may also be constrained on input markets as certain inputs are not 
produced locally and most equipment used is imported from abroad (Dinh et al., 
2010).  
Government policy for the informal sector: the need for an evidence base. 
While the questions discussed above regarding informal enterprises have been a 
lively subject of academic debate, they also have important implications for 
policy. For example, there is little consensus on the appropriate pace of 
formalization. If the informal economy is largely unproductive, it would be 
appropriate for the government to proceed with formalization as quickly as it can, 
concentrating on improving enforcement and implementation of formal 
arrangements, particularly those that provide worker rights. Government support 
for informal workers would be largely limited to providing a social safety net for 
those displaced from subsistence informal activities, or helping them to find 
formal sector jobs.  
On the other hand, if informal entrepreneurs really are ‘constrained gazelles’, 
there is a chance that rapidly imposing a heavy tax or regulatory burden on them 
could stifle their potential for growth. Instead, it would be appropriate to offer 
support to informal entrepreneurs, allowing them to expand, provide more 
employment and, eventually, contribute to the formal economy (Tokman, 1989). 
Overall, it is unclear what policy options should be used. 
Because the questions on which these choices are based are empirical in nature, 
the appropriate policy can be chosen only with the help of rigorous empirical 
analysis. Impact evaluation has provided some insights into which policies are 
effective, but an understanding of the fundamental questions underlying the 
debate is also essential to understand the channels of impact. This thesis 
investigates a number of questions about informal entrepreneurs and MSEs, all of 
which contribute to that evidence base from different, but complementary, 
perspectives. 
  




Contributions of this thesis 
This thesis aims to narrow the research gap on informal enterprises, helping to 
answer the key questions identified above. The results on marginal returns to 
capital in Chapter 1 and on employment growth in Chapter 3 indicate that the 
potential of informal enterprises may be substantial, if constraints to growth can 
be overcome. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide new evidence on the specific 
constraints facing informal entrepreneurs. The chapters focus respectively on: 
monetary entry barriers, inefficient allocation of inputs by gender and lack of 
access to international markets. The final chapter examines the impact of changes 
in the firm distribution – influenced heavily by the success or failure of small, 
largely informal firms – on wage inequality, a variable of significant policy 
interest. This illustrates some of the implications of the existence and expansion 
of informal enterprises for the overall economy. 
Chapter 1 investigates the patterns of capital entry barriers and returns to capital 
in informal MSEs using a unique micro data set covering seven countries in Sub-
Saharan-Africa. By understanding the importance of monetary entry barriers and 
the patterns of returns to capital among informal enterprises we gain insights into 
their hidden potential, and into the role of capital constraints.  
Our results reveal that although informal enterprises are heterogeneous, they are 
not predominantly engaged in subsistence activities. While an assessment of 
initial investment identifies some informal activities with negligible entry 
barriers, a notable cost of entry is associated with most activities. We find very 
heterogeneous patterns of capital returns. At very low levels of capital marginal 
returns are extremely high – often exceeding 70 percent per month. Above a 
capital stock of 150 international dollars (Int. USD),
4
 marginal returns are found 
to be relatively low, at around four to seven percent monthly. We provide 
evidence that the high returns at low capital stocks may reflect high risks. At the 
same time, most informal enterprises appear to be severely capital constrained.  
The finding of high returns at low levels of capital stock suggests that policies to 
alleviate capital constraints for MSEs in SSA could help informal entrepreneurs 
to utilize the full potential of their enterprises. However, in order to design 
effective policy interventions, the reasons for these high returns need to be better 
understood. The role of risk for marginal returns in particular needs to be 
investigated in more depth. Some of the results described in the chapter suggest 
that it may play an important role, but the data are insufficient to rigorously test 
this hypothesis. If risk is a reason for high returns at low levels of capital, 
alleviation of capital constraints may have limited benefits without measures to 
help entrepreneurs mitigate and cope with risk. Furthermore, policy interventions 
                                                 
4 In this thesis Int. USD refers to local currency converted into International Dollars using the Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) conversion factors for GDP from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2013). 




need to take into account interactions with other constraints. For example, social 
network effects could hinder informal entrepreneurs from reinvesting their 
profits, limiting the impact of improved financial access. Similarly, the gender 
effects identified in Chapter 2 may also impact on the effectiveness of policy.  
In Chapter 2, we explore the efficiency of informal enterprises, as well as the role 
of social/individual constraints in constraining their productivity. The chapter 
asks whether households allocate capital and labour between informal enterprises 
headed by women and those headed by men in a pareto efficient way. To test for 
pareto efficiency we apply and follow closely the approach used by Udry (1996) 
in an agricultural setting to the same data set of informal enterprises in urban 
areas of seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Controlling for household 
characteristics (observable and unobservable), sectoral differences and enterprise 
characteristics we find that profits of female headed enterprises are between 25 
and 40 percent lower than the profits of male headed enterprises. This result is 
inconsistent with pareto efficiency. Our results show that total profits from 
informal enterprises could be about 20 percent higher if resources were allocated 
optimally within the household. Our simulations and results from an Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition show that the inefficient allocation of capital explains 
most of the gender gap.  
Taken together, our findings show that gender should be considered carefully 
when designing policy tools for the informal sector – the returns to interventions 
such as the provision of microfinance will be affected by who receives the 
additional resources. Targeting interventions by gender has potential to increase 
their effectiveness. However, the chapter was unable to conclusively establish the 
reasons behind the seemingly inefficient allocation of resources, and this topic 
would need further investigation before definitive policy recommendations could 
be made. If the allocation arises not merely from social norms but from 
unobserved differences in enterprises that are correlated with gender (for 
example, differences in risk preferences), these unobserved factors could 
determine the success of targeting. Further research on the risk and time 
preferences of male and female entrepreneurs, and on other unobserved factors 
that may vary between male and female headed enterprises would help to close 
the research gap. 
Lack of access to markets and inputs has also been suggested as a constraint to 
the growth of informal entrepreneurs, but has received less attention in the 
empirical literature than the role of credit constraints. To address this gap in the 
literature, Chapter 3 examines the role of international trade for employment 
growth in MSEs using a representative sample of manufacturing firms in six 
Southeast Asian countries.  
In this sample, employment in firms in the bottom quintile of the initial size 
distribution grew the fastest, and contributed considerably to overall employment 




creation. After controlling for firm and individual characteristics as well as 
country and sector dummies, participation in international trade is found to play a 
significant role in explaining this growth, boosting firm-level growth by three 
percent on average. Participating in international trade also increases the 
probability of being a top performing firm by 10 percent.  
The fact that firms start exporting quickly after the foundation of a firm suggests 
that reverse causality is not an issue for our estimates. However, biases arising 
because of unobserved heterogeneity cannot be ruled out because of the cross-
sectional character of the available data. This means that the relationship between 
participation in international trade and employment growth should be interpreted 
as a correlation rather than a causal relationship. However, evidence from an 
instrumental variable approach (exploiting the fact that firms were exposed to 
unexpected variation in real exchange rates between 2005 and 2008), although 
inconclusive, do not suggest that the relationship is driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, first difference estimations computed using panel 
data from Bangladesh confirm the findings from Southeast Asia. The education of 
the firm’s owner, foreign ownership and firm age are also closely related to firm-
level employment growth.  
Overall, the evidence of this chapter suggests that measures to improve access of 
entrepreneurs to import and export markets could help these firms to expand. In 
the absence of further research, using panel data or an instrumental variable 
approach to firmly establish the causal relationship, these sorts of interventions 
could be worthwhile piloting, with rigorous assessment of their benefits.  
The final chapter looks at the role of the firm size distribution for wage inequality 
in order to understand the implications of the expansion of MSEs for the overall 
economy. The chapter uses data from nationally representative labour force 
surveys (LFSs) of 1995 and 2005 in Thailand. The evidence shows that relatively 
slow wage growth among MSEs increased the wage gap between their workers 
and workers in medium and larger enterprises, contributing to rising wage 
inequality. In addition, the firm size distribution changed towards an even more 
pronounced ‘missing-middle’ pattern. Firms became clustered at the large and 
micro to small end of the spectrum, with relatively few medium-sized enterprises. 
Because of the large gap between the wages in micro to small and medium to 
large enterprises, this contributed significantly to the increase in wage inequality. 
This finding holds even when controlling for observed factors influencing the 
wage distribution but correlated with firm size. Specifically, even when we 
control for the fact that the smallest enterprises are concentrated in the poorest 
regions, and in agriculture, which is characterized by low wages, we still find that 
changes in the firm size distribution impacted on wage inequality. 
However, it should be noted that the expansion of wage opportunities, many of 
which have been provided by MSEs, may have mitigated the effect of rising wage 




inequality and contributed to the fact that overall income inequality remained 
stable over the period studied. This suggests that, despite their limited or negative 
contribution to wage inequality over the period studied, MSEs nonetheless have 
an important role to play in reducing or mitigating overall income inequality. In 
particular, if they were able to expand beyond a small size, leading to reduction in 
the typical “missing middle” pattern, this would have potential to decrease wage 
and income inequality. 
  













1. Barriers to Entry and Returns to Capital in Informal 






This paper investigates the patterns of capital entry barriers and capital returns in 
informal micro and small enterprises (MSEs) using a unique micro data set from 
seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings support the characterisation 
of a heterogeneous informal sector that is not primarily host to subsistence 
activities. While an assessment of initial investment identifies some informal 
activities with negligible entry barriers, a notable cost of entry is associated with 
most activities. We find very heterogeneous patterns of capital returns in informal 
MSEs. At very low levels of capital, marginal returns are extremely high – often 
exceeding 70 percent per month. Above a capital stock of 150 international 
dollars, marginal returns are found to be relatively low, at around 4 to 7 percent 
monthly. Some of our evidence suggests that the high returns at low capital stocks 
reflect high risks. At the same time, most MSEs appear to be severely capital 
constrained. 
  
                                                 
 Based on joint work with Michael Grimm and Jann Lay. 







Most urban dwellers in the developing world make their living from informal 
micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and the performance of those enterprises 
often decides upon livelihood success and failure. Successful entrepreneurs seem 
to co-exist with the masses of petty traders or other menial workers who can 
hardly make a living. It is widely assumed that the earnings potential of many of 
those entrepreneurs is under-exploited, as they face important economic 
constraints, such as entry barriers and limited access to credit. This provides a 
rationale for policy interventions such as micro-credit programs. The presence of 
entry barriers combined with capital market imperfections may indeed explain the 
heterogeneity amongst informal entrepreneurs in developing countries. In poverty 
trap models, returns to capital below a certain threshold of investment are often 
assumed to be very low or even zero, as entry of other poor individuals into this 
subsistence segment of the informal sector eats up potential returns. Only if 
entrepreneurs are wealthy enough or can obtain credit to overcome the barrier to 
entry, can they earn much higher returns. Returns to capital in MSEs can thus be 
regarded as a key indicator of the unexploited potential of informal 
entrepreneurship. 
Despite an abundant literature on the informal sector in developing countries 
(Moser, 1978; Peattie, 1987; Rakowsky, 1994; Maloney, 2004; Henley et al., 
2006), the empirical literature on entry barriers and returns to capital in MSEs is 
fairly recent and surprisingly limited. This is all the more remarkable since a very 
early insight from the literature on the informal sector is that it comprises very 
heterogeneous activities or, more specifically, heterogeneous forms of production 
(Hart, 1973). Existing studies on capital returns consistently find very high  
returns, often in the order of more than 60 percent annually. De Mel et al. (2008), 
for instance, use data from a randomised experiment to estimate returns to capital 
of Sri Lankan microenterprises. In this experiment, the authors randomly give 
cash or in-kind transfers, which represent 55 to 110 percent of the median 
investment, to microenterprises. They find a significant and positive correlation 
between transfers and real profits of the enterprises. Using the random treatment 
as an instrument for changes in the capital stock the authors estimate the returns 
to capital to be in a range from 55 to 70 percent per year. McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2006) find very high returns at low levels of capital, yet little evidence 
for the existence of high entry costs, for the case of informal Mexican enterprises, 
although start-up costs vary considerably by sector. As we will follow their 
empirical approach very closely, our findings can be readily compared to theirs.  
For Sub-Saharan Africa, there is also evidence of extremely high returns to 
capital (Udry and Anagol, 2006; Schündeln, 2004; Kremer et al., 2010). Kremer 
et al. (2010) for instance study retail firms in rural Kenya and find an average 





annual real marginal rate of return of 113 percent, although the results also 
revealed substantial heterogeneity across firms. The rates of returns are derived 
from information on foregone earnings due to insufficient inventory or stock-
outs, and alternatively, by assessing whether firms take advantage of quantity 
discounts from wholesalers. Both procedures yield very similar estimates.  
With respect to the causes of the observed pattern of high returns at relatively low 
levels of capital, the evidence is inconclusive, although some findings do suggest 
an important role for capital market constraints (Banerjee and Duflo, 2004; 
Schündeln, 2006; de Mel et al., 2008). In general, high returns in MSEs point at 
the huge potential of these firms, as a very large share of urban employment is 
generated by MSEs. Based on the same dataset used in this paper, Brilleau et al., 
(2005) find for instance that the share of informal sector employment uniformly 
exceeds 70 percent in urban Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In this paper we estimate capital returns for MSEs in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
examine entry barriers into small-scale economic activities. We address the 
following questions: First, do informal activities exhibit high entry barriers (start-
up costs) relative to the income and wealth levels of entrepreneurs? Second, how 
do capital returns vary with the size of the capital stock; do we also find high 
returns at low levels of capital or the inverse as some of the theoretical literature 
suggests? And third, what can be said about the causes of the observed patterns of 
capital returns? To answer these questions, we use a unique, albeit cross-
sectional, micro data set on informal enterprises covering the economic capitals 
of seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In our empirical approach, we closely 
follow the study by McKenzie and Woodruff (2006). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 outlines our 
analytical framework and formulates the hypotheses that are tested in Section 1.3. 
Section 1.4 concludes. 
  





1.2. Analytical framework and hypotheses 
 
In what follows we develop a simple model in which prospective entrepreneurs 
face entry barriers and non-convex production technologies and then derive 
testable assumptions under alternative hypotheses about capital market 
imperfections. In the literature on entrepreneurial activity in developing countries, 
incomplete capital markets have long been stressed as a major economic 
constraint (e.g. Tybout, 1983; Bigsten et al., 2003). If capital markets function 
poorly because credit contracts cannot be easily enforced, so goes the argument, 
capital fails to flow to its most productive uses and marginal returns across 
entrepreneurial activities are not equalised. Faced with different costs of capital 
because of differences in wealth and their capacity to provide collateral, 
borrowers may have to choose to invest in different technologies (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2005). 
In such a setting, the informal sector may be divided into different segments 
characterised by different entry barriers in terms of skill or capital requirements 
(e.g. Fields, 1990; Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). This basic idea is reflected 
and formalised in a number of models of economic development and poverty 
traps, which emphasise the role of the distribution of wealth (e.g. Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). In these models, the segmentation of 
economic activities and the co-existence of high and low returns are caused by 
the interaction of non-convex production technologies and capital market 
imperfections. If gainful entrepreneurial activities require a certain level of start-
up capital that cannot be obtained from capital markets, poorly endowed 
individuals will be prevented from entry. This implies that poor individuals get 
stuck in low-productivity activities and hence the whole economy may end up in 
a poverty trap; the higher the share of initially poor people, the higher the share of 
those in low-productivity industries.
5
 
These models typically assume very low levels of returns, or subsistence returns, 
at very low levels of capital and higher returns once a certain threshold has been 
passed. In the simplest of worlds, the entrepreneur maximises the difference 
between output y and the costs of capital (rk), i.e. profit π subject to his borrowing 
constraint B . He can only produce a non-zero output using neoclassical 
technology f if he is able to raise at least K . Otherwise his production will be 
absorbed entirely by the costs of capital and his profit will be zero. 
  
                                                 
5 Risk and risk aversion can also create such poverty traps. 





Max. rKy         (1.1) 
s.t. )(Kfy   if  KK      (1.2) 
 rKy   if  KK      (1.3) 
 BK          (1.4) 
The entrepreneur will chose his capital stock such that 
rKf  )(   if KB      (1.5) 
If his borrowing constraint is binding, i.e. KB  , then the entrepreneur will be 
indifferent between different sizes of capital stock, as he earns zero profits 
anywhere between KK 0 . Returns to an additional unit of capital, i.e. )(' K
, will hence be 0 between KK 0 . Once his borrowing capacity allows the 
entrepreneur to pass the threshold K , he earns very high marginal returns that fall 
to zero when he reaches the optimal level of capital K*. The resulting patterns of 
marginal returns to capital as a function of the borrowing constraint B are 
presented in the graph below.  
Figure 1–1: Borrowing constraints and marginal returns to capital 
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This simple exposition allows us to formulate two basic hypotheses to be tested 
subsequently: First, the existence of a threshold K  should be observable in the 
distribution of initial investment undertaken by MSEs. Second, returns to capital 
should be low at low levels of capital, and high but decreasing in K at higher 
levels. Note that this theoretical insight contradicts most of the empirical evidence 
presented in the introduction. In what follows, we will test whether this 
framework has also to be rejected for the economies we focus on. 
1.3. Entry costs and capital returns in African MSEs 
1.3.1. Data 
 
We test these hypotheses by using data from a set of surveys (1-2-3 surveys or 
Enquêtes 1-2-3) in seven economic capitals of the West-African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) in the early 2000s.
6
 A 1-2-3 survey is a multi-layer 
survey organised in three phases and specially designed to study the informal 
sector.
7
 Phase 1 is a representative labour force survey collecting detailed 
information on individual socio-demographic characteristics and employment. 
Phase 2 is a survey which interviews a representative sub-sample of informal 
production units identified in Phase 1. The focus of the second phase is on the 
characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their production unit, including the 
characteristics of employed workers. It also contains detailed information on 
input use, investment, sales and profits. Phase 3 is a household expenditure 
survey interviewing (again) a representative sub-sample of Phase 1. The datasets 
from all three phases are organised in such a way that they can be linked. For this 
paper we use data from Phase 2, a cross-sectional sub-sample of informal 
entrepreneurs in seven urban centres in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brilleau et al., 
2005a). 
1.3.2. Basic MSE characteristics 
 
The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as production units that (a) do not 
have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered with the tax 
administration. Part (b) of this definition varies slightly between countries, as 
registration may not always refer to registration with tax authorities. The so-
defined informal sector accounts for the vast majority of employment in the 
WAEMU cities covered by the surveys, as illustrated in Table 1-1. The share of 
informal sector employment exceeds 70 percent in all cities considered – in 
Cotonou and Lomé even 80 percent. Employment in informal firms is typically 
                                                 
6 These urban centres are Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Niamey, Lomé and Ouagadougou. The surveys 
were carried out by AFRISTAT and the National Statistical Institutes (INS) with the support of 
Developpement Institutions & Mondalisation (DIAL) as part of the Regional Program of Statistical Support 
for Multilateral Surveillance (PARSTAT) between 2001 and 2003. For a more detailed description of the 
data see Brilleau et al. (2005a). 
7 See Roubaud (2008) for a detailed assessment of this type of survey instrument. 





self-employment, i.e. the employed individual is also the MSE owner. However, 
employees and/or helping family- and non-family workers account for 30 to 40 
percent of employment in this sector. 
Table 1-1: Employment by sector in seven urban centres in Sub-Saharan Africa (percent) 
Principal 
employment 
Cotonou Ouaga. Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé Total 
Public 
administration 
6.3 10.4 5.5 7.5 13.5 5.7 5.2 6.6 
Public firm 2.2 2.3 1.1 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.3 1.8 
Private formal firm 9.9 11.8 17.6 11.4 11.8 15.0 10.5 14.2 
Private informal 
firm 
80.3 73.4 74.7 77.5 71.1 76.4 81.0 76.2 
of which         
Owners 63.7 67.5 60.4 73.4 72.2 65.2 68.6 65.0 
Family workers 19.2 16.3 16.1 8.6 14.5 17.6 13.6 15.5 
Non-family 
workers 
17.1 16.2 23.5 18.0 13.3 17.2 17.8 19.5 
Associations 1.3 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.2 
Source: Brilleau et al. (2005), and authors’ computations based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 
2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
The 1-2-3 surveys do not (explicitly) apply a size criterion, but more than 90 
percent of the enterprises employ a maximum of three people including the owner 
and any family members employed. As shown in Table 1-2, around 70 percent of 
informal enterprises function in ‘pure self-employment’ mode, i.e. they only 
consist of the owner. Accordingly, the average enterprise size – including all 
employed family- and non-family-members – is only 1.6 individuals. The 
information in Table 1-2 has been computed from a sample of 6,521 informal 
enterprises from all seven countries that will be used for all the subsequent 
empirical analyses. This number includes 243 MSEs reporting zero profits and 
892 MSEs reporting zero capital stock. 
These small enterprises had been in operation for more than seven years on 
average. The median age, however, is significantly lower, only five years. 
Owner’s experience in the business is typically lower than the enterprise age, 
mainly reflecting the fact that some MSEs are transferred within the family. MSE 
owners have only 3.7 years of schooling on average and about half of them are 
female. 
Average monthly profits of informal enterprises are about 380 International US 
Dollars (Int. USD)
8
 with median profits at 112 Int. USD. Profits are computed as 
value added (sales minus input costs including expenses for products for re-sale). 
The questionnaire has very detailed sections on sales of transformed, non-
                                                 
8 Whenever Int. USD are mentioned this refers to local currency converted to International USD using 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion factors for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). 





transformed or re-sold products as well as offered services. The same holds for 
the input side, which covers raw materials, intermediates, products for re-sale, 
taxes, rents and other utility costs. All these items are covered for the last month 
in the survey. Note that interest payments are not deducted from value added. 
Average capital stock is fairly high, at around 1,000 Int. USD, but this result is 
driven by a few MSEs with very high capital stocks – the median MSE capital 
endowment stands at only 75 Int. USD. We measure capital stock by the 
replacement value of all business-related assets, including the business 
establishment, machines, furniture, vehicles and utilities. More specifically, the 
entrepreneur is asked to report all the equipment that she has used in the last year 
to operate her business and the replacement value of each item.
9
 While this 
implies that the corresponding equipment is used for the operation of the 
business, it is impossible to determine whether this is its sole use or whether it is 
also used for other purposes in the household. We will come back to this point in 
the discussion of our results. Another complication of computing capital stocks 
stems from the fact that capital is also bound by inventories (or stocks of raw 
materials). This is ignored in the above calculation, but we will take this into 
account when we analyse entry barriers and returns to capital below. 















Age of the enterprise 7.4 5 6.7 7.1 8.2 7.7 7.4 
Owner's age 36.3 35 35.2 35.8 36.8 36.1 37.8 
Owner's years of 
schooling 3.7 3 3.3 2.5 3.2 3.9 5.5 
Owner's experience 6.9 4 6.1 6.6 7.6 7.1 6.9 
Owner female 0.51 
 
0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Firm size 1.6 1 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.5 
Share of pure self-
employment 0.69 
 
0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Monthly profit (in 
2001 Int. USD) 380.3 112 206.7 179.9 323 412 783.3 
Capital stock (in 
2001 Int. USD) 997.2 76.8 2.1 23.4 83.6 351.8 4554.4 
Number of 
observations 6521 6521 1324 1293 1306 1302 1296 
Notes: Quintiles of capital (minimum and maximum capital in Int. USD in parentheses). 2001 
international dollars are on the basis of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) converters for GDP 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, we do not have any information about sales of or damage to capital goods. 





For a first assessment of MSE heterogeneity, we also report the above 
characteristics by capital quintiles. The first quintile basically works without 
capital. These MSEs mainly comprise trading activities and other services 
(industry composition not reported). The profits of these enterprises are around 
200 Int. USD, almost two times median profits. Typically, these MSEs are made 
up of self-employed individuals. This also holds for entrepreneurs in the second 
capital quintile. They resemble those without capital, but are significantly less 
educated and earn about 30 Int. USD less per month. In the third quintile, profits 
are more than 70 percent higher than in the second quintile while the average 
capital stock approximately quadruples. Yet, it remains low at only about 80 Int. 
USD on average. The owners of these firms have fewer years of schooling that 
the average, but 0.7 years more than those with very little capital. Fewer owners 
are female and their firms are slightly bigger than in the lower quintiles. From the 
third to the fourth quintile, changes are similar to moving from the second to the 
third. Capital stock again quadruples, owner’s average education increases, as 
does firm size and the share of male owners. However, monthly profits only 
increase by 90 Int. USD on average, to 412 Int. USD. Much more pronounced are 
the differences in capital and profits between the fourth and the fifth quintile. 
Average capital stock of MSEs in the fifth quintile is almost 5,000 Int. USD and 
monthly profits are much higher than in other enterprises. These entrepreneurs 
also tend to be much better educated than the average and more than half of them 
employ at least a second person. 
These descriptive statistics indeed hint at a considerable degree of heterogeneity 
within the informal sector, although MSEs of the bottom 40 percent of the capital 
distribution share a number of common characteristics. This heterogeneity – also 
in profits – seems to be linked to capital stock, which, in turn, may be associated 
with the respective sector of activity. Therefore, Table 1-3 shows the industry 
distribution of the MSEs for each country and for the sample as a whole. Overall 
the most important sector is ‘petty trading’ (27.1 percent), followed by ‘other 
manufacturing and food’ (16.0 percent) and ‘other services’ (11.8 percent), i.e. 
services that are not covered by the other listed industries. The smallest sector in 
terms of its share is the transport sector, which is likely to require substantial 
start-up costs, including investment in physical capital and cost for licences (4.6 
percent). The relative importance of the various industries is in line of what one 
would expect when looking at demand patterns. Whereas small services, small 
traded goods and food have a high share in the households’ budgets, transport or 
repair services have a rather small share. It is also interesting to see that the 
industry distribution is relatively homogenous across the seven countries, with 
two exceptions: ‘Other manufacturing and food’ are particularly frequently 
reported in Ouagadougou and Niamey. These cities have in turn relatively low 
shares for the sector ‘hotels and restaurants’, so it might be that the border 
between ‘producing or processing food’ and ‘selling food in a restaurant’ was not 
drawn in exactly the same way in the seven cities under study. The industry 
composition seems to be relatively unrelated to the level of GDP per capita; the 





richer centres in the sample such as Abidjan and Dakar do not have a 
substantially different distribution than Niamey and Lomé. 
Table 1-3: Industry composition of informal MSEs by country (number of observations and 
percent of firms) 
Industry/City Cotonou Ouaga. Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé Total 
Clothing and 
apparel 
98 78 122 137 56 98 117 706 




102 223 103 134 225 151 106 1,044 
11.0 23.3 10.4 13.7 31.6 15.2 11.1 16.0 
Construction 
70 68 68 101 39 91 55 492 
7.5 7.1 6.9 10.3 5.5 9.1 5.8 7.5 
Wholesale/retail 
shops 
104 103 102 92 46 109 100 656 
11.2 10.8 10.3 9.4 6.5 10.9 10.5 10.1 
Petty trading 
235 251 262 265 194 283 279 1,769 
25.3 26.2 26.5 27.1 27.2 28.4 29.2 27.1 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
89 78 80 40 8 50 66 411 
9.6 8.2 8.1 4.1 1.1 5.0 6.9 6.3 
Repair services 
67 51 63 49 41 36 68 375 
7.2 5.3 6.4 5.0 5.8 3.6 7.1 5.8 
Transport 
80 22 43 37 26 54 39 301 
8.6 2.3 4.3 3.8 3.7 5.4 4.1 4.6 
Other services 
85 83 147 124 78 125 125 767 
9.1 8.7 14.9 12.7 10.9 12.5 13.1 11.8 
Total 930 957 990 979 713 997 955 6,521 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: Shares (in percent) in italics. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 survey (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
1.3.3. Entry barriers 
 
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the existence of entry barriers into 
informal activities. We expect that MSEs engage in petty (or subsistence) 
activities that require little capital as well as more capital intensive activities that 
involve considerable initial investment. In some industries we expect more of 
these activities, for example in trade, than in others, for example in transport. We 
therefore first analyse distributions of initial investment in equipment that should 
reflect these patterns. In a second step, we also consider other start-up costs 
including expenses for other inputs and inventories. 
Before we quantitatively examine these entry barriers, we briefly report and 
comment on some evidence from questions that ask entrepreneurs for the 
problems they face. Table 1-4 reports the share of entrepreneurs who report to 
have problems in a specific area. We distinguish MSEs (only in the clothing and 
apparel sector to reduce heterogeneity) by their age in order to determine whether 





those problems are different when an enterprise starts operating. Two groups of 
problems figure prominently for MSEs in the clothing and apparel sector; on the 
one hand, those related to the lack of demand (not enough clients, too much 
competition) and, on the other, those associated to the access to capital in a broad 
sense (access to credit, lack of locality, machines, and equipment). Access to raw 
material is a problem only for 25 percent of the MSEs, but much more so for 
younger ones. Demand-related problems seem to be equally important for MSEs 
at all ages, and so for a vast majority. Half of the firms report inadequate access 
to credit. The answer to this question (and the next question on credit too 
expensive) is likely to be biased by actual experience of demanding/being 
declined credit, which might explain why more of the older firms report problems 
in this area. This seems plausible, as problems that result from credit constraints, 
such as the lack of locality, machines, and equipment, are indeed cited more 
frequently by younger firms suggesting that these costs may represent important 
barriers to entry. Other constraints, such as the lack of qualified personnel, 
technical or management problems, and institutional or governance constraints 
appear to be much less important. There is also no evidence that these problems 
are more important when firms start operating.
10
 
Table 1-4: Perceived problems faced by MSEs in the clothing and apparel sector by 
enterprise age (share) 
 All Enterprise age 
Problem  
less than 
1 year 2-3 years 4-8 years 
more than 
8 
Access to raw materials 0.25 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.23 
Not enough clients 0.67 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.64 
Too much competition 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.60 
Access to credit 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.51 
Credit too expensive 0.28 0.27 0.34 0.25 0.27 
Recruitment of qualified personnel 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11 
Lack of adequate locality 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.40 0.34 
Lack of machines, equipment 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.40 
Technical difficulties of production 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.15 
Management difficulties 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Too many regulations and taxes 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 
Number of observations 706 93 164 194 255 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 survey (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
Although our dataset is cross-sectional, it allows us to identify investment paths 
since, for each enterprise asset, we know the date of purchase. Furthermore, we 
know when an enterprise was established. As a proxy for initial investment in 
equipment we therefore use the accumulated investment undertaken during the 
                                                 
10 We are aware that these descriptive statistics are biased by the fact that some constrained firms never set 
up a shop. This also holds for the subsequent analyses and is a bias that is impossible to address with the data 
at hand. 





first year of operation. As we expect measurement error in the investment history 
to be severe for investments undertaken a long time ago, the subsequent analysis 
of this section only considers enterprises that have been established four years 
before the survey or later. This leaves us with a sub-sample of 3,144 informal 
enterprises. 
We first examine initial investment by industry. Table 1-5 hence shows the 
replacement value of business assets accumulated in the first year of operation at 
certain quantiles of the initial-investment distribution. The statistics are again 
based on the pooled data from all seven countries in the dataset. 
Table 1-5: Replacement value of assets accumulated in the first year of operation (Int. USD 
and share of firms) 





ment Mean Mean (>0) p10 p25 p50 p75 p99 
Clothing and apparel 319 0.18 813 994 0 14 233 615 10955 
Other manfg & food 493 0.23 708 919 0 5 46 364 20781 
Construction 128 0.30 262 377 0 0 31 119 3961 
Wholesale/retail shops 329 0.39 684 1119 0 0 24 193 14974 
Petty traders 943 0.38 177 288 0 0 10 35 2607 
Hotels and restaurants 229 0.14 802 937 0 30 93 396 8860 
Repair services 159 0.17 1150 1386 0 36 200 708 30347 
Transport 171 0.29 3645 5109 0 0 932 3397 34074 
Other services 373 0.42 760 1318 0 0 15 296 15401 
Total 3144 0.31 734 1060 0 0 30 275 12740 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 survey (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
Overall, levels of initial investment in equipment are fairly low. Quite a number 
of activities do not seem to require any initial investment. This holds for 31 
percent of all enterprises and somewhat less for ‘capital intensive’ informal 
industries, such as repair services and hotels and restaurants. In most activities, 
initial investment however remains low also at higher quantiles. The median petty 
trader, for example, still does not invest more than 10 Int. USD during the first 
year after establishing the enterprise. However, although 29 percent of all 
enterprises in the transport sector do report zero initial investment, the median 
initial investment (among those MSEs that do invest) is about five times larger 
than for the repair services sector and the clothing sector, the industries with the 
second and third largest values. The top 25 percent in the transport sector invest 
more than 3,300 Int. USD in the first year. Overall, there is substantial 





heterogeneity of initial investment across industries,
11
 as also illustrated by Figure 
1–2 showing the distribution of (log) initial investment for all enterprises, the 
service, the manufacturing and the transport industries. Discontinuities in these 
distributions could be taken as a sign of entry barriers within a given sector. The 
service sector seems to have such a barrier at very low levels of capital of around 
50 Int. USD. There are only some small spikes in the distribution for the 
manufacturing sector. The transport sector shows a more pronounced spike above 
1000 Int. USD. Overall, this brief descriptive analysis does not lend support to the 
hypothesis of significant entry barriers. 
Figure 1–2: Histograms of initial investment (current Int. USD) 
 
Notes: The histograms exclude zero investment. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
However, as indicated above, entrepreneurs incur additional costs when they want 
to start a business. These costs include recurrent expenses, such as expenses for 
raw materials and building up inventories. While these costs will in principle be 
recovered once the final product is sold, they need to be financed when the 
business starts operating. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow us to compute 
those costs at start-up. We only know the monthly recurrent expenses that we 
report in Table 1-6 (based on the same sample as Table 1-5) along with initial 
                                                 
11 It turns out that the distributions of start-up costs across industries in the different countries are fairly 
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investment and median profits as a reference point. Admittedly, these monthly 
expenses are an imperfect proxy of this component of start-up costs. For some 
industries, for example the wholesale and retail sector, inventories bought during 
the last month may be a reasonable proxy for this component of start-up costs. A 
petty trading activity, however, can possibly be started with a fraction of the 
reported monthly purchases of inventories. Moreover, in many cases inputs may 
only be bought once an order has been received and hence these costs may have 
more the character of variable than fixed costs. The interpretation of these figures 
will hence be somewhat speculative. To illustrate the relative size of the different 
components of start-up costs, Table 1-6 also reports median monthly MSE 
profits. 













  Mean p50 Mean p50 Mean p50 Mean p50 Mean p50 p50 
Clothing and apparel        813 233 164 58 111 27 5 0 5 0 77 
Other manfg & food 708 46 396 170 308 105 27 0 8 0 98 
Construction                262 31 624 34 509 0 9 0 32 0 187 
Wholesale/retail shops      684 24 1477 414 48 0 1318 359 4 0 131 
Petty traders               177 10 511 182 52 0 424 136 3 0 70 
Hotels and restaurants      802 93 944 545 590 384 263 0 9 0 170 
Repair services             1150 200 306 88 87 0 95 0 11 0 125 
Transport                   3645 932 683 284 92 0 31 0 17 0 293 
Other services              760 15 230 35 28 0 66 0 8 0 102 
Total                       734 30 560 151 157 0 304 0 8 0 105 
Notes: Non-labour expenses include raw materials, inventories, and all other recurrent expenses 
(for example fuel). 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
While labour expenses seem to be negligible, monthly non-labour expenses can 
be substantial compared to initial investment. The industry patterns correspond to 
expectations with raw materials being more important for manufacturing and 
construction, while inventories account for the major part of non-labour expenses 
for trading activities. It seems that investment in equipment indeed accounts for a 
large part of start-up costs in manufacturing activities (with the likely exception 
of food processing). This is less the case at lower levels of capital, as the 
difference between mean and median is much smaller for non-labour expenses 
than for initial capital. For trading activities, the costs of building-up inventories 
may be more important than initial investment in equipment. 
A comparison of start-up costs with median monthly profits shows that both 
equipment costs and non-labour expenses can be substantial – albeit not 
insurmountable – in some industries while they are negligible in others. In the 





transport and the clothing and apparel sector, for instance, almost three months of 
earnings are necessary to cover median initial investment. When we combine the 
information on expenses on equipment capital and recurrent monthly costs, this 
adds up to less than 30 Int. USD combined start-up costs for only 12 percent of 
the MSEs. Hence, while there are indeed some informal activities with negligible 
entry barriers, there is some fixed cost associated to entry into most informal 
activities. However, it should be noted that the costs shown here must be seen as 
an estimated upper bound. 
1.3.4. Returns to capital 
 
We now turn to the estimation of the returns to capital at different levels of 
capital stock. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional character of our data does not 
allow us to estimate the returns to initial investment (or to additional investment), 
but only to total capital stock. In our empirical model, profits πihj of MSE i in 
household h residing in country j are not only a function of capital Kihj, but also of 
a vector of exogenous variables Xihj and two unobserved factors, one at the 
household level 
hj , for example household wealth, and one at the individual level
ihj , which we primarily think of as entrepreneurial ability. These factors do not 
only influence profit directly, but simultaneously determine the size of the capital 
stock. 
),,),,(( ihjhjihjihjhjihjihj XKf         (1.6)
 
In log-linearised form and with 
ihju , a random error, the equation can be 
expressed as  
ihjihjhjihjihjKihj uXK    21ln)ln( .   (1.7) 
The observable exogenous characteristics of the entrepreneur in the models 
estimated below are the MSE owner’s years of schooling, experience and gender. 
We also include total labour input in hours (including both household and hired 
labour). Further ‘exogenous’ variables include industry and country dummies as 
well as industry-country interaction terms. As returns to capital, labour and 
schooling may differ across countries and industries we also include the 
corresponding interaction terms. 
The cross-sectional estimation of equation (1.7) is confronted with a number of 
potential biases. First, K  may be biased due to the mentioned omitted variables 
that are correlated with both capital stock and profit. The classical example of 
such a variable is unobserved ability of an entrepreneur. Certain managers will 
have abilities that allow them to accumulate more capital and to generate more 
profits than others. The omission of these abilities will lead to an upward bias of





K . Moreover, the estimation of equation (7) may be complicated by reverse 
causality. Higher profits allow faster capital accumulation, which would again 
lead to an upward bias of K . Finally, the estimation has to deal with classical 
measurement error in both profits and capital stocks, which will bias K  
downward. We explain below how we address these different biases. 
A test for heterogeneity in returns, i.e. in K  as a function of K, can be 
introduced in various ways. Our approach is to simply split the sample into 
entrepreneurs with different levels of capital stock. Without the intention to 
ignore the above caveats, Table 1-7 below reports the results from OLS 
regressions for all enterprises and for sub-samples of low (lower than 150 Int. 
USD), medium (higher than 150 Int. USD and lower than 1000 Int. USD) and 
high capital stock (higher than 1000 Int. USD). These thresholds were chosen on 
the basis of the above shown distribution of initial investment (specifically the 
1000 Int. USD threshold) as well as non-parametric plots of capital profitability 
(profit/capital) against capital (not reported). The latter suggest very high capital 
profitability at low levels of capital that falls very quickly with increasing levels 
of capital. At around 150 Int. USD capital profitability starts to decrease much 
slower than at lower levels. In addition, the thresholds were chosen such that the 
sub-samples remain sufficiently large. Applying these thresholds implies a split 
of the sample into about 50 percent of low-capital, 30 percent of medium-capital 
and 20 percent of high-capital MSEs. 
We estimate equation (1.7) on these different samples as double-log-
specification, i.e. we regress log profits on log capital and log labour using 
OLS.
12
 Note that the double-log specification assumes a constant capital elasticity 
of profits and marginal returns of capital – our main variable of interest – 
eventually depend on capital profitability (π/K). More precisely marginal returns 
will be the product of K  and (π/K). Since the estimated elasticity is an average 
effect, we should compute (average) marginal returns at the average of (π/K). 
However, we will also evaluate returns at different levels of capital stock that we 
know to exhibit different levels of capital profitability. In the first set of results 
reported in Table 1-7 below, we interact log capital with country dummies – with 
Dakar (Senegal) as the reference category. The second set of regressions, reported 
in Table 1-8, includes interactions of capital with industry dummies. Here, 
manufacturing has been chosen as reference category.
13
   
                                                 
12 We also estimate a specification without taking logs regressing monthly profits on a second-degree 
polynomial in both capital and labour. The estimates are similar to those from the double-log specification 
and are available from the authors on request. 
13 The regressions exclude enterprises that report to operate without any capital (and/or zero profits), which 
leaves us with 5,403 observations (of 6,584). We will address to the possible biases introduced by this 
procedure later. In all regressions, we drop influential outliers, identified using the DFITS-statistic. As 
suggested by Belsley et al. (1980), we use a cutoff-value NkDFITS ihj 2||  with, k the degrees of freedom 
(plus 1) and N, the number of observations. This procedure reduces the (sub-) samples quite considerably; 





Table 1-7: Returns to capital – results from OLS including capital-country interactions 
   All 
Capital < 150 
Int. USD 
Capital >150 Int. 
USD & < 1000 
Int. USD 
Capital > 
1000 Int. USD 
Log capital 
0.180*** 0.290*** 0.343** 0.493*** 
(0.021) (0.049) (0.167) (0.117) 
Log capital x 
dummy for  
Cotonou 
0.049 -0.005 -0.105 -0.235* 
(0.034) (0.099) (0.218) (0.141) 
Ouaga 
0.062** -0.006 -0.201 0.207 
(0.029) (0.074) (0.233) (0.161) 
Abijan 
-0.002 -0.091 -0.450** -0.104 
(0.034) (0.079) (0.215) (0.163) 
Bamako 
0.080** 0.089 -0.422* -0.036 
(0.033) (0.075) (0.224) (0.216) 
Niamey 
0.071* 0.146* -0.411* -0.320* 
(0.037) (0.083) (0.246) (0.180) 
Lome 
0.049 -0.048 0.080 0.002 
(0.030) (0.071) (0.211) (0.154) 
Additional controls 
Log labour and Log labour-country interactions, Owner's 
education and owner's education-country interactions, Owner's 
experience, owner female, industry dummies, country dummies, 
country-industry interactions 
R-squared 0.392 0.339 0.350 0.425 
N 5082 2742 1400 935 
Implied MRK 
(at average P 
and K) 
Dakar 0.10 0.71 0.34 0.10 
Cotonou 0.03 0.70 0.14 0.03 
Ouaga 0.07 0.89 0.14 0.13 
Abijan 0.10 1.07 -0.13 0.07 
Bamako 0.13 2.39 -0.08 0.09 
Niamey 0.06 1.51 -0.04 0.01 
Lome 0.03 0.39 0.13 0.03 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
‘segment’-level (around 10 observations per segment) in parentheses. MRK = marginal monthly 
return to capital. The full results are available from the authors on request. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
The first column of Table 1-7 reports the results from the full sample. Overall, the 
estimations explain an acceptable portion of the variation in profits with R-
squared always between 0.3 and 0.4. The coefficients of the control variables (not 
reported, but available from the authors on request)
14
 correspond to expectations, 
but show quite some variation across countries. The profit elasticity of capital 
fluctuates between 0.18 and 0.25 between countries and formal tests reject 
parameter equality across countries. Evaluated at country-specific mean capital-
profitabilities these parameters translate into marginal returns to capital (MRK) 
between 3 and 13 percent per month. We now split the sample according to the 
                                                                                                                                     
the losses in sample size range from 5 to 10 percent. This may partly be due to measurement and reporting 
errors, but it may also reflect the high degree of heterogeneity among informal MSEs.  
14 In the remainder of the paper we will discuss a number of findings that could not  reported in a table due to 
space limitations. All these tables are available from the authors on request. 





thresholds defined above. The results for the three sub-samples are reported in 
columns two to four of Table 1-7.
15
 Column two of Table 1-7 shows one of the 
key results of this paper: Very high marginal returns at low levels of capital. With 
the exception of Togo (Lomé), monthly marginal returns to capital exceed 70 
percent and are even higher for some countries. This result is driven by very high 
profit-capital ratios at low levels of capital. Table 1-7 shows that K  is 
significantly different from 0.29 (the base coefficient for Dakar) only for Niamey 
at the 10 percent level, which is why an F-test for the joint significance of the 
capital-country interactions does not reject parameter equality across countries for 
MSEs with low capital stocks.  
At higher levels of capital, the marginal returns to capital are much lower. This is 
despite the fact that the coefficient of log capital increases with higher capital 
stocks. Profit-capital ratios are, however, much lower at higher levels of capital 
stock. At medium levels of capital between 150 and 1,000 Int. USD, the log 
capital coefficients differ significantly and considerably between countries. For 
Abidjan, Bamako, and Niamey, the interaction terms are strongly negative and 
hence the correlation between log profits and log capital is not significantly 
different from zero for this set of countries in this range of capital stock. The 
implied MRKs are even negative in those cases. For the other countries, we find 
MRKs around 13 to 14 percent with the exception of Senegal where monthly 
returns amount to 38 percent. At levels of capital above 1,000 Int. USD, there 
seems to be less heterogeneity. Only for Cotonou and Niamey are capital 
coefficients much lower than in Dakar. This also explains why the MRKs are 
much lower for these countries. The low returns for Lomé, in contrast, are driven 
by a low profit-capital ratio. In the other countries, monthly capital returns are 
between 7 and 13 percent.  
These findings may be partly driven by differences in the industry composition of 
informal MSEs across countries (see Table 1-3 above). As our dataset is not large 
enough to include to full set of country-industry-capital interaction terms,
16
 Table 
1-8 reports the results from regressions that instead of country-capital interactions 
includes industry-capital interactions. We have aggregated industries into four 
categories: (1) Manufacturing, (2) construction, hotels, transport, (3) trade, and 




                                                 
15 All the results are robust to slight variations in the thresholds. 
16 Alternatively, one may analyze the variation within one industry and include country-capital interactions. 
The only industry with a sufficient number of observations for such an exercise is the trade sector. The 
results (not reported) confirm our main finding. Marginal returns to capital at low levels of capital stock 
exceed 65 % except in Lomé and Bamako (35 and 33 % respectively). 
17 Within these aggregate sectors, capital coefficients were found to be homogeneous. 





Table 1-8: Returns to capital – results from OLS including capital-industry interactions 
   All 
Capital < 150 
Int. USD 
Capital >150 
Int. USD & < 
1000 Int. USD 
Capital > 
1000 Int. USD 
Log capital 
0.205*** 0.363*** 0.288*** 0.510*** 
(0.018) (0.041) (0.038) (0.088) 
Log capital x 




0.096*** 0.155* 0.003 -0.136 
(0.026) (0.073) (0.050) (0.110) 
Trade 
0.007 -0.084 -0.034 -0.043 
(0.024) (0.054) (0.059) (0.139) 
Repair and 
other services 
-0.038 -0.235*** -0.034 -0.087 
(0.025) (0.059) (0.056) (0.130) 
Additional controls 
Log labour and Log labour-country interactions, Owner's 
education and owner's education-country interactions, Owner's 
experience, owner female, industry dummies, country dummies, 
country-industry interactions 
R-squared 0.3807 0.3339 0.3641 0.3961 
N 5091 2748 2338 932 
Implied MRK 
(at mean P 
and K) 




0.09 2.68 0.07 0.06 
Trade 0.10 1.35 0.06 0.07 
Repair and 
other services 
0.04 0.47 0.04 0.04 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
‘segment’-level (around 10 observations) in parentheses. MRK = marginal monthly return to 
capital. The full results are available from the authors on request. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
The results suggest that the cross-country heterogeneity identified above may 
indeed be partly explained by differences in industry compositions. Overall, we 
find much less heterogeneity in the capital coefficient across industries than 
across countries. In fact, at medium and high levels of capital none of the 
industry-capital interaction terms turns out to be significant (columns three and 
four of Table 1-8). Marginal returns at these levels of capital are 4 percent for the 
repair and other services sector, and 6 or 7 percent for all other sectors. In this 
specification, there is now more heterogeneity in returns at low levels of capital. 
However, even though MRKs fluctuate between 47 percent (for repair and other 
services) and 268 percent (for construction, hotels, and transport), the main 
finding from above is not altered: We consistently find very high marginal returns 
to capital at low levels of capital.
 18
 In the following, we discuss the robustness of 
the above results and present a number of additional robustness and specification 
checks. We first address the possible implications of how we measure our key 
                                                 
18 Semi-parametric estimates (not reported) confirm the identified patterns of capital returns. This approach 
also reveals considerable heterogeneity within the sub-samples. The estimates show that marginal returns are 
(extremely) high – up to several hundred percent – at (very) low levels of capital, but decline very rapidly. 





variables and the problem of missing or zero values for capital and profits. Then, 
we analyse parameter heterogeneity by gender. Finally, we address the possibility 
of omitted variable biases, in particular ability bias. 
Random measurement errors in profits and capital tend to bias the estimated 
coefficients towards zero, so this source of bias does not give rise to major 
concerns in light of the significant effects. It is difficult to judge whether and how 
measurement error changes with higher or lower levels of profits and capital 
stock. We think there is little reason to assume that measurement error is less 
pronounced at lower levels of capital stocks, which would then partly explain 
higher returns at lower levels of capital. For capital, we have briefly discussed the 
problem that capital might not just be used for business purposes. How this 
affects our estimates depends on whether non-business use is systematically 
higher or lower at higher levels of capital. One may argue that more expensive 
capital goods, like machines, are likely to be of exclusive use to the business. Yet, 
our estimates of similar capital returns across industries can be taken as evidence 
against systematic differences in non-business use of reported capital stock.
19
 
The inclusion of zero and missing values (as zeros) for the capital stock in the 
regressions lowers the estimated returns to capital, but the estimated coefficients 
still indicate very high but decreasing returns at low levels of capital. The 
coefficients on labour, education, and experience are much higher. The size of the 
sub-sample, which again is reduced by excluding influential outliers, increases by 
almost 1000 observations. We have also run Tobit regressions that explicitly 
model censoring, without major implications for the results. 
Heterogeneity in returns may also stem from gender differences, as shown for 
example by de Mel et al. (2008) for Sri Lankan MSEs. To test this hypothesis we 
also run regressions (on the entire and the split samples) that include – instead of 
country-capital or industry-capital interactions – interactions of key inputs with 
the female-owner dummy.
20
 For all inputs, including capital, the coefficients are 
only found to be significantly different for women at higher levels of capital 
stock. This also holds for capital profitability that is much higher for men than for 
women at higher levels of capital stock. This implies that marginal returns to 
capital are very high for both men and women at low levels of capital stock 
(albeit a bit lower for women). In both the medium and the high capital stock 
range, marginal returns in enterprises headed by women are much lower with 
about 2 percent compared to 8 and 7 percent for those headed by men. 
As explained above, our results may be biased because of other omitted variables. 
These biases, in particular, ability bias, cannot be easily removed. A first 
                                                 
19 We also distinguish between different types of capital goods (machines, transport means, or furniture) with 
no major implication with regard to our results. Similarly, including inventories in capital stocks does not 
affect the results. 
20 Note that female entrepreneurs account for 62 percent of low capital, 40 percent of medium capital, and 
only 26 percent of high capital entrepreneurs. 





straightforward attempt to solve this problem is to include ability proxies into the 
estimated equation. We have constructed two such proxies from the information 
available in the 1-2-3 surveys using principal component techniques. The first is 
an ’intellectual ability index‘, which includes information on literacy, language 
spoken at home, type of school (private or public), and father’s schooling. The 
second index proxies ‘financial literacy’ and is constructed using questions 
regarding the knowledge of credit and other financial products. A third index 
measures whether the household has a tradition of being engaged in a particular 
business. Including these proxies into our regression (not reported) does not affect 
the results.  
1.3.5. Returns to capital with a household fixed-effect 
 
An alternative to the inclusion of admittedly imperfect proxies to control for 
ability is to include a household fixed-effect into the above regressions. Quite a 
number of households own more than one enterprise, allowing us to explore the 
co-variation of profits and capital across firms within the same household, thus 
removing the omitted household-level variables from the estimated equation. This 
procedure may mitigate the ability bias if entrepreneurs in the same household are 
more similar to each other in terms of their ability than they are compared to 
entrepreneurs outside the household, which is quite plausible. 
An analysis of intra-household differences also allows us to test the assumption 
that factor returns are equated across different activities within the household. A 
rational household should equate returns, as otherwise pareto-improving factor re-
allocations would be possible. In other words, given fixed characteristics of the 
household certain constraints, for example credit or labour market constraints, 
faced by the individual entrepreneur should not be visible – within the 
household.
21
 If instead, we detect differences in marginal returns to capital, we 
can take this as suggestive evidence for inefficient capital allocations. 
Theoretically, such inefficiencies could arise, for example, due to non-
cooperative behaviour within the household. Optimal capital allocations, 
however, can also be consistent with differing marginal returns across activities in 
the presence of (a) some non-linearity in capital stocks that prevents the 
household from equalizing returns, or (b) risk and risk aversion. The above fairly 
smooth distributions of entry costs seem to suggest that non-linearities are 
unlikely to be of great importance in most of MSE activities, at least at lower 
levels of capital stock. Yet, if activities are associated with different risks and 
households choose to hold portfolios with different risks, they should equate risk-
adjusted returns. In this case, the fixed-effects estimates should reflect the 
differences in returns that can be attributed to risk differences. Finally, while risk 
                                                 
21 In this case, the no-log specification should render zero coefficients for capital, while the log-specification 
should allow us to test the equation of marginal returns using capital profitabilities. 





may be the main reason for (dπ/dK) to be different from zero within-households, 
it cannot be ruled out that single activities, in some cases operated by different 
individuals, are faced with different constraints, for example different access to 
capital. In sum, the below fixed-effects results should not only be seen as a 
robustness check and an attempt to address ability bias, but also as a first attempt 
to reveal the possible causes of the observed pattern of returns to capital. 
Before we discuss the results, it should be noted that the fixed-effects estimation 
is prone to selection bias because of the implied reduction of the sample to only 
those MSEs in households with more than one enterprise.  
The results of the fixed effects estimates are reported in Table 1-9. To start with, 
we have 946 households owning 2,079 enterprises (i.e. with at least two MSEs). 
Again, we exclude MSEs that report zero profits and/or zero capital and remove 
influential outliers from the respective (sub-) samples. In the case of the whole 
(sub) sample, this leads to a considerable reduction of the sample. The first set of 
estimates is based on only 600 households with 1,301 firms. In addition to the 
double-log specification from above, we now also estimate a model without 
taking logs. The coefficients in the ‘no log’ specification can directly be 
interpreted as the marginal return to capital.
22
 
Overall, the fixed-effects estimates yield similar results to the estimates without 
fixed-effects.
23
 Capital returns are of a similar magnitude at low levels of capital. 
In the no-log specification, marginal returns are about 90 percent. As non-
linearities in capital stocks are unlikely to explain these intra-household 
differences at low levels of capital stock, the identified returns may reflect the 
high risks associated with activities in this capital range. For the medium range, 
capital is not significant in either specification, but the magnitude is close to the 
above estimates. With monthly marginal returns of about 9 percent (last column 
of Table 1-9) the marginal returns at higher levels of capital are slightly higher 
than those obtained without fixed effects. At higher levels of capital, intra-
household differences may be due to activity-specific capital constraints, but non-
linearities, for example for machinery investment, are also likely to come into 
play. That returns are slightly higher in the fixed-effects model may, on the one 
hand, reflect the selection of more talented and entrepreneurial households into 
the sub-sample of those with at least two MSEs. It seems plausible that this 
selection effect is stronger at higher levels of capital. On the other hand, higher 
                                                 
22 Note that the sub-samples by capital size include only households, in which all enterprises have a capital 
stock that meets the sub-samples’ conditions, for example capital stock smaller than 150 Int. USD. 
23 This also holds when we estimate the earlier specification without fixed effects on the much smaller 
samples. In the interpretation of the fixed effects estimates it should be noted that the two key variables under 
consideration, profits and capital stock, are likely to be measured with error. This problem is reinforced when 
only within-household variation is being used. Such measurement error would bias the returns to capital 
towards zero; an effect that would be the opposite to the possible ability bias. 





returns may also stem from the ability of diversified households to take (some 
more) risks and earn higher returns.
24
  
The fixed-effects estimates hence support our finding of very high returns at low 
levels of capital. Of course, the reductions in sample size are considerable and 
one has to be careful not to draw too far-reaching conclusions from these 
estimates. Nonetheless, we do think that these results may also be taken as an 
indication that risk plays a major role in explaining the high returns at low levels 
of capital. 
                                                 
24 While capital stocks and profits between different MSEs within the same household (co-) vary enough to 
allow us to estimate the fixed-effects model, other characteristics, like education and experience (and to some 
extent experience) vary little within the household. In addition, some MSEs are operated by the same 
individual. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.3.6. Some more thoughts on the causes 
 
A thorough investigation of the causes of the observed pattern of capital returns 
goes beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future work. This section hence 
briefly presents only some suggestive evidence on the channels that might explain 
these patterns. More specifically, we assess the risks associated with activities at 
different levels of capital. Risks should be higher at low levels of capital if risk 
really explains the observed high returns, as suggested by the fixed-effects 
estimates. We then make an attempt to proxy capital constraints and again look at 
these proxies at different levels of capital. We would expect MSEs with low 
levels of capital to be more constrained than those with more capital. 
Although it is generally difficult to proxy risks – and more so in a cross-sectional 
dataset – our survey offers a number of possibilities to construct risk proxies. 
First, we construct ‘classical’ proxies for risk, the variation of profits or sales. We 
chose to measure this variation at the country-sector level, where industries are 
disaggregated as finely as possible while keeping the number of observations in 
each country-sector cell at least at 30. Such a procedure yields 123 country-sector 
cells, for which we compute the coefficients of variation in profits and sales. 
Second, we use business risk perceptions of the entrepreneur. Specifically, we set 
a ‘risk-of-closure dummy’ to 1 if an entrepreneur sees the lack of clients or too 
much competition as a major business risk – which about 60 percent of all MSEs 
do.
25
 The sample means of these – admittedly imperfect – risk proxies are 
reported in Table 1-10 for different levels of capital stock. 
Table 1-10: Risk proxies at different levels of capital stock 
  
Capital < 150 Int. 
USD 
Capital >150 Int. 
USD & < 1000 
Int. USD 
Capital > 1000 
Int. USD 
Coefficient of variation in 
sales 1.98 2.01 1.97 
Coefficient of variation in 
profits 2.04 1.93 1.91 
Perceived risk of closure 
due to lack of clients or too 
much competition 
(percent) 0.61 0.65 0.59 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1-10 support the view that risk may partly 
explain the observed pattern of returns. Both the coefficient of variation in profit 
and sales are lowest for higher levels of capital. The coefficient of variation of 
                                                 
25 The corresponding question in the survey reads ‘which are major threats to the existence of the MSE’. 





profits, likely the better indicator for risk, is higher for low levels of capital 
compared to the other two groups. High capital MSEs (with lower returns) are 
hence more frequently found in sectors with lower variation in profits. However, 
the differences in these indicators are far from being significant (the standard 
errors of the above means of the coefficients of variation are in a range of 0.5 to 
0.9). According to the third indicator, risk is not highest for activities at low 
levels of capital. The threats to business survival appear to be slightly stronger at 
medium levels of capital, a finding that does not fit with the idea of marginal 
returns reflecting high risks. 
More detailed analysis of the above risk indicators, for example by country or by 
capital profitability (not reported), does not render consistent results. This is also 
why we think that the presented evidence provides at best some weak support for 
risk as major factor behind the above pattern of capital returns. Yet, in our view, 
these non-findings can be attributed to some extent to the lack of adequate risk 
(and risk aversion) proxies as well as the rather simple empirical approach. 
Furthermore, the effects of risk on returns (and capital stocks) may interact with 
capital market constraints. This interaction is not measured in our analysis. 
Finally, we briefly examine the possible role of capital constraints in explaining 
the observed pattern. To this end, Table 1-11 reports three proxies of capital 
constraints, again by capital stock range. At least for low levels of capital, for 
which we find extremely high marginal returns, we would expect MSEs to be 
severely capital constrained. 
Table 1-11: Capital constraint proxies at different levels of capital stock (share) 
  
Capital < 150 Int. 
USD 
Capital >150 Int. 
USD & < 1000 
Int. USD 
Capital > 1000 
Int. USD 
No access to external 
capital 0.88 0.81 0.77 
Liquidity constraints 0.14 0.10 0.10 
Access to formal credit 0.03 0.03 0.07 
Share in lowest wealth 
quintile 0.26 0.16 0.09 
Share in highest wealth 
quintile 0.15 0.22 0.32 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
Table 1-11 shows that MSEs with low levels of capital stock are indeed more 
capital constrained than others. 88 percent of these firms have financed their 
capital stock only out of own savings without recourse to any source of external 
funds, including formal and informal credit, family funds or support from 







 This holds for 81 and 77 percent of firms at medium and high levels of 
capital stock, respectively. Similarly, 14 percent of the entrepreneurs report being 
liquidity constrained,
27
 compared to 10 percent in the other two groups. When we 
split up MSEs by the wealth of the households, in which they are operated, the 
empirical picture is also in line with expectations. Of the high capital MSEs, 32 
percent can be found in households in the highest wealth quintile. Yet, there are 
both rich households with low capital MSEs and poor households with high 
capital MSEs. 
While these findings are all in line with expectations, they hardly provide 
sufficient evidence of the importance of capital constraints. In fact, the 
descriptive statistics are somewhat fuzzy. The relatively high share of low-capital 
MSEs in high wealth households for example, may rather be taken as an 
indication that there are further factors explaining capital accumulation. For 
instance, as seen above, many households seem to practice extensive growth, i.e. 
they invest in several small or very small firms instead of setting up one large 
firm. This would mean that households are not capital constrained, but rather risk 
averse. Moreover and more generally, as McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) also 
pointed out, MSEs should, in principle, be able to re-invest their very high returns 
to accumulate capital. Capital constraints would then only partly be reflected in 
high returns. Intangible assets such as location, reputation and access to a network 
of reliable business partners are other unobserved factors which could play a role 
in explaining the high observed marginal returns. No suitable proxies for these 
factors are available in our dataset. 
1.4. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed the patterns of capital entry barriers into informal activities as 
well as returns to invested capital using a unique micro data set on informality 
covering seven urban centres in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our assessment of initial 
investment of MSEs suggests that most informal activities exhibit important entry 
barriers, at least when operating costs are taken into account. We can also identify 
a sub-sector for which fixed costs of entry are negligible. A relatively small 
fraction of informal entrepreneurs undertakes very substantial initial capital 
investments, in particular in the transport sector. These findings in conjunction 
with our descriptive analysis of MSE characteristics point at substantial 
heterogeneity among informal activities. 
We also find heterogeneous returns to capital. Marginal returns are extremely 
high at low levels of capital stock. In this capital range, we consistently find 
                                                 
26 For each item of capital stock, the entrepreneur is asked for the source of funding. From this information, 
we construct the dummy for ’No access to external capital’. 
27 The ‘liquidity constraints’ dummy is set to 1 if entrepreneurs perceive the lack of liquidity as a major 
threat to survival of their enterprise. 





marginal monthly returns of at least 70 percent. However, we also show that 
marginal returns decline very rapidly with increasing levels of invested capital. At 
capital stocks above 150 Int. USD, we find monthly marginal returns of four to 
seven percent using a simple OLS approach and around nine percent using a 
household fixed-effects estimator. The annualised return at higher levels of 
capital would thus be around 50 to 70 percent, which is much higher than the 
effective rates charged by typical micro-credit providers (between 15 and 25 
percent) and within the range of informal money lenders’ rates (60 percent and 
more). 
Our findings on returns are in line with earlier studies on small-scale activities 
from different contexts. We hence provide yet another piece of evidence that the 
informal sector does not primarily host small-scale activities with low capital 
stocks and close to zero returns, as suggested by our simple theoretical exposition 
and often articulated in the discourse on the informal sector. Rather, MSEs with 
very low capital stocks – or at least an important share of them – earn high returns 
and hence seem to have the potential to grow out of poverty. While our static 
analysis remains silent on this important dynamic dimension, we provide some 
evidence on the factors that hold back these entrepreneurs. 
We analyse in particular capital constraints and risk as possible causes of high 
returns at low levels of capital. While MSEs with low levels of capital stock are 
likely to be severely capital constrained, their access to capital is not different 
enough from other MSEs to explain the extreme differences in returns across the 
capital stock distribution. Our approach to assessing the role of risk is somewhat 
innovative, as we interpret our finding of high marginal returns at low levels of 
capital stock in a household fixed-effects profit function estimation to mainly 
result from differences in risks between the informal activities operated by the 
household. We provide some evidence in favour of a prominent role for risk in 
explaining high returns to capital in small-scale economic activities. Yet, this 
piece of evidence should be interpreted with care, as our results cannot be fully 
corroborated by other indicators of risks we consider. Finally, we understand this 
work as a first step towards a better understanding of the constraints and 
opportunities faced by informal entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa. A more 
detailed investigation into the causes of the heterogeneity in returns is needed in 
particular since informal activities are likely to remain the main income source of 
the  poor in that region in the decades to come. 
  






Table 1-12: Detailed results: Returns to capital 
 
All 
Capital < 150 Int. 
USD 
Capital >150 Int. 
USD & < 1000 Int. 
USD 















ln capital 0.180 0.021 0.290 0.049 0.343 0.167 0.493 0.117 
ln capital x Cotonou 0.049 0.034 -0.005 0.099 -0.105 0.218 -0.235 0.141 
ln capital x Ouagdougou 0.062 0.029 -0.006 0.074 -0.201 0.233 0.207 0.161 
ln capital x Adbidjan -0.002 0.034 -0.091 0.079 -0.450 0.215 -0.104 0.163 
ln capital x Bamako 0.080 0.033 0.089 0.075 -0.422 0.224 -0.036 0.216 
ln capital x Niamé 0.071 0.037 0.146 0.083 -0.411 0.246 -0.320 0.180 
ln capital x Lomé 0.049 0.030 -0.048 0.071 0.080 0.211 0.002 0.154 
ln labor 0.061 0.021 0.072 0.043 0.059 0.063 0.029 0.029 
ln labor x Cotonou 0.222 0.064 0.289 0.100 0.126 0.107 0.351 0.129 
ln labor x Ouagdougou 0.077 0.029 0.048 0.051 0.094 0.079 0.109 0.049 
ln labor x Adbidjan 0.090 0.042 0.093 0.067 0.193 0.090 -0.130 0.079 
ln labor x Bamako 0.113 0.034 0.146 0.071 0.075 0.072 0.030 0.045 
ln labor x Niamé 0.035 0.038 0.010 0.064 0.116 0.091 0.362 0.222 
ln labor x Lomé -0.062 0.028 -0.101 0.050 -0.054 0.071 0.214 0.049 
Onwer's eduction 0.029 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.074 0.020 0.069 0.021 
ln Owner's education x Cotonou 0.027 0.015 0.043 0.023 -0.061 0.031 0.018 0.029 
ln Owner's education x 
Ouagdougou 0.040 0.013 0.091 0.021 -0.025 0.031 -0.027 0.027 
ln Owner's education x Adbidjan -0.019 0.013 0.030 0.019 -0.070 0.028 -0.067 0.031 
ln Owner's education x Bamako -0.016 0.015 -0.007 0.020 -0.053 0.027 -0.017 0.036 
ln Owner's education x Niamé -0.039 0.016 0.025 0.024 -0.117 0.039 -0.106 0.046 
ln Owner's education x Lomé -0.001 0.013 0.019 0.019 -0.047 0.031 -0.011 0.031 
Owner's experience 0.020 0.002 0.017 0.003 0.026 0.005 0.016 0.006 
Female Owner -0.420 0.041 -0.379 0.054 -0.471 0.081 -0.339 0.110 
Benin -2.091 0.371 -2.306 0.581 -0.036 1.399 -0.506 1.198 
Burkina Faso -0.933 0.220 -0.644 0.360 0.852 1.430 -1.409 1.227 
Côte d'Ivoir -0.097 0.276 0.049 0.444 2.078 1.277 3.745 1.263 
Mali -0.649 0.250 -0.874 0.432 2.707 1.377 1.179 1.578 
Niger -0.505 0.252 -0.809 0.408 2.082 1.438 2.980 2.199 
Togo -0.783 0.215 -0.346 0.338 -0.757 1.283 -1.445 1.158 
Clothing and apparel 0.083 0.155 0.444 0.196 -0.079 0.232 0.979 0.318 
Other manufacturing & food 0.150 0.155 0.217 0.170 -0.326 0.295 1.309 0.352 
Construction 0.986 0.148 0.828 0.185 1.259 0.249 2.596 0.402 
Wholesale/retail shops 0.101 0.145 0.087 0.174 0.210 0.286 0.794 0.328 
Hotels and restaurants 0.731 0.187 0.420 0.256 1.088 0.354 1.193 0.400 
Repair services 0.511 0.146 0.528 0.145 0.773 0.324 0.553 0.348 
Transport 0.549 0.197 0.093 0.236 0.017 0.245 1.262 0.291 
Other services 0.260 0.133 0.381 0.146 -0.043 0.290 0.751 0.345 





Benin x Clothing and apparel -0.832 0.238 -1.252 0.299 -0.857 0.360 -0.907 0.440 
Burkina x Clothing and apparel -0.900 0.218 -1.526 0.269 -0.418 0.428 -0.917 0.529 
Côte x Clothing and apparel -0.423 0.229 -1.068 0.303 0.199 0.349 -2.372 0.603 
Mail x Clothing and apparel -0.355 0.212 -0.436 0.247 -0.553 0.400 -0.939 0.533 
Niger x Clothing and apparel -0.795 0.263 -0.507 0.297 -0.794 0.414     
Togo x Clothing and apparel -0.241 0.196 -0.572 0.263 0.108 0.370 -1.052 0.502 
Benin x Other manufacturing & 
food 0.039 0.232 -0.113 0.261 0.517 0.460 -0.485 0.498 
Burkina x Other manufacturing & 
food -0.143 0.204 -0.232 0.240 0.165 0.450 -1.402 0.489 
Côte x Other manufacturing & 
food -0.268 0.208 -0.574 0.241 0.629 0.435 -2.604 0.604 
Mail x Other manufacturing & 
food -0.405 0.204 -0.511 0.229 0.145 0.420 -1.151 0.511 
Niger x Other manufacturing & 
food -0.179 0.201 -0.177 0.214 0.288 0.410 -2.777 0.657 
Togo x Other manufacturing & 
food -0.050 0.218 -0.130 0.248 0.450 0.453 -0.746 0.588 
Benin x Construction -0.025 0.213 0.135 0.281 -0.354 0.369 -1.174 0.527 
Burkina x Construction -0.433 0.213 -0.652 0.297 -0.566 0.438 -1.867 0.526 
Côte x Construction -0.712 0.213 -0.666 0.251 -0.805 0.364 -2.441 0.659 
Mail x Construction -0.280 0.200 -0.343 0.237 -0.184 0.413 -1.509 0.647 
Niger x Construction -1.595 0.287 -2.152 0.344 -0.468 0.478 -3.427 0.568 
Togo x Construction -0.606 0.214 -0.519 0.261 -0.603 0.418     
Benin x Wholesale/retail shops -0.277 0.228 -0.599 0.271 -0.662 0.481 -0.259 0.439 
Burkina x Wholesale/retail shops 0.195 0.221 0.169 0.280 0.185 0.503 -0.624 0.502 
Côte x Wholesale/retail shops 0.105 0.219 -0.040 0.261 0.387 0.427 -1.858 0.622 
Mail x Wholesale/retail shops -0.188 0.242 0.187 0.311 -0.453 0.502 -0.759 0.567 
Niger x Wholesale/retail shops 0.298 0.243 -0.263 0.266 1.182 0.414 -1.856 0.535 
Togo x Wholesale/retail shops -0.098 0.192 -0.076 0.236 0.015 0.421 -0.627 0.516 
Benin x Hotels and restaurants 0.184 0.244 0.246 0.327 -0.341 0.511 0.710 0.519 
Burkina x Hotels and restaurants -0.327 0.236 -0.249 0.325 -0.567 0.488 -0.618 0.536 
Côte x Hotels and restaurants -0.312 0.244 -0.549 0.363 -0.342 0.465 -1.300 0.619 
Mail x Hotels and restaurants -0.410 0.259 -0.237 0.348 -0.864 0.482     
Niger x Hotels and restaurants -0.167 0.251 0.418 0.287 -0.263 0.561     
Togo x Hotels and restaurants -0.049 0.246 0.303 0.319 0.101 0.550 -1.692 0.568 
Benin x Repair services -0.683 0.223 -1.017 0.320 -0.608 0.455 -0.274 0.431 
Burkina x Repair services -0.611 0.214 -0.953 0.255 -0.728 0.454 -0.452 0.512 
Côte x Repair services -0.533 0.228 -0.234 0.298 -0.877 0.441 -1.332 0.581 
Mail x Repair services -0.717 0.203 -0.763 0.244 -0.817 0.453 -0.010 0.630 
Niger x Repair services -1.026 0.242 -1.383 0.316 -1.575 0.468 -1.241 0.771 
Togo x Repair services -0.847 0.224 -0.524 0.266 -1.177 0.470 -1.366 0.593 
Benin x Transport -0.414 0.252     0.355 0.459 -0.551 0.384 
Burkina x Transport -0.559 0.266         -1.659 0.480 
Côte x Transport 0.110 0.281 1.275 0.366 0.834 0.422 -1.845 0.522 
Mail x Transport -0.548 0.292 0.085 0.289 -1.048 0.398 -1.034 0.683 
Niger x Transport -1.413 0.276 -1.910 0.332     -3.374 0.495 
Togo x Transport -0.079 0.261     0.460 0.508 -0.702 0.462 
Benin x Other services -0.244 0.205 0.049 0.272 -0.194 0.467 -0.535 0.450 
Burkina x Other services 0.050 0.220 -0.139 0.247 0.878 0.510 -0.686 0.599 





Côte x Other services -0.139 0.186 -0.247 0.203 0.256 0.436 -1.890 0.583 
Mail x Other services -0.280 0.194 -0.424 0.209 0.741 0.431 -1.750 0.599 
Niger x Other services -1.628 0.225 -1.516 0.261 -1.284 0.479 -2.931 0.569 
Togo x Other services -0.396 0.190 -0.636 0.221 0.010 0.428 -0.761 0.514 
Constant 3.737 0.160 3.429 0.256 2.393 1.000 0.614 0.897 
N 5082   2742   1400   935   
R-squared 0.392   0.339   0.350   0.425   
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 survey (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
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2. Gender and the allocation of labour and capital in informal 






This paper tests whether households allocate capital and labour between informal 
enterprises headed by women and those headed by men in a pareto efficient way. 
To test for pareto efficiency we follow closely and apply an approach used by 
Udry (1996) in an agricultural setting to a data set of informal enterprises in urban 
areas of seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Controlling for household 
characteristics (observable and unobservable), sectoral differences and enterprise 
characteristics we find that profits of female headed enterprises are between 40 
and 25 percent lower than the profits of male headed enterprises. This result is 
inconsistent with pareto efficiency. Our results show that total profits from 
informal enterprises could be about 20 percent higher if resources were allocated 
optimally within the household. Our simulations and results from an Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition show that the inefficient allocation of capital explains 
most of the gender gap. 
  
                                                 
 Based on joint work with Nina Fenton. 
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2.1. Introduction  
 
Many city dwellers in developing countries generate income in informal 
household enterprises.
28
 In the seven economic centres in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) analysed in this paper, these enterprises account for around 75 percent of 
employment. Numerous constraints impede these enterprises from growing and 
hence prevent people from escaping from poverty. See for instance Grimm et al. 
(2010) and Grimm et al. (2011) for studies that examine kinship ties, low returns 
to capital and entry barriers as potential external constraints for these 
entrepreneurs. This paper focuses on constraints facing female entrepreneurs. 
These may include prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory behaviour, which can 
affect the intra-household allocation of inputs (Amine and Straub, 2010). 
Constraints facing female entrepreneurs are examined not only as an explanation 
for low incomes of women, but also as a constraint to maximization of household 
incomes: inefficient resource allocation reduces total household profits.   
This study is motivated by findings by Grimm et al. (2011) using the same data 
set that will be analysed in this chapter. Two findings of this study hint at 
inefficient resource allocations within households. Firstly, returns to capital are 
not equalised within households. Secondly, the study shows that informal 
enterprises have high returns to capital at low levels of capital stock and lower 
returns at higher levels of capital stock. The percentage of female business 
owners in the entire sample is 50 percent but only 30 percent of enterprises in the 
highest capital stock segment are headed by a woman. These findings together 
suggest that the allocation of capital is inefficient and a re-allocation of capital 
from the male dominated enterprises with high capitals stocks to the female 
dominated enterprises with low capital stocks, and therefore high returns to 
capital, could make a household better off.  
Therefore, this paper investigates the role of gender plays in determining the 
allocation of household resources across different informal enterprises in urban 
areas of seven countries in SSA. We follow closely the approach of Udry (1996), 
who found that about 6 percent of output is lost due to inefficient allocation of 
resources, in a rural area. Applying this to an urban setting and controlling for 
household characteristics (both observable and unobservable), sectoral 
differences and enterprise characteristics we find that profits of female headed 
enterprises are between 25 and 40 percent lower than profits of male headed 
enterprises. This effect is large in magnitude and inconsistent with pareto 
efficiency. In a final step we estimate a baseline constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) production function and compare predicted profits using the actual and 
                                                 
28 In Brilleau et al. (2005) and in this paper, informal sector employment is understood to comprise 
employment in firms that neither have formal written accounts nor are registered with the tax administration.  
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optimal resource allocations. Our results show that profits from informal 
enterprises could be up to 20 percent higher if resources were allocated optimally 
within households. The potential increase in profits is mostly driven by a re-
allocation of capital from the male headed to the female headed enterprise. The 
results from an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition show that about 60 percent of the 
differences in profits occur due to differences in endowments (particularly the 
unequal distribution of capital) of enterprises headed by mean and enterprises 
headed by women. Hence, the main driver for the inefficiencies we observe is the 
unequal distribution of capital between male and female entrepreneurs together 
with decreasing returns to capital. A comparison with the results of Udry (1996), 
which found that 6 percent of output was lost due to inefficiencies in intra-
household allocation, supports the view that these inefficiencies based on gender 
are even greater in urban than in rural areas.  
 
However, our results on the gains from redistribution need to be interpreted with 
caution. Findings from randomised control trials shows that additional capital 
does not have an effect on female headed enterprises with an initial capital stock 
below a certain threshold (Fafchamps et al., 2011; Karlan and Zinman, 2010; De 
Mel et al., 2009). Our findings rule out differences in sectors, productions 
functions, endowments, and unobservable household level characteristics as an 
explanation for the difference in resource allocation between male and female 
headed enterprises. However, different preferences of male and female 
entrepreneurs may also play a role in explaining the differences between male and 
female headed enterprises that we observe. For example, time differences may 
differ between male and female entrepreneurs. This could lead to a resource 
allocation that appears inefficient. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief 
review of relevant findings in the literature on how gender differences affect 
resource allocation within households. In Section 2.3 we adapt the theoretical 
approach taken by Udry (1996) to our urban context of informal enterprises. 
Section 2.4 shows the empirical results and section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Testing for efficiency using different theoretical approaches 
To be able to develop testable hypotheses regarding the efficiency of intra-
household resource allocation a theoretical model with assumptions that are 
realistic for an urban, developing country context is needed. Much of the 
economics literature has modelled households as one unit, maximizing a 
household utility function. This ‘unitary’ model implies either that preferences 
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are identical within households, or that one ‘dictator’ makes decisions on the 
allocation of the pooled resources. The assumptions of the unitary model have 
been broadly rejected by empirical evidence (Schultz, 1990). Consequently, so-
called ‘collective’ models have been developed to allow for the possibility that 
household members have different preferences. Different levels of bargaining 
power have been introduced to describe intra household resource allocation 
mechanisms. It is important to note that even under the assumptions of these 
models, the allocation of resources within the household is still found to be pareto 
efficient in theory (Browning and Chiappori, 1998). 
The predictions of the collective model have been tested in various regional 
contexts. Early examples from developed countries include studies by 
Bourguignon et al. (1993) using French data, Browning and Chiappori (1998) 
using Canadian data, Lundberg et al. (1997) using data from the United Kingdom 
and Thomas and Chen (1994) using data from Taiwan. These studies confirm that 
the predicted outcomes of the collective model hold, including efficient allocation 
of resources. Outcomes consistent with the collective model have also been found 
in developing country contexts. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), for example, 
use data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia and South Africa. They proxy 
household member bargaining power by assets and education brought into the 
marriage. In the unitary model nothing but total household income should 
influence the demand of the household. However, analysing the effect of 
bargaining power on household expenditures shows that assets controlled by 
women or men affect household expenditures in different ways in three out of 
four countries. But, despite the evidence that bargaining power matters, they 
cannot reject the hypothesis that allocations of expenditures are pareto efficient in 
all four countries, which suggests that a collective model is appropriate.  
One prominent study that rejects pareto efficiency is Udry (1996).
29
 Using data 
collected by the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) he tests the hypothesis that yields of different land plots are identical 
within households, controlling for plot characteristics and crop type. This 
hypothesis is rejected. Yields on plots of the same crop, within the same 
household, are significantly lower when that plot is controlled by a woman. On 
average the yield of female-controlled plots is less than 70 percent of the yield on 
plots controlled by men. This finding is inconsistent with efficiency. The study 
finds that one of the reasons for lower yields on plots controlled by women is 
inefficient allocation of inputs. Fertilizer is much more intensively used on plots 
controlled by mean than on plots controlled by women. As fertilizer shows 
diminishing returns, output could be higher if more fertilizer were allocated to the 
                                                 
29 Akresh (2005) also finds inefficient resource allocations within households in the regions where the data 
used by Udry (1996) was collected. However, using the nationally representative sample of Burkina Faso, 
Akresh (2005) cannot detect pareto-inefficiencies in the rest of the country. 
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women’s plots. Furthermore, the magnitude of the loss due to inefficiencies is 
computed by estimating a CES production function and comparing actual yields 
with the yields that are predicted if resources were optimally allocated. Using this 
methodology Udry (1996) shows that 6 percent of output is lost due to inefficient 
input allocations. 
Similarly a study by Goldstein and Udry (2008) on Ghana shows that women 
seldom have sufficient political power to ensure that their land is not 
expropriated. Since plots are likely to be taken away when they are fallow, 
women tend to leave their plots fallow for shorter periods and invest less than 
would be optimal. This study confirms that allocations of resources within 
households are often inefficient and that the gender dimension plays a major role 
in explaining these inefficiencies.  
Another example is Andrews et al. (2010). From their theoretical model the 
authors show that in the case of pareto-efficiency the marginal rates of 
substitution of male and female labour should be equated over the crops within 
the household. The authors use data from the Uganda National Household Survey 
of 2005 and 2006. The study detects a gender division between cash crops and 
food crops. This gender division can be pareto efficient if labour is allocated 
according to comparative advantage and in line with the production technology 
available. However, the empirical tests reveal that pareto improvements would be 
possible if labour inputs were reallocated across plots and partners compensated 
adequately.The finding that gender differences play an important role is 
supported by a recent stream of literature that uses randomised experiments to 
analyse gender differences in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). These 
experiments randomly allocate cash or in-kind transfers to enterprises and analyse 
the effects on the firms. Such experiments have been carried out in Ghana 
(Fafchamps et al., 2011), Sri Lanka (De Mel et al., 2009) and the Philippines 
(Karlan and Zinman, 2010). The results from Ghana show that there is no effect 
of randomly allocated grants in enterprises run by woman with initial profits 
below the median. For enterprises run by men however, both grants and in-kind 
transfers have a significant and positive effect in profits. In Sri Lanka, men invest 
the randomly allocated grants and as a consequence profits rise by up to 14 
percent of the grant amount. Women, in contrast, only invest large grants but do 
not earn any return on this investment. In the Philippines randomly allocated 
microcredit increases profits only in male led enterprises which in turn use the 
extra money to send the children to school. The loans have no effect on 
enterprises led by women. 
Evidence on reasons for the gender gaps detected in these experimental studies is 
scarce. In Ghana it seems that capital alone is not enough boost enterprise growth 
in subsistence enterprises. In Sri Lanka, the evidence shows that the sectoral 
division of male and female headed enterprises may play a role as female headed 
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enterprises operate in sectors where enterprises invest less and returns to 
investment are low. Finally, the findings presented in the first chapter of this 
thesis suggest that gender differences may play a role for resource allocation 
within households as marginal returns to capital are not equalised within 
household enterprises and the gender dummy is negative and significant in most 
specifications. However, the evidence from urban areas is still limited. In this 
paper we try to narrow this research gap. To test for efficiency we adopt the 
methodology used by Udry (1996) and apply it to an urban context in seven 
countries in SSA. 
This evidence on gender differences in informal enterprises will contribute to an 
evidence-based assessment of the gender impacts of micro-finance policies, and 
the effectiveness of targeting women for these and other interventions.  
 
2.3. Theoretical background 
 
To derive testable hypotheses on the efficiency of intra household resource 
allocation we follow very closely the theoretical model developed by Udry 
(1996), adapted slightly to the urban context.
30
  
In our model the household comprises 2 members, denoted by subscript j. One 
member is female and the other is male (  stands for the woman,   stand for the 
man) with individual utility functions        {   }.
31
 These utility functions 
depend on the consumption of a vector of private goods   bought in the market. 
Each household member cares about the private consumption of the other 
household member, to some degree. The labour supply of each household 
member is denoted by   . Hence, the utility functions of the household members 
can be written as: 
                          (2.1) 
Household production by informal enterprises 
We assume that the goods these urban households produce are produced by two 
informal enterprises rather than agricultural plots, as assumed in Udry (1996). 
One enterprise is led by a woman and the other is headed by a man. We let the 
superscript      {   } denote the two enterprises, and    denote profit in that 
enterprise. Hence, the overall household profits (    can be written as: 
                                                 
30 An overview on different versions of collective household models can be found in Apps and Rees (2009). 
In addition to Udry (1996), models similar to the one used here are also used by Browning and Gørtz (2010) 
and also by Andrews et al. (2010). 
31 All subscripts refer to persons, whereas superscripts refer to enterprises. 
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   ∑      
    
    
                  (2.2) 
  
  and   
  stand for male and female labour,   
  for hired labour,    for capital 
and a vector of enterprises characteristics   . We assume male, female and hired 
labour to be homogenous in terms of productivity
32
. This means that the equation 
can be simplified to: 
   ∑                          (2.3) 
Where      
    
    
  
 
The assumption that different types of labour are homogenous in productivity 
could be invalid for a number of reasons. Firstly, workers may have different 
skills. For example, hired labour could be more productive than the labour of the 
owner if the additional workers are hired because they have specific skills which 
make them more productive. Second, principal-agent problems may apply. Hired 
workers will be less motivated than enterprise owners if their wage is not related 
to enterprise profits. For similar reasons, women may be less productive when 
working in male-led enterprises than when working in their own enterprises, and 
vice versa.  
Notwithstanding these considerations it will be appropriate to work on the basis 
of this assumption for several reasons. Firstly, only around 30 percent of 
enterprises in our sample hire any employees at all, and the average number of 
employees hired is low, at around 2. Most (around 75 percent) have only one or 
two employees. In addition roughly half of the employees are family members. It 
seems highly likely that benefits family employees receive from their 
employment are correlated with enterprise profits, either in the short or the longer 
term, through wages received and through solidarity for family members. Even 
those employees who are not household members are likely to be well known to 
the household, and to make up part of the same community. Hence, we argue that 
moral hazard is likely to be attenuated even among these non-related employees 
by strong social ties.
33
 Secondly, given the high proportion of family members 
employed, it seems unlikely that skills are the primary motivation for hiring 
employees. In addition, the hired employees do not differ greatly from the 
enterprise owners in terms of their years of education. Finally, our results hold 
even if we restrict the sample to enterprises without employees.
34
  
                                                 
32 Jacoby (1991) uses data on peasant households in Peru and shows that female and male labour cannot be 
aggregated, because farm inputs affect marginal productivity of male and female farmers differently. In our 
data set no female entrepreneurs work in the enterprise of the male entrepreneur and vice versa. Male 
enterprise owners predominantly employ men and the same is true for women. Therefore, we do not 
aggregate male and female labour. 
33 There exists a recent stream of literature on the importance of kinship ties and their effects on consumption 
and investment. Recent examples include di Falco and Bulte (2009, 2011) and Grimm et al. (2010).  
34 Results available from the author on request. 
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Principal-agent issues may exist in practice even where household members work 
in a family enterprise. However, the other assumptions of our model, particularly 
the assumption that the members maximise a joint production function and care to 
some extent about the utility of other members and the consumption of the 
household good imply that this does not occur. If the predictions of the model fail 
to hold, a principal-agent problem arising from failure of the key assumptions is 
one possible explanatory factor. 
The other key assumption for the model is that, although households do hire 
labour, the amount of labour hired is fixed in the short to medium term and the 
enterprise owners do not work outside of the enterprise. We make this assumption 
because we concentrate on the allocation of labour between the enterprises, rather 
than examining the question of whether the amount of labour the household uses 
is efficient. In addition we can see that, in practice, most of the enterprise owners 
work full-time (8 hours on average assuming 6 working days per week) in their 
own enterprises, so either they are unable to access the outside labour market and 
hence spend their time in their own enterprise, or working in the enterprise is 
more attractive, leaving them with no time to work in the labour market. 
However, the main predictions of the model do not depend on the existence of a 
labour market, since factors can be re-allocated within the household (Udry, 
1996; Andrews et al., 2010). 
We assume that the household’s capital endowment is fixed in the short term, so 
        . This is justified as access to capital markets among enterprises in 
the sample has been shown to be weak (see Chapter 1).
35
 In addition, as with 
labour, we are interested in the efficiency of allocation of capital between the 
household enterprises, not between different households, so this assumption is 
unimportant for our predictions.
 36
 
In contrast to Udry (1996)    does not represent the plot area but enterprise 
characteristics. Such characteristics include the experience and education of the 
enterprise head. 
Given our assumption that the entrepreneurs do not participate in the labour 
market but only work in the informal enterprise, the time constraint for the two 
household members can be written as: 
    ∑   
 
    (2.4)  and        ∑   
 
    (2.5) 
We assume a one period game. Therefore, the household can neither borrow nor 
save. The household budget constraint is: 
              (2.6) 
                                                 
35 Roughly 80 percent of all enterprises in the sample have financed their capital stock from savings or 
retained profits, without any external funding. 
36 Andrews et al. (2010) make a similar assumption for the input factor, land. 
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Subject to household production (2.3), time (2.4) and budget constraints (2.5) a 
pareto-efficient allocation of resources within the household solves
37
: 
   
     
    
    
              for         (2.7) 
Given the described setup, the allocation of labour and capital across the 
enterprises within the household solves: 
            
∑      
    
                  (2.8) 
subject to        
    
         
We follow further the approach by Udry (1996) and assume that the production 
functions of these enterprises are concave and strictly increasing in    If we then 
assume that both enterprises have the same characteristics, resources would be 
divided equally between enterprises. Labour and capital allocation and hence 
profit of the two enterprises within households depend on only enterprise 
characteristics. We can define the profits of the enterprise   in the solution of (7) 
as follows: 
  (  )    [  
 (  )   
 (  )   (  )   ]       [   ]  (2.9) 
   is the profit of the enterprise   , given the values of   
    
  and    (labour and 
capital allocations) that solve (2.7). These allocations depend only on enterprise 
characteristics. Denoting the mean of    by  ̅ within the household and allowing 
enterprise characteristics to vary within the household we can write (2.8) as 
follows using a first order Taylor approximation: 
  (  )       ̅   
     ̅ 
  
       ̅        [   ]   (2.10) 
 
Equation (2.9) shows that the equation that should be estimated measures the 
deviation of enterprise profits from the mean enterprise profit as a function of the 
deviation of enterprise characteristics from mean enterprise characteristics within 
the household. This is the fixed effects estimator. For our estimation we can re-
write (2.9) as follows: 
 
                                  (2.11) 
 
In (2.10)      is the profit of enterprise   in household  .   is a vector of 
enterprise characteristics that we regard as exogenous.
38
 These characteristics 
include the experience and education of the enterprise head.      is a dummy 
                                                 
37   can be interpreted as the so called pareto weight and represents the extent to which the respective partner 
can influence the decision process within the household (Browing and Gørtz, 2010 and Apps and Rees, 
2009). 
38 Endogeneity of enterprise characteristics is a potential problem. Unfortunately the available data do not 
allow us to use an instrumental variable approach to control or this. 
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variable that indicates the gender of the enterprise head.    captures effects of 
unobservable differences across households (such as household wealth) and      is 
an error term, assumed to be randomly distributed. From our theoretical setup we 
expect    . This is the main hypothesis tested in this paper: Controlling for 
enterprise characteristics, profits in informal enterprises in the same household 
(controlled by different members of the household) are equal.  
2.4. Empirical analysis 
2.4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The data we use for our empirical analysis stem from a set of surveys (1-2-3 
surveys or Enquêtes 1-2-3) in seven economic capitals of the West-African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in the early 2000s.
39 
A 1-2-3 survey is 
a multi-layer survey organised in three phases and specially designed to study the 
informal sector.
40 
 Phase 1 is a representative labour force survey collecting 
detailed information on individual socio-demographic characteristics and 
employment. Phase 2 is a survey which interviews a representative sub-sample of 
informal production units identified in Phase 1. The focus of the second phase is 
on the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their production units, including 
the characteristics of employed workers. It also contains detailed information on 
input use, investment, sales, and profits. Phase 3 is a household expenditure 
survey interviewing (again) a representative sub-sample of Phase 1. The dataset 
from all three phases are organised in such a way that they can be linked.  
For this paper we use data from Phase 2 which is a sample of informal 
entrepreneurs in urban centres of seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brilleau 
et al., 2005). The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as production units 
that (a) do not have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered with the 
tax administration. Part (b) of this definition varies slightly between countries, as 
registration may not always refer to registration with tax authorities. Table 2-1 is 
based on our sample of 6,521 firms and shows employment by company type. It 
shows the importance of informal enterprises for employment in urban centres in 
the seven countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in our sample in the early 2000s. 
Averaged over all countries in the sample, private informal firms are responsible 
for more than 70 percent of employment. In Cotonou and Lomé employment by 
informal firms exceeds 80 percent of employment. Pure ‘self-employment’ on 
average accounts for about 70 percent of these workers. The remaining 30 percent 
                                                 
39 These urban economic centres are Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoir), Bamako (Mali), Cotonou (Benin), Dakar 
(Senegal), Niamey (Niger), Lomé (Togo) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). The surveys were carried out by 
AFRISTAT and the National Statistical Institutes (INS) with the support of Developpement Institutions & 
Mondalisation (DIAL) as part of the Regional Program of Statistical Support for Multilateral Surveillance 
(PARSTAT) between 2001 and 2003. For a more detailed description of the data see Brilleau, et al. (2005a). 
40 See Roubaud (2008) for a detailed assessment of this type of survey instrument. 
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are split almost equally between enterprises that employ family workers and non-
family workers. 
Table 2-1: Employment by sector in seven urban centers in Sub-Saharan Africa (percent) 
Principal 
employment 
Cotonou Ouaga. Abidjan Bamako Niamey Dakar Lomé Total 
Public 
administration 
6.3 10.4 5.5 7.5 13.5 5.7 5.2 6.6 
Public firm 2.2 2.3 1.1 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.3 1.8 
Private formal firm 9.9 11.8 17.6 11.4 11.8 15.0 10.5 14.2 
Private informal 
firm 
80.3 73.4 74.7 77.5 71.1 76.4 81.0 76.2 
of which         
Owners 63.7 67.5 60.4 73.4 72.2 65.2 68.6 65.0 
Family workers 19.2 16.3 16.1 8.6 14.5 17.6 13.6 15.5 
Non-family 
workers 
17.1 16.2 23.5 18.0 13.3 17.2 17.8 19.5 
Associations 1.3 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.2 
Source: Brilleau et al. (2005), and authors’ computations based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 
2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, INS). 
Following the model described in Section 2.2 we restrict the sample to 
households that have exactly two enterprises, one managed by a woman and one 
by a man. The results will be prone to selection bias as we reduce the 
representative sample of about 6,521 firms to 922 firms in 461 households. It 
could be that these households are more entrepreneurial than households with 
only one enterprise. In such a case we would expect estimates of input factors to 
be upwardly biased. An upward bias could also be created by the fact that 
households with more than one enterprise are better able to diversify risks. In 
addition, the results are prone to downward bias caused by measurement error. 
This bias is increased by reducing the sample size. To check for possible selection 
biases we estimated all specifications for the entire sample and also for sub-
samples containing; households with more than 2 enterprises, and; households 
with enterprises headed by a female or male entrepreneur.
41
 All results are robust 
to this sample variation. Certainly our results should be interpreted with caution 
due to the relatively small sample size. Nonetheless, the fact that the results are 
robust across various samples is encouraging. 
Profit is defined as value added and is computed as sales minus input costs 
including expenses for products for re-sale.
42
 Note that labour costs and interest 
                                                 
41 This sub-sample contains about 1,300 firms in about 600 households. 
42 Input costs are measured in detail and include the following items: raw materials, materials for re-sale, 
rent, water, gas, electricity, telephone, fuel, tools, transport insurance, repair costs, taxes, patents and other 
charges and fees. 
Gender and the allocation of labour and capital in informal enterprises: Evidence 




payments are not deducted.
43
 Capital is measured by the replacement value of 
capital stock. Labour input is measured in hours worked in the enterprise per 
month by the owner and all employees. The reference period for all of the 
variables is one month. All monetary values are in international US Dollars (Int. 
USD).
44
 Table 2-2 shows that the average monthly value added of a male 
entrepreneur in the wholesale or retail sector is 576 Int. USD monthly compared 
to 329 Int. USD for the average female entrepreneur. The distribution between 
firms with pure ‘self-employment’ and firms that employ either family or non-
family workers remains similar after restricting the sample. The main enterprise 
characteristics of this sub-sample are shown in Table 2-2.  
  
                                                 
43 To check for the robustness of our results we also deducted labour costs. When controlling for labour 
inputs we excluded paid labour hours. The results are robust to this variation. Results are available from the 
author on request. 
44 PPP conversion rates from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank (World Bank, 2013) 
have been used. 
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Clothing and apparel                 
mean 450.8 166.5 1035.6 556.9 224.7 146.7 2.1 1.6 0.51 
median 104.3 59.9 370.8 87.6 240.0 147.0 1.0 1.0 1.00 
N 49 50 49 50 49 50 49 50 99 
Other 
Manufacturing 
        mean 536.4 147.9 2170.5 198.0 198.7 177.0 2.3 1.3 0.47 
median 148.6 57.7 211.3 39.9 208.0 150.0 2.0 1.0 0.00 
N 79 71 79 71 79 71 79 71 150 
Construction 
         mean 1174.6 0.0 446.7 0.0 176.5 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.00 
median 372.8 0.0 96.6 0.0 192.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.00 
N 69 0 69 0 69 0 69 0 69 
Wholesale/ retail 
        mean 576.8 329.4 924.3 1380.1 241.4 189.5 1.7 1.3 0.48 
median 214.7 93.7 199.7 36.6 258.0 189.0 1.0 1.0 0.00 
N 41 38 41 38 41 38 41 38 79 
Petty trading 
        mean 370.4 135.8 325.6 109.4 212.4 190.5 1.3 1.1 0.83 
median 79.9 44.9 23.1 19.2 233.0 180.0 1.0 1.0 1.00 
N 45 217 45 217 45 217 45 217 262 
Hotels and restaurants 
       
mean 624.6 345.2 1961.6 296.2 277.2 194.5 1.9 1.7 0.82 
median 664.4 136.9 1197.9 123.1 270.0 192.0 2.0 1.0 1.00 
N 9 40 9 40 9 40 9 40 49 
Repair 
services 
         mean 231.8 507.7 1901.3 68.1 231.4 200.0 2.4 2.0 0.0 
median 123.1 507.7 231.8 68.1 240.0 200.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
N 53 1 53 1 53 1 53 1 54 
Transport 
         mean 1096.3 14950.0 6689.5 21385.4 227.7 84.0 1.7 1.0 0.02 
median 452.8 14950.0 2993.9 21385.4 240.0 84.0 1.0 1.0 0.00 
N 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 61 
Other 
services 
         mean 291.7 123.9 1399.3 332.8 175.0 143.4 1.6 1.3 0.43 
median 161.4 84.9 84.5 15.4 192.0 155.0 1.0 1.0 0.00 
N 56 43 56 43 56 43 56 43 99 
Total 
         mean 620.0 207.0 1960.4 359.5 209.5 179.3 2.0 1.3 0.5 
median 177.2 61.5 239.4 30.7 216.0 180.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 
N 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 461 922 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
On average the value added of an enterprise headed by a man is about three times 
as high as the value added in the average female headed enterprise. This ratio is 
similar when using the median value of value added. Even larger differences can 
be found when examining the differences in capital stocks. The average capital 
stock of a male headed enterprise is about 5.5 times bigger than the average 
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capital stock of a female headed enterprise. Both distributions of capital stock and 
value added are heavily skewed. Median values are much smaller than the 
respective means. 
When comparing the labour inputs by the gender of the enterprises owners we 
cannot detect big differences. Assuming six working days per week, both male 
and female entrepreneurs work about 8 hours daily. Firm size (which includes the 
owner) is slightly bigger in male headed enterprises. On average male headed 
enterprise have 1 employee compared to 0.3 in female headed enterprises. Again, 
the average is driven by a few firms that have a large number of employees. The 
majority of the firms do not have employees. One of the most important findings 
for our analysis, shown in Table 2, is the unequal distribution of female and male 
headed enterprises by sector. In construction, repair services and transport there 
are virtually no female enterprise heads whereas the sectors of ‘hotels and 
restaurants’ and ‘petty trading’ are dominated by female entrepreneurs.  
These descriptive statistics show two relevant findings. First, in some capital 
intensive sectors (e.g. transport) there are virtually no female enterprise owners. 
Second, male headed enterprises in all sectors have larger capital stocks and value 
added, whereas labour inputs by male and female enterprise owners do not differ 
substantially. This fact, combined with the findings of decreasing marginal 
returns to capital in all sectors, suggests inefficient resource allocations within 
households.  
2.4.2. Econometric analysis 
 
We now test formally for efficiency. We estimate the following equation, derived 




                                  (2.12) 
 
In (2.12)      is the value added of enterprise   in household  .   is a vector of 
enterprise characteristics (experience and education of the enterprise head).      is 
a dummy variable that indicates the gender of the enterprise head.    captures 
effects of unobservable differences across households (such as household wealth) 
and      is an error term, assumed to be random.
46
 The hypothesis is that the value 
added in an enterprise led by a woman does not differ from the value added of a 
                                                 
45 Zero and missing values for value added, labour and capital have been excluded in order to avoid a 
downward bias. However, running the regression with missing values as zeros did not affect the overall 
findings. 
46 In all regressions, we drop influential outliers from our sample (and sub-samples). These outliers are 
identified by the DFITS-statistic. As suggested by Belsley et al. (1980), we use a cutoff-value |     |    
 √  ⁄  with, k the degrees of freedom (plus 1) and N, the number of observations. By applying this 
approach to correct for influential outliers our sample is reduced by about three to five percent.  
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male headed enterprise in the same household, after controlling for enterprise 
characteristics (   ). 
 
The results of estimating (2.12) are reported in the first column of in Table 2-3. 
For every specification we also report the mean and standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. The results reported in column 1 show that value added in 
female headed enterprises are significantly lower (by about 230 Int. USD) than 
value added in male headed enterprises, even when controlling for all household 
characteristics using a fixed effects specification. The difference is equivalent to 
70 percent of mean value added.  
Table 2-3: OLS fixed effects estimates, dependent variable value-added on enterprise level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  








561.19 445.63 600.64 223.34 
Owner 
Female -233.903***  -196.996***  -79.801* -61.069*** 
 
(38.922)  (49.316)     (41.440) (21.319) 
Owner's 
education 5.188     3.232     9.107 5.996 
 
(7.780)   (6.209)     (7.009) (4.660) 
Owner's 
experience 1.675     6.245     1.185 -1.207 
 
(3.518)   (3.459)     (2.994) (1.884) 
Capital 
 
              0.044*** 0.001 
  
              (0.015) (0.004) 
Labour 
 
             0.524*** 0.542*** 
                 (0.149) (0.119) 
Household 
fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes 
Sector fixed 
effects No Yes No No 
N 650 657 648 278 
R-squared 
within 0.153 0.052 0.364 0.223 
R-squared 
between 0.005 0.32 0.162 0.009 
R-squared 
overall 0.052 0.083 0.232 0.062 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
‘segment’-level (around 10 observations) in parentheses.  
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
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However, it could be the case that unobserved characteristics that are correlated 
with value added are also correlated with sector, and that these differences 
explain the significance of the gender dummy. If this is the case, and we assume 
that the households cannot change the sector of their enterprises in the short term, 
the allocation of resources may not be inefficient, even if the gender dummy is 
significant, as seen above. Udry (1996) deals with a similar concern regarding 
differences in productivity between crops, by restricting the sample to households 
where both men and women farm the same crop, on separate plots. To control for 
such sectoral effects we estimate a sector fixed effects model. The results are 
reported in column 2 and show that the gender effect prevails and is of similar 
magnitude to the results in column 1.
47
 The findings of the first two columns are 
inconsistent with efficiency and the main hypothesis that arose from our 
empirical model (   ) is rejected.48 
 
In column 3 of Table 2-3 we relax the assumption that capital and labour 
allocations are purely driven by enterprise characteristics. This is done to test the 
hypothesis that lower value added in female-led enterprises can be explained by 
lower allocations of capital and labour. 
 
In column 3 the gender dummy remains significant on a ten percent level but is 
much smaller in magnitude than in our first two specifications. This shows that 
some of the variation in value added is explained by lower allocations of labour 
and capital to female headed enterprises.49 However, these variations in input 
factor allocations do not fully explain the gender bias. Average value added in 
female headed enterprises is still lower by 80 Int. USD, or 25 percent of mean 
value added, in the sub-sample used in column 3, which controls for capital and 
labour allocations. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the persistence of gender bias, even 
after controlling for capital and labour. It is probable that women look after the 
children at the same time as working in the informal enterprise (Udry, 1996). The 
outputs in terms of this ‘household public good’ are not measured. This would 
mean that time spent by a female entrepreneur creates skills for the future 
entrepreneurs in addition to the enterprise value added. This could change our 
conclusion on efficiency. Child labour is reportedly used more frequently in male 
headed enterprises, but younger children may be looked after by women, 
reducing the productivity of their labour. 
                                                 
47 The results also hold when we limit our sample to households where both firms operate in the same sector. 
The gender dummy remains significant at the ten percent level and explains more than 40 percent of mean 
profits. 
48 Because of the cross-sectional nature of our data set we are unable to control for endogeneity of the input 
choices.  
49 One possibility is that capital allocations are driven by the sector the enterprise operates in. Nonetheless, 
one can argue that choice of sector in itself reflects a gender effect, as social norms restrict men and women 
to working only in certain sectors. The descriptive statistics in Table 2-2 lend support to this hypothesis. 
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To test the robustness of our results to our assumption that labour of the owner is 
indistinguishable from labour of the employees we also estimate (12) including 
capital and labour endowment for a sub-sample of enterprises which do not use 
external labour. The results are reported in column 4. The gender dummy is 
significant at the 1 percent level and remains very large in this robustness test. It 
shows that value added in female headed enterprises is about 60 Int. USD lower 
than for male headed enterprises. If there were differences in productivity of the 
labour of the owner and employees one would expect the coefficient on labour to 
vary between columns 3 and 4. However, the coefficient on labour in our fourth 
specification changes very little compared to column 3. Also, the other 
coefficients are relatively stable. The only exception is the coefficient on capital, 
which is almost zero. This might be caused by measurement error combined with 
the small sample size. Overall, there is no evidence that our assumption that hired 
and owner’s labour are indistinguishable is inappropriate. 
 
The gender dummy is significant and negative in all our specifications.
50
 This is 
inconsistent with efficient allocation of resources. Under efficient allocation of 
resources, the gender dummy should be equal to zero, as described in our 
theoretical model. In contrast to this prediction we find that value added in female 
headed enterprises, after controlling for enterprise and household characteristics 
including unobservables, is between 25 and 40 percent lower, depending on the 
specification. This effect is partly caused by the inefficient allocation of capital 
and labour. It is remarkable that our findings are very much in line with the 
finding of Udry (1996) who also finds the gender differential to be over thirty 
percent in a rural setting. 
 
2.4.3. Quantifying the potential gains from re-allocation 
 
Having established that an important part of the difference in value added 
between male and female headed enterprises is due to inefficient allocations we 
now turn to quantifying the increase in value added that would, in theory, be 
available to these informal enterprises, if the resources were allocated in the 
optimal way. Our first step is to estimate a baseline production function. Finally 
we predict value added using the estimated parameters, for the actual allocation 
of resources and under the optimised allocation, and compare these two estimates. 
                                                 
50 The results are also robust to changing the definition of value added to sales minus all inputs minus labour 
costs. Under this definition the gender dummy remained significant at the 1 percent level. 
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We assume decreasing returns to capital. Therefore, we use a constant elasticity 




                     ⁄        (2.13) 
Taking logs and adjusting the notation of the economic model so that it can be 
estimated yields a production function with the following form (see Greene, 
1999, 331f. or Kmenta, 1967, 180) 
              
 
 
  [     
             
  ]          (2.14) 
In (2.14)   stands for value added, measured by sales minus total expenses, 
including goods for re-sale and excluding wages and interest payments.   is the 
replacement value of the capital stock of the respective firm and   stands for 
labour input in hours.   is a returns to scale parameter,   measures the relative 
importance of the input factors and   stands for the substitutability of capital and 
labour.             represents the influence of unobserved enterprise-level (    
which can be interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP)) and household level 
(   which includes factors such as household wealth) variables on value added. 
We eliminate    by estimating (2.14) using household fixed effects.
52
 Following 
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          ]
    
                                       (2.15) 
In this logarithmic form all terms are linear which enables us to estimate the 
production function using OLS: 
       [ 
 
 
          ]         (2.16) 
All the unknown parameters of (2.15) and (2.16) can now be inferred in a linear 
fashion: 
                                                 
51 We also tested whether it is appropriate to use a Cobb-Douglas production function. The hypothesis that 
the sum of the capital and labour coeffcient is equal to one was strongly rejected.  
52 If experienced entrepreneurs can observe TFP early enough that they are able to base their input choices on 
this information, as seems likely,    will be correlated with inputs. Unfortunately the cross-sectional nature of 
the data does not allow us to control for this problem by including lagged variables as instruments. No other 
suitable instruments are available. 
53 To simplify, we drop the     subscripts. We follow closely the notation for linearization of a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function Greene (1999, 331f) and Kmenta, 1967, 180f). 
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                           (2.18) 
            ⁄          (2.19) 
Once we know   we can calculate the elasticity of substitution ( ): 
                 (2.20) 
We estimate a baseline production function using (2.15). The baseline results are 
reported in column 1 of Table 2-4. ν is highly significant and smaller than one, 
indicating decreasing returns to scale. The coefficients on ln capital and ln labour 
are similar, resulting in a distribution parameter δ of about 0.5. Substitutability 
between capital and labour is relatively high (the substitution parameter implies 
an elasticity of substitution of 1.44). 
Before we can compute the potential gains from resource re-allocation we need to 
test our assumption that the production functions of the male and female headed 
enterprises are identical. We do so by including gender interactions in our 
baseline estimates and testing for joint significance of the interaction terms. The 
F-Test statistic has a value of 36.43, rejecting the hypothesis that the production 
functions for female and male entrepreneurs are identical. The results in column 2 
of Table 2-4 show that capital is equally productive in male and female headed 
enterprises. Labour, by contrast, is significantly less productive in female headed 
enterprises.
54
 The reason for relatively low productivity is unclear. As discussed 
above, it is likely that women care for children at the same time as working in the 
informal enterprise. This could explain lower productivity of labour. Differences 
in time or risk preferences could also play a role. Therefore, when quantifying the 
potential gains we assume that the production functions for male and female 
entrepreneurs differ. 
  
                                                 
54 Another possible reason for the inefficiencies we detect is that TFP varies by gender. However, our 
analysis does not provide any support to this hypothesis.  
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Base Gender interactions 
ln Capital 0.274***   0.148***   
 
(0.022) (0.027)      
ln Capital X Female owner 
 
 -0.011      
  
(0.044)      
ln Labour 0.350***   0.306***   
 
(0.048) (0.049)      
ln Labour X Female owner 
 
 -0.135***   
  
(0.040)      
g ( K, L) -0.047***  -0.031***   
 
(0.005) (0.006)      
g ( K, L) X Female owner 
 
  0.010      
    (0.009)      
Returns to scale (ν) Male / all enterprises 0.624*** 0 .454*** 
 
 (0.052) (0 .053) 





Distribution (δ) Male / all enterprises 0.560***  0.674*** 
 
(0.041) (0.056) 





Substitution (ρ) Male / all enterprises  -0.307*** -0.314*** 
 
(0 .028) (0 .043) 
Substitution (ρ) Female enterprises 
 
-0.281** 
    (0.095) 
N 740 740 




R-squared within 0.382   0.497 
R-squared between 0.163   0.154 
R-squared overall 0.245   0.296 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
‘segment’-level (around 10 observations) in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
To quantify the inefficiencies we first predict value added using the actual 
distribution of capital and labour and the parameters            from Table 2-4. 
In a next step we maximise the following equation and compare the predicted 
value added under optimal and actual distributions of labour: 
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       ∑                    (2.21) 
s.t.          ,        ,     ,      
in (2.21)   stands for sum of value added of the two household enterprises,    and 
   represent labour and capital allocated to the respective enterprise, and   and   
represent the endowment of the household with labour and capital.  
The results from this maximization exercise are reported in Table 2-5. Using the 
actual distribution of input factors value added is about 108 Int. USD on average, 
compared to about 130 Int. USD when resources are allocated optimally within 
households. Hence, value added could be increased by about 20 percent, on 
average, by re-allocating capital and labour. Table 2-5 also reports the magnitude 
of the re-distributions needed to maximise value added of the enterprise within 
households. On average almost 200 Int. USD or about 19 percent of the average 
capital stock would need to be transferred from the male to the female headed 
enterprise, in order to reach the optimal allocation. Given that capital is equally 
productive in male and female headed enterprises, decreasing returns to capital 
and the initial unbalanced distribution of capital, this seems a plausible result. For 
labour the results show that about 20 hours per month or 7 percent of the average 
labour inputs are re-allocated from male to female headed enterprises, on average. 
Several factors play a role in this outcome. First, labour in female headed 
enterprises is less productive than in male headed enterprises. This effect is offset 
by the fact that initially male headed enterprises are allocated more labour, and by 
decreasing returns to labour. Also, labour and capital are imperfect substitutes. 
Since a considerable amount of capital is reallocated to female headed enterprises 
in order to reach the optimum, complementarities increase the required re-
distribution of labour. 
However, the average effect observed is a combination of two effects. In around 
60 percent of households, capital would be reallocated from the male to the 
female headed enterprise, in order to achieve the maximum value-added. In about 
50 percent of cases, labour would be reallocated towards the female headed 
enterprise. However, in the remaining cases, capital and/or labour would be 
reallocated from the female enterprise to the male headed enterprise. Because of 
decreasing returns to capital and labour the increase in value added in the male 
headed enterprises that receive more inputs outweighs the decrease in enterprise 
that lose inputs. As a consequence, the average value-added of male headed 
enterprises increases when inputs are reallocated, even though the average labour 
and capital allocations of male headed enterprises fall. This complexity illustrates 
the heterogeneity of household enterprises, and makes it difficult to make policy 
prescriptions about reallocation of inputs without a close understanding of 
household circumstances.  
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enterprises 425.01 403.45 1715.49 1517.87 81.75 91.24 
No. of observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 
Female headed 
enterprises 224.74 246.30 392.87 590.49 25.27 39.86 
No. of observations 366 366 366 366 366 366 
Total 324.88 324.88 1054.18 1054.18 107.02 130.69 
 
732 732 732 732 732 732 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 1-2-3 surveys (Phase 2, 2001/02, AFRISTAT, DIAL, 
INS). 
To disentangle the contributions of capital and labour to the increase in value 
added we repeated the exercise and kept either labour or capital constant. When 
only allowing labour to be re-distributed the increase in value added is around 3 
percent. Holding the distribution of labour constant and maximizing value added 
by varying capital within households has a much bigger effect – value added rises 
by about 16 percent. These results are in line with expectations, since capital was 
much more unequally distributed than labour.  
Another relevant question is what part of the differences in value added can be 
attributed to different endowments of the enterprises on the one hand, and the fact 
that production functions vary between men and women on the other.
55
 One way 
of answering this question is to use the so called Oaxaca – Blinder 
decomposition. This methodology was made popular by Blinder (1973) and 
Oaxaca (1973)
56
 and was used to explain differences in average wages between 
men and women.  
For our purposes we follow the approach described by Daymont and Andrisani 
(1984) and decompose mean differentials in value added between male and 
female headed enterprises into three groups: 
 ̅    ̅    ̅    ̅   ̂   ̅ ( ̂   ̂ )     ̅    ̅  ( ̂   ̂ )  (2.22) 
To obtain the parameters described in (2.22) we estimated a CES production 
function as described in (2.15) separately for male and female headed 
                                                 
55 The results in Table 2-3 suggest that differences between male and female enterprises can largely be 
explained by differences in endowments of labour and capital. 
56 The approach divided differences in mean wages into an ‘price effect’ caused by different returns to 
education for men and women and an ‘endowment effect’ caused by differences in educational 
achievements. This approach has been widely used and augmented (see Bourguignon et al., 2008 or Jones 
and Kelley, 1984 ). 
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 In (2.22)  ̅   are group means of predicted value added,  ̅   
represent mean endowments
58
 for male and female headed enterprises, and  ̂   
is a vector of coefficients obtained from the production CES function estimation 
that was done for both sub-groups. 
The first part of (2.22) is the endowment effect, the second part the effect caused 
by different coefficients in male and female headed enterprises and the third part 
measures interaction effects of endowments and coefficients. 
The results show, as could be expected, that predicted value added in male 
headed enterprises is about 3 times higher than value added in female headed 
enterprises. The analysis shows that differences in capital, labour and education 
of the owner account for more than 60 percent of these differences. Applying the 
coefficients derived from the regression including only male headed enterprises to 
the characteristics of female headed enterprises shows that differences in the 
coefficients account for about 40 percent of the differences. The importance of 
the interaction term is negligible. Since differences in capital account for the 
majority of the endowment effect we find that the inefficiencies in resource 
allocations between households are mainly driven by unequal distributions of 
capital between male and female headed enterprises. 
Overall, these results indicate slightly larger potential gains to re-allocation than 
the results of Udry (1996), who detects a potential increase of 6 percent. The 
difference between the findings for rural farms and for informal enterprises in an 
urban setting may arise from a number of factors. The significantly larger capital 
stocks in the urban enterprises may be one important explanation: this leaves the 
households with greater potential for redistribution, compared to the households 
in Udry’s rural setting. 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we test whether households allocate capital and labour between 
informal enterprises headed by women and those headed by men in a pareto 
efficient way. We use a data set on informal enterprises from seven countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The input factors are distributed unequally between female 
and male headed enterprises. The differences are particularly pronounced for 
capital. Capital stocks in male headed enterprises are on average 5 times higher 
than in female headed enterprises. Together with decreasing marginal returns to 
capital this suggests inefficiencies in resource allocation.  
 
                                                 
57 The constant terms that represent the efficiency parameter do not vary substantially between male and 
female headed enterprises. 
58 This refers to capital, labour and the experience and education of the enterprise head. 
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To examine this question more carefully we apply and follow closely an approach 
used by Udry (1996) in an agricultural setting. Controlling for household 
characteristics (including unobservables), sectoral differences and observable 
enterprise characteristics we find that the value added of a female headed 
enterprise is between 25 to 40 percent lower than the average value added of a 
male headed enterprise. This result is inconsistent with pareto efficiency. 
 
In a second step we calculate the optimal capital and labour allocation, based on a 
CES production function. We compare predicted value added using the actual 
resource allocation with predicted value added in the case where capital and 
labour are allocated optimally. Our results show that under the optimal resource 
allocation average value added increases by 20 percent. Comparing optimal and 
actual resource allocations shows that on average almost 200 Int. USD or 19 
percent of the average capital stock would need to be re-distributed from the male 
to the female headed enterprise to reach the optimal allocation. Similarly, 20 
hours per month or 6 percent of the average labour input would need to be re-
allocated from the male to the female headed enterprise. Decreasing returns and 
large initial imbalances of capital explain the direction of capital re-distribution in 
our simulation. The labour effect is a mixed effect of lower labour productivity in 
female headed enterprises, decreasing returns to labour and complementarities 
between labour and capital.  
 
These results need to be interpreted with caution as evidence from a number of 
randomised control trials shows no effect of additional capital on female headed 
enterprises with an initial capital stock below a certain threshold (Fafchamps et 
al., 2011; Karlan and Zinman, 2010; De Mel et al., 2009). These studies provide 
limited insights into the underlying mechanisms and why no rise in profits for 
female enterprises can be observed. Although we can rule out differences in 
sectors, enterprise characteristics and unobservable household level variables as 
the drivers of differences in capital stock between male and female headed 
enterprises, other unobserved factors may be behind the differences. For example, 
it could be the case that time (or other) preferences differ between men and 
women. This could explain the lower capital stocks in female headed enterprises. 
 
In addition to this optimization exercise we carry out an ‘Oaxaca – Blinder’ 
decomposition to examine the magnitude of differences in value added associated 
with endowments versus differences in production functions. We find that about 
60 percent of the differences in predicted value added for men and women can be 
explained by differences in endowments. Differences in the coefficients of the 
production function account for about 40 percent. Hence, unequal distributions of 
capital between male and female headed enterprises combined with decreasing 
returns to capital, are the main driver of the inefficiencies we observe. 
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Our findings show that households in urban Sub-Saharan Africa do not allocate 
resources optimally, so the distribution of labour and capital between men and 
women matters for final outcomes. These findings are in line with Udry (1996), 
who found potential gains from reallocating fertilizer and labour from plots 
controlled by men to plots controlled by women. It seems that the same pattern is 
observed in urban areas, with female enterprises using a sub-optimal amount of 
capital, just as they were allocated a sub-optimal amount of fertilizer in the rural 
context. The misallocation of capital and labour and hence the potential increase 
in value added in the urban enterprises appear to be larger than in the rural setting 
explored by Udry. 
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We examine the role of international trade for employment growth in micro- and 
small enterprises (MSEs) using a representative sample of manufacturing firms in 
6 Southeast Asian countries. In this sample, employment in firms in the bottom 
quintile of the initial size distribution grew the fastest and contributed 
considerably to overall employment creation. After controlling for firm and 
individual characteristics as well as country and sector dummies, participation in 
international trade plays a significant role in explaining this growth, boosting 
firm-level growth by 3 percent on average. Participating in international trade 
also increases the probability of being a top performing firm by 10 percent. The 
fact that firms start exporting soon after their foundation suggests that reverse 
causality is not an issue for our estimates. However, biases arising from 
unobserved heterogeneity cannot be ruled out. Therefore, we exploit the fact that 
firms were exposed to unexpected variation in real exchange rates between 2005 
and 2008 to investigate the causal relationship between trade and employment 
growth. The results are inconclusive, because of the small sample size and, 
possibly, relatively weak instruments, but they do not suggest that the relationship 
is driven by unobserved heterogeneity. The education of the firm’s owner, foreign 
ownership and firm age are also closely related to firm-level employment growth. 
Based on our findings we formulate recommendations for policy measures to 
boost employment growth in developing Asia. 
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The motivation for this paper stems, firstly, from the importance of micro- and 
small enterprises (MSEs) as sources of employment in developing countries. 
Informal enterprises (which are MSEs in the majority of cases) account for 72 
percent of non-agricultural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 51 percent in 
Latin America, and 65 percent in Asia, using the definition of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO, 2002). It has also been found that firms with 6 
workers or fewer account for roughly 50 percent of employment in Latin America 
and substantially more in Africa and Southeast Asia (Fajnzylber et. al, 2006). Fox 
and Sohensen (2012) find that small scale household enterprises generated most 
new jobs outside agriculture, and that earnings from household enterprises have 
the same marginal effect on consumption as wage and salary employment.  
Secondly, it has been observed empirically that, despite the severe constraints 
faced by MSEs in developing countries, a significant number of them have 
managed to grow, indicating that they do have potential to drive economic 
growth. However, based on the characteristics of these successful firms there 
appears to be a significant number of firms which have, so far, failed to realise 
their growth potential (Grimm et al., 2012). Helping small enterprises to grow is 
desirable not only to provide employment, but also to provide better employment. 
Wages in small enterprises tend to be low and it is usually difficult for the owner 
to provide workers with social security unless the firm can graduate into a larger 
and more efficient firm. In this context, it is important to understand what 
constraints prevent firms from realizing their growth potential. Lack of access to 
credit has been acknowledged by numerous authors as a fundamental constraint 
to business expansion, especially for MSEs (Dinh et al. 2010; Bigsten et al., 
2003). However, other major constraints faced by MSEs such as business risk, or 
lack of access to markets, inputs and, technology have received less attention. 
This paper focuses on the role of international trade for employment growth, with 
a special focus on MSEs. There are several ways in which participating in 
international markets can, in theory, help firms to overcome growth constraints. 
Exporting is one important channel to overcome the small size of local markets 
and low elasticity of demand. Empirical evidence also shows that exporting helps 
firms to grow and boost productivity through learning effects and the exploitation 
of economies of scale (van Biesebroeck, 2005). Similarly, firms in developing 
countries may be constrained in input markets: many inputs are not produced 
locally and most equipment is imported from abroad. 
Using a representative sample of manufacturing firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam 
we find that firms that started in the lowest quintile of the initial size distribution 
grew by about 20 percent annually, compared to about 10 percent for the average 
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 Although small initial size reduces their contribution to overall 
employment creation even if growth rates are high, they nonetheless account for a 
substantial 15 percent of total employment creation. We also find that after 
controlling for firm and individual characteristics as well as country and sector 
dummies, participating in international trade boosts employment growth by 3 
percent on average. In order to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity, we 
employ an instrumental variable approach, exploiting the ‘natural experiment’ 
created by unexpected variation in exchange rates caused by the economic and 
financial crisis that started in 2008. Although the results are inconclusive, they 
provide no evidence to suggest that the relationship between firm growth and 
participation in international trade is driven by endogeneity bias. 
Using panel data from Bangladesh between 2007 and 2011 confirms our result 
from Southeast Asia. Using first differences estimation the results show that the 
correlation between participation in international trade and employment growth is 
significant and positive even after controlling for firm level unobservables.  
To provide information for policy makers we define top performers as firms in 
the top quintile of the employment growth distribution. We find that about every 
third top performing firm started as an MSE and that participating in international 
trade or having an owner with a college degree increase the probability of being a 
top performer by about 10 and 5 percent respectively. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the recent economic literature on constraints faced by enterprises in 
developing countries and the role of MSEs. Section 3.3 describes the empirical 
findings and section 3.4 concludes and derives policy implications. 
3.2. Literature review 
 
The importance and potential of the MSE sector  
Evidence from around the world shows the importance of MSEs for employment 
especially in developing countries.
60
 Given the magnitude of the MSE sector, as 
described above, it is important to understand whether these enterprises are 
merely low-productivity, subsistence activities (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000) or have the potential to grow and contribute to 
employment creation and economic growth (Grimm at al., 2012).  
  
                                                 
59 Throughout this paper we measure enterprise growth by the annual growth in the number of full time 
employees since enterprise foundation. 
60 MSEs are frequently defined as firms with up to 5 permanent workers (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009; 
Liedholm, 2002). 
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Empirical evidence on heterogeneous MSE growth patterns 
McMillan and Woodruff (2002) provide evidence of the potential of newly 
founded firms, mostly small firms, in transitional and developing economies such 
as the Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Poland and 
Vietnam. The example of Vietnam shows the potential of MSEs. Between 1992 
and 1995 private sector employment grew by almost 2.5 million. These new jobs 
can almost all be attributed to the expansion of household enterprises in the retail 
and repair sectors and to small manufacturing firms. In the PRC newly founded, 
mostly small, enterprises contributed substantially to the fact that the share of 
industrial production by rural firms rose from 9 percent in 1978 to 30 percent in 
1991. These examples in developing countries demonstrate the potential for small 
firm growth in developing and transitional economies.  
Mead and Liedholm (1998) find that MSEs create almost twice as many jobs as 
formally registered large-scale enterprises in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, although overall employment growth in those 
countries was slow. The study also finds MSE growth to be heterogeneous. The 
authors show that most of the MSE growth can be attributed to a minority of 
enterprises- although even those added only a few workers. They find average 
annual growth rates of MSEs to be between 8 (Botswana) and 30 percent 
(Kenya). On average only 27 percent of all enterprises grew, creating 0.14 jobs 
per year on average. The study also analyses the income generated by MSEs and 
finds that returns to labour rise substantially once the enterprises consist of more 
than one person. This increase in efficiency is associated with higher levels of 
income for the employees and the enterprise owner. 
Another study that examines firm growth over the past three years is Dinh et al. 
(2010). Using the World Bank enterprise surveys (WBESs) between 2006 and 
2010 the study examines determinants of average annual firm growth in the past 
three years using cross-sectional data set, with almost 40,000 observations. The 
findings show that firm growth is highest for enterprises with fewer than 10 
employees. Firms that had been established in the previous 5 years grew faster 
than older firms and average enterprise growth was lowest in East Asia and the 
Pacific and highest in South Asia.
61
 Following the growth diagnostic approach by 
Hausman et al. (2005) the study identifies financial constraints and informal 
sector competition as the most binding constraints to firm growth in developing 
countries. Though the study mentions firm heterogeneity between and within 
countries, the analysis does not include empirical results on country level. 
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) analyse the firm growth process in Côte 
d’Ivoire using a representative sample of manufacturing firms. The empirical 
results show a negative relationship between firm growth and firm age and size in 
                                                 
61 The other sub-regional groups are Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & 
Caribbean, and Middle East & North Africa. 
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Côte d’Ivoire. However, comparing firm growth by enterprise size between Côte 
d’Ivoire and Germany shows differences in firm growth patterns between 
developed and developing countries. This is an extreme example, as Germany is 
well known for its broad base of small and medium enterprises, but similar results 
are shown for other developed countries.
62
 Small enterprises grew relatively fast 
in Germany, resulting in the fact that 28 percent of today’s large or medium firms 
(100 or more employees) started as micro enterprises (1-4 employees). In Côte 
d’Ivoire only a few large firms started small but larger enterprises (with more 
than 50 employees) grew faster than in Germany. The findings are consistent with 
a ‘missing middle’ in the firm size distribution in developing countries.  
To sum up, the reviewed empirical literature on firm growth in developing 
countries shows that firm growth, in particular for MSEs which account for the 
majority of firms in most developing countries, is heterogeneous. In most 
countries only few MSEs show rapid growth. The next section sums up studies on 
different groups of constraints and identifies the research gap for the role of trade 
for employment growth in MSEs in Southeast Asia. 
What constraints impede MSE growth? 
We assume that the relatively high concentration of MSEs in developing 
countries and the heterogeneous growth patterns of these firms must be explained 
by certain constraints these enterprises face. An overview study by Nichter and 
Goldmark (2009) lends support to this hypothesis. The authors review the most 
influential studies on firm growth in developing countries of the past 50 years and 
identify four key factors that are associated with low firm growth in developing 
countries. These are: individual characteristics (e.g. education, gender, or work 
experience), firm characteristics (e.g. firm age, formality, firm size or access to 
finance), relational factors (e.g. value chains or social networks) and contextual 
factors (e.g. business environment). Since this study focuses on constraints 
related to access to markets, inputs and technology, the group of relational 
constraints is particularly relevant. 
The set of constraints to MSE growth most relevant for this study originates from 
demand side issues, input unavailability and lack of technology. A small domestic 
market and hence limited domestic demand, potentially combined with a low 
elasticity of demand for the particular products commonly produced by MSEs, 
may impede firms from growing (Lachaud, 1990). Recent empirical evidence 
confirms the importance of this constraint (Böhme and Thiele, 2012).  
Exporting is evidently a way to overcome the small size of local markets in 
developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2004; Diao et al. 2006). Empirical evidence 
from Asia and Africa shows that after entering the export market productivity 
increases occur, which can be largely attributed to the exploitation of scale 
                                                 
62 See Stenkula (2006) for an overview of firm size distribution of European countries. 
The role of international trade for employment growth in micro- and small-




economies (van Biesebroeck, 2005).
63
 Firms may also be constrained on input 
markets as certain inputs are not produced locally and most equipment used is 
imported from abroad.  
In addition to the traditional pattern of exporting (i.e. from a developing country 
that has comparative advantage in relatively low skilled textile manufacturing to a 
developed country) falling transport costs and reductions of trade barriers, as well 
as rapid advancements in production technology, have made it possible for large 
international firms to ‘slice up the value chain’ (Krugman et al., 1995). This 
relatively new phenomenon of regional and global production networks means 
that it can be easier for firms to start exporting, as they can specialise in only one 
small step of the production process. This new trend is confirmed by the fact that 
production network trade has generally grown faster than total world trade in 
manufacturing (Athukorala, 2011). 
Benefits from participating in global markets might also stem from the increasing 
presence of foreign firms. The evidence on whether the presence of foreign firms 
creates employment and boosts the success of domestic firms is ambiguous. As 
described by Markusen and Venables (1999) using the example of Taiwan, it can 
be the case that foreign firms create additional demand for local products and 
services, boosting firm growth. On the other hand it is argued that foreign firms 
compete with local firms both for markets and for skilled workers, and hence 
crowd out local firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). In addition to employment 
effects caused by the presence of foreign firms there might also be positive skill 
or technology spillover effects.
64
 However, empirical evidence on these spillover 
effects is mixed (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
Given the rapid growth of opportunities for participation in international trade via 
production networks this paper focuses on the effects of engaging in international 
trade on employment growth in MSEs using data from 6 Southeast Asian 
economies. The MSE sector matters as it accounts for over 50 percent of 
employment in Asia. The constraint of access to markets, inputs, and technology 
is particularly relevant for the region as many countries either are plugged into, or 
would like to plug into, regional or global production networks. Therefore, this 
paper tries to fill the research gap on the effects on trade and investment 
liberalization on firm growth. In particular we will examine the following 
questions: 
  
                                                 
63 See also Wagner (2012) for an overview of empirical studies examining the relationship between exporting 
and productivity. 
64 An example of such spillovers is the skills acquisition channel. Foreign firms provide training to workers 
and workers trained by foreign firms might later start working for a local firm. 
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- Can we observe employment growth in MSEs and if so, do firms that started 
small contribute to overall employment growth? 
- What role does participating in international trade play for employment 
growth? 
- What are the characteristics of firms that grew particularly fast and what does 
this mean for policy makers? 
3.3. Empirical Analysis 
 
For our empirical analysis we use the WBESs from Malaysia and Thailand (2007) 
and Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Vietnam (2009). The surveys are 
representative samples of registered manufacturing firms with 5 or more 
employees. The surveys in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam also include 
firms in the service sector. The questionnaires used in Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam are identical.
65
  
3.3.1. General enterprise characteristics 
 
Our sample comprises almost 5,400 firms in these 6 Southeast Asian countries.
66
 
Note that the employment growth rates and determinants of employment growth 
need to be interpreted with caution. Our data set is cross-sectional and therefore it 
includes only the firms that survived. Hence, all estimates for employment 
growth should be interpreted as upper bound figures.
67
  
Enterprise growth is measured, for the purposes of this paper, by the growth of 
employment in firms. Measuring firm growth using other indicators such as 
profits or capital is not possible as these indicators are not measured consistently 
across countries. 
Table 3-1 summarises the main enterprise characteristics. The results show 
significant employment growth. Firms in our sample started with 64 full time 
employees on average and had 114 employees when the surveys were carried out. 
The median values of the initial firm and current size are considerably lower, with 
a starting size of 20 employees and a current size of 40 employees. This shows 
that a small proportion of firms heavily influence the average numbers. The firms 
in our sample are relatively old, around 16 years on average. The mean and 
                                                 
65 For more information on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys see the following website: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/. 
66 In order to avoid biased estimation results due to influential outliers we excluded the top 2 percent of firms 
in terms of absolute employment growth. This reduces the sample by about 160 observations. 
67 We examined major enterprise characteristics by firm age. They do not differ substantially across firm age 
quintiles. This suggests that the bias caused by firms that did not survive might be limited. 
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median values of firm age are similar and do not vary substantially across 
countries. 
The orientation towards international markets is somewhat limited – about three 
quarters of the output is sold domestically. The data allow us to further 
distinguish between direct and indirect exports. Directly exporting is the preferred 
mode – on average only 5 percent of the overall output is exported indirectly 
through an intermediary, while about 20 percent is exported directly. Thailand 
and Malaysia show the highest share of production being exported with an 
average of 27 and 34 percent respectively. We define firms that import inputs and 
also export as participants in international trade. Using this definition, about 21 
percent of firms participate in international trade. 
Table 3-1: General enterprise characteristics 







































Philippines mean 78.72 58.16 80.94 13.67 5.40 15.75 29.20 89.20 17.57 18.52 
  N 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130 
Indonesia mean 88.86 51.99 91.04 6.89 2.08 7.16 25.84 32.71 16.61 5.82 
  N 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1076 1070 
Vietnam mean 143.10 109.59 71.68 19.96 8.36 23.05 21.61 66.43 10.27 13.26 
  N 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 
Thailand mean 161.34 71.94 73.29 23.81 2.90 29.71 33.09 69.26 14.02 21.31 
  N 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 976 619 
Malaysia mean 129.54 48.84 66.46 28.82 4.72 36.53 8.82 43.51 18.98 21.47 
  N 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1032 1031 
Lao PDR mean 64.04 44.46 80.94 9.17 9.89 9.69 37.89 42.74 10.86 14.20 
  N 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 351 350 
Total mean 113.62 63.50 77.52 17.67 4.81 21.22 24.81 58.87 15.58 15.66 
  N 5259 5259 5259 5259 5259 5259 5259 5259 5259 4894 
Notes: To correct for outliers we excluded the top 2 percent of firms that showed the highest 
increase in full time employees.  
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
Only every fourth enterprise owner in our sample is female (Table 3-1). The 
numbers do not vary substantially across countries. About 60 percent of all 
enterprise owners have a college degree. Indonesia is the only country where this 
number is lower than 35 percent. The average percentage of foreign ownership is 
roughly 15 percent. Taken together, the results of Table 3-1 show that, on 
average, firms grew, and that a considerable share of firms participates in 
international trade. 
3.3.2. Enterprise growth and the role of initial firm size 
 
Table 3-2 describes employment growth in the sample, applying 3 different 
employment growth measures. The first two columns Table 3-2 show the mean 
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and median values of the simple annual average of employment growth and the 
compound average – these measures are also used by Mead and Liedholm (1998). 
The third column shows the average number of jobs that have been created since 
foundation per year. 
Table 3-2: Employment growth in developing Asia 














Philippines mean 18.80% 5.77% 0.78 
 
median 3.52% 2.58% 0.36 
  N 1130 1130 1130 
Indonesia mean 19.17% 8.77% 2.43 
 
median 6.10% 4.14% 0.33 
  N 1076 1076 1076 
Vietnam mean 30.42% 11.85% 6.27 
 
median 6.67% 5.20% 1.97 
  N 694 694 694 
Thailand mean 51.92% 18.13% 9.76 
 
median 20.00% 9.46% 4.27 
  N 976 976 976 
Malaysia mean 28.72% 8.24% 5.11 
 
median 10.61% 5.89% 1.76 
  N 1032 1032 1032 
Laos mean 23.80% 7.97% 1.40 
 
median 5.56% 4.01% 0.37 
  N 351 351 351 
Total mean 28.84% 10.11% 4.40 
 
median 8.00% 5.14% 1.10 
  N 5259 5259 5259 
Notes: Average annual growth rate (simple averages) is defined as: 
[                                         ⁄                     ]            
Average annual growth rate (compound) is defined as: 
[((current employment)⁄(initial employment))^(1⁄(firm age)) ]-1  
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
Our preferred measure of employment growth is the compound measure 
presented in column 2. Average growth rates ranged from 6 percent (Philippines) 
to 18 percent (Thailand). Median values of employment growth are about half of 
the average values, reflecting the heterogeneity between firms. Malaysia is the 
only country where mean and median employment growth figures are roughly 
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similar, suggesting that the employment growth distribution in Malaysia is close 
to normal. 
Since foundation, the average firm in our sample created about 4 jobs per year. 
The countries where the firms grew fastest also created the most jobs: in Thailand 
and Vietnam 10 and 6 jobs were created per firm, per year, on average. The 
average firm in the Philippines and Lao PDR only created about 1 job per year.  
In sum, Table 3-2 shows that enterprises in our sample have grown by about 10 
percent since their foundation but that growth patterns are heterogeneous between 
and within countries. The next section will examine differences in employment 
growth across the initial firm size distribution to examine how firms that started 
as MSEs contributed to employment growth. 
Do MSEs contribute to overall employment growth? 
Table 3-3 shows employment growth by initial size quintile.
68
 Firms that started 
in the bottom quintile of the initial size distribution grew by about 21 percent per 
year. In contrast, firms in the top quintile of the initial size distribution grew by 
only 1 percent by year. Columns 3 and 4 report the absolute number of jobs 
created by firms in our sample and the relative importance of the respective 
quintile for overall job creation. 
















1 62.70% 20.58% 40,773 15.47% 
2 28.85% 11.49% 36,385 13.80% 
3 21.08% 7.61% 51,267 19.45% 
4 15.35% 6.26% 78,299 29.71% 
5 5.53% 1.46% 56,852 21.57% 
Total 28.84% 10.11% 263,576 100.00% 
Notes: Average annual growth rate (simple averages) is defined as: 
[                                         ⁄                     ]            
Average annual growth rate (compound) is defined as: 
[((current employment)⁄(initial employment))^(1⁄(firm age)) ]-1 
Quintiles computed by country 
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
Overall, the firms in our sample created about 260,000 jobs since their 
foundation. Firms in the bottom quintile of the initial size distribution created 
                                                 
68 Note that the initial size quintiles are computed by country. 
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about 41,000 jobs and hence accounted for about 15 percent of all created jobs. 
Based on the findings in Table 3-3 we conclude that firms in the bottom quintile 
of the initial size distribution contributed considerably to overall employment 
growth. 
3.3.3. What is the role of participating in trade for employment growth? 
 
Having confirmed the hypothesis that firms that started small contribute 
substantially to overall employment growth, we now test the hypothesis that 
access to imported inputs and/or foreign markets enables firms to exploit 
economies of scale and hence boosts employment growth. We use the following 
model to test this hypothesis: 
                                    (3.1) 
The dependent variable is enterprise growth      in firm   located in country  .69 
This is measured using the compounded measure of employment growth: 
[(
                  
                  
)
         ⁄
]         (3.2) 
    in Equation (3.1) represents a vector of enterprise and individual 
characteristics. In particular,     includes: the number of full-time employees at 
enterprise foundation, the percentage of the firm that is owned by a foreign entity, 
a dummy that takes the value 1 if the enterprise owner is female, a dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the owner has a college degree, the firm’s age, and the 
owner’s experience in years. 
To measure the effect of participating in international trade on employment 
growth we include a dummy that takes the value 1 if a firm exports and also 
imports inputs.
70
 We also use export intensity (direct and indirect exports over 
sales) as a proxy for participation in international trade to check the robustness of 
the results. To make the interpretation of the coefficients straightforward we will 
use the dummy variable specification when discussing the magnitude of the trade 
effect, but the other results are available from the author on request. Using 
different proxies for participation in international trade does not alter the results. 
Furthermore, we control for heterogeneity across sectors and countries using a set 
of dummies.
71
 Finally,     represents a random error term. 
                                                 
69 Although the data are cross-sectional, respondents were asked how many workers were employed in the 
firm when it was first established.  
70 The results are robust to variations in this definition (e.g. using an exporter dummy) and to omitting 
explanatory variable such as the size at enterprise foundation. 
71 The sectors chemicals, auto parts, furniture, office accounting and computing machinery, wood and wood 
products, non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, fabricated metal products, construction, and transport 
have been summarized under ‘other manufacturing’. The sector dummy ‘services’ includes the following 
sub-sectors: hotels and restaurants, IT, wholesale, retail, and services of motor vehicles. 
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It is important to be aware of a number of biases which may affect the estimation 
results. Measurement error will bias the results downwards, and this tendency is 
likely to be exacerbated by the fact that the dependent variable used is a change 
over time. The possibility of reverse causality between participating in 
international trade and employment growth should also be considered. The model 
we would like to test is that firms grow because of their participation in 
international trade, for instance because it allows them to exploit economies of 
scale. However, it is not implausible that firms are unable to export unless they 
are already profitable, and therefore growing, so the causality runs from growth to 
exports, rather than vice versa. If that was the case, our results would be biased 
upwards. However, despite the cross-sectional character of our data set, we know 
in which year a firm started exporting. The majority of firms for which these data 
are provided started exporting in the year the enterprise was set up or one year 
after. The fact that most firms export shortly after foundation means that the issue 
of reverse causality between exporting and employment growth is unlikely to be a 
serious cause of bias. 
However, there is a strong possibility of endogeneity bias, which can make causal 
interpretation of results, and therefore policy implications, misleading. 
Endogeneity bias arises because it is difficult to isolate the causal effect of 
exporting on the employment growth of a firm from the effect of unobserved 
factors that are correlated with exporting. It is plausible that export status is 
correlated with unobserved factors such as motivation of the manager. Businesses 
run by highly motivated managers are likely to expand rapidly, even if they do 
not choose to export or do not succeed in exporting, and the motivated managers 
will also put more effort into seeking out export opportunities. In this case, an 
apparently large impact of trade on enterprise growth could, in reality, be largely 
a reflection of the higher motivation of the business owners. 
Similar issues of endogeneity bias have been addressed in empirical studies that 
examine the effects of participating in international trade on productivity. One 
remedy is using full information maximum likelihood (Clerides et al, 1998). 
However, as noted by Bigsten et al. (2004) this approach can be sensitive to the 
assumptions on the joint error distribution. Another approach is to use matching 
techniques (de Loecker, 2007; Fernandes and Isgut, 2005; or Girma et al., 2004). 
The underlying idea behind this technique is to match starting exporters and non-
exporters based on propensity score matching to get an idea how a firm would 
have performed if it had not started exporting. However, matching approaches are 
able to eliminate biases based only on observables. Given the cross-sectional 
nature of our data set it is not possible to use fixed-effects techniques to control 
for endogeneity. 
  
The role of international trade for employment growth in micro- and small-




An Instrumental Variable approach 
As means of controlling for the potential unobserved heterogeneity discussed 
above, we apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach, adapting the approach 
by Park et al. (2010) to our data set. The authors use the unforeseen exchange rate 
shocks in certain countries during the Asian crisis as a ‘natural experiment’. 
Firms that exported to destination countries such as Thailand experienced heavy 
demand shocks due to exchange rate variations whereas companies exporting to 
Europe, for example, did not experience large shocks. The weighted average real 
depreciation of a firm’s pre-crisis trade partners, which captures these exchange 
rate shocks, is therefore used as an instrument for the change in exports, in order 
to isolate the causal effect of exporting on productivity. 
While Park et al. (2010) focused on the period of the Asian financial crisis, we 
exploit the variation in exchange rates caused by the financial and economic crisis 
that started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008. In 
contrast to the Asian crisis exchange rates between the Asian countries and US 
and Europe fluctuated. The two most common export destinations for our sample 
firms are Japan and the USA. A significant proportion of firms also export to 
Europe.
72
 As the main export destinations and the proportions received by each 
vary by firm, exposure to the shocks varies. 
The exchange rate shock variable is a suitable instrument if it is strongly related 
to export intensity, but unrelated to any unobserved factors. The latter is a 
reasonable assumption, as the exchange rate shocks experienced between 2005 
and 2008 were largely unforeseen by firms (and indeed by economic analysts). 
The firms in the sample had no significant influence over these economic events, 
especially as the crisis is widely understood to have been triggered mainly by 
events in the US (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).  
The first requirement will be met if trade intensity in 2008 is strongly related to 
the shock variable. This will be the case if firms who experience an exchange rate 
shock react by reducing the proportion of goods that they export. This is likely to 
occur if it is easier for them to re-orient sales towards the domestic market than to 
find new export partners, in the short term. In this case, the firms who 
experienced the bigger shocks would have lower export intensities than firms 
who experienced no shock, or a positive change.
73
 
Exporting firms in three countries in our data set (Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam) reported information on their two most important export partners. In 
                                                 
72 About 40 percent of firms indicate either Japan or the USA as their top export destination. Ten percent of 
all firms report the European Union as their top export destination. 
73 Firms in our data set report exports and the shares of the two most important destination countries in 2008. 
Due to contracts that have to be fulfilled and have been negotiated before the crisis there could be some delay 
in the reaction of exporters. Hence, by using data from only 2008 it could be that we are underestimating the 
impact of the exchange rate shock on export intensities. 
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line with Park et al. (2010) we compute the exchange rate shock for each 
destination country   as follows: 
            {[  (      )            ]  [  (      )            ]} (3.3) 
In Equation (3.3),     is the nominal exchange rate (local currency unit per unit of 
the respective destination country currency) in year  , and      is the price level.
74
 
We follow the approach of Park et al. (2010) and create a firm level indicator for 
exchange rate variations by weighting the exchange rate index by the share of 
sales destined for the respective destination country in 2008. We obtain a firm-
level exchange rate index: 
                                              (3.4) 
The shares of the respective destination countries of firm   are represented by 
    . The numbers         represent the two most important export destinations.
75
 
If a firm only reports the share for the most important country, we give that 
country a weight of 100 percent. The larger the value of the           
variable, the larger the increase in the price of exported goods, on average, in the 
local currencies of the destination countries. Ceteris paribus, this would reduce 
exports. Using a firm level variable as an instrument has the advantage that we 
can still include country and sector dummies in the IV estimation. 
Only cross-sectional data are available, so we focus on the relationship between 
the shock and export intensity in 2008, rather than on the change in exports 
between 2005 and 2008, as in the approach of Park et al. (2010). 
It should be noted that using this approach restricts the sample to firms that 
export, around 30% of the sample. As well as reducing the sample size 
significantly, this means that the equation captures only part of the effect of trade 
on firm growth. If there is a large benefit to exporting, regardless of quantity (in 
other words, a non-linear effect), the IV approach will understate the benefits of 





The results are reported in Table 3-4. Columns 1 to 4 report the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) results. In the first specification we include only the export 
                                                 
74 Exchange rate data stem from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
(2013) database. Data on consumer price indexes stem from the World Bank (2013) World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
75 Averaged over all countries in our sample, 74 percent of all exports are destined for the two most 
important export destinations. Hence, the data constraint of having only data on the two most important 
export destinations is not critical for our analysis. 
76 Note that the information on export destination shares is very noisy. Only half of all exporters report 
consistent information on the destination countries and/or the respective shares. 
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intensity variable and country and sector dummies, and use data from all 6 
countries in the data set. In column 2 we add all control variables as described 
above. In the third column we use a dummy that takes the value 1 if a firm 
exports and also imports inputs as a proxy for participation in international trade. 
In column 4 we show the results using only data from the 3 countries that 
reported information on their export partners. These countries are the ones used in 
the IV estimates. In column 5 we report the results of the IV estimation, using the 
weighted exchange rate shock between 2005 and 2008 as an instrument for export 
intensity. In column 6 we report OLS estimates using the same sample that was 
used for the IV estimates. We use Vietnam as the reference country, and 
machinery and equipment as the reference sector.  
The first four specifications show highly significant coefficients on the trade 
variables, which are stable across all specifications. These results are robust to a 
number of variations in the key variables.
77
 Another finding that is robust across 
all specifications is that firms that started small expand faster, controlling for 
other factors.
78
 The foreign ownership variable is significant and positive in 
models 2 to 4. The coefficient is positive and of similar magnitude in all other 
specifications. The coefficient on the gender of the enterprise owner is negative in 
most specifications, and is significant for the sample used in the IV specification 
(only exporting firms).
79
 Education of the owner seems to matter – the dummy 
education variable is positive and significant in all specifications. 
Including control variables leads to a considerable increase in the adjusted R-
squared, but has little effect on the trade variables. The estimates from the 6 
country sample are of similar magnitude to the results using the 3 country sample 
(column 5). 
  
                                                 
77 The results remain stable when running the regression by size and age groups and using alternative 
specifications of employment growth (absolute growth of employment or a log specification). 
78 The sign and magnitude of the age variable is in line with other studies such as Dinh et al. (2010) or 
Wignaraja (2012). One possible explanation for this result is that younger firms find it easier to adapt to new 
and more efficient production technologies, which enables them to grow faster. We also detected some 
evidence for a non-linear age effect when including age squared in the specification. 
79 This indicates that export firms headed by female entrepreneurs face particular barriers to employment 
growth. Further investigation would be needed to identify the reasons for this finding. 
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Table 3-4: The Role of Trade for Employment Growth, OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)        (5)              (6)        (7) 
Methodology 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS 
Export 
intensity 0.0110** 0.0211*** 
 




(0.0041)   (0.0093)      (0.1089)   (0.0177)  
Trade dummy 
  
  0.0302***  
    
   
(0.0047)     




-0.0002***   -0.0002*** -0.0001***    -0.0001***    -0.0001***    -0.0001*** 
  




0.0002***    0.0002** 0.0002***     0.0001        0.0002         0.0002   
  
(0.0001)  (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0001)      (0.0002)       (0.0002)   
College 
 
0.0149***    0.0127** 0.0112***     0.0117**      0.0387*        0.0371*  
  
(0.0039)  (0.0039)   (0.0031)   (0.0059)      (0.0205)       (0.0204)   
Firm age 
 
-0.0025***  -0.0025*** -0.0019***    -0.0019***    -0.0017**     -0.0020*** 
  
(0.0002) (0.0001)    (0.0001)   (0.0002)      (0.0008)      (0.0006)    
Female GM 
 
-0.0036  -0.0026   -0.0025     0.0041       -0.0362**       -0.0344**  
  
(0.0042) (0.0042)   (0.0032)   (0.0055)      (0.0150)        (0.0144)    
Constant 0.0752*** 0.1092***   0.1083*** 0.0888***     0.0752***     0.0458          0.0668*  
  (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0082)    (0.0060)   (0.0098)      (0.0725)   (0.0370)   
Country 
dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector 
dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Test for 
underidentifica
tion (p-value)           
0.0018 
  
Test for weak 
identification 
(F statistic)           
6.8140 
  
N 5327 4933 4930 4843 2679 308  308 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.0506 0.1404 0.1442 0.1634     0.0774      0.1368 0.1505 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01, In all regressions, 
we drop influential outliers from our sample, identified using the DFITS-statistic. As suggested by 
Belsley et al. (1980), we use a cutoff-value |       |   √  ⁄  with k, the degrees of freedom 
(plus 1) and N, the number of observations. Export intensity: Sales/Exports. Instrument used: ln of 
weighted exchange rate shock of the 2 most important export destinations 
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
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As could be expected from the descriptive statistics the Thailand dummy (not 
reported) is significant and positive. The other country dummies show that after 
controlling for individual and enterprise characteristics employment growth was 
significantly lower in Indonesia and the Philippines than in Vietnam. Firms in the 
electronics sector show the highest growth rates after controlling for country 
effects and individual and enterprise characteristics. 
However, as described above, these results should be interpreted with caution 
because of the strong possibility that they are affected by endogeneity bias. 
Therefore, in column 5 we introduce the IV approach described above. We report 
the second stage IV estimates in column 5. The first stage estimates (see 
Appendix for the complete results) show the expected negative and highly 
significant (t-value:-2.61) relationship between export intensity and our exchange 
rate shock index.  
The null hypothesis of underidentifcation is rejected at a 5 percent confidence 
level.
80
 However, an F Test of whether all excluded instruments are significant 
suggests that the instrument may be weak. This test in our data set has an F-value 
of 6.8. According to thresholds defined in Stock et al. (2002) this means that the 




As explained by Stock et al. (2002), the presence of weak instruments leads to 
unreliable point estimates, and confidence intervals. This means that the IV 
estimates should be interpreted with caution, and is likely to explain the fact that 
the IV specification provides only weak evidence for the impact of trade on 
employment growth. Neither specification shows a significant coefficient for 
trade intensity. However, the fact that the coefficient does not change sign, and 
remains of a similar magnitude is encouraging. Large swings in the coefficient 
and implausible magnitudes are common characteristics of weak instruments. 
Also, the first stage results indicate that the exchange rate shocks did affect trade 
intensity, supporting the appropriateness of this instrument. Another factor behind 
the lack of a significant result in the IV specification is that the data on export 
destinations and export shares are very noisy, so many observations need to be 
dropped, resulting in a small sample size. 
 
As a further robustness check of our results we estimated 3.1 using firm level 
panel data from the WBESs carried out in Bangladesh in 2007 and 2011. We use 
total value of exports in int. USD as a proxy for trade. The results are reported in 
Table 3-9. The first two columns show the results using cross-sectional data from 
                                                 
80 See Baum et al. (2003) for details. In the case of one endogenous regressor and one instrument the null 
hypothesis of this test is that the correlation matrix between this regressor and the instrument is non-zero.  
81 The results do not change when using Tobit estimation techniques in the first stage regression or using the 
exchange rate shock between 2006 and 2008. Results are available on request from the author. 
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2007 with and without control variables. Column 3 shows results using first 
differences estimation techniques and panel data from 2007 and 2011. The results 
show that the correlation between participation in international trade and 
employment growth is significant and positive even after controlling for firm 
level unobservables. The example from Bangladesh is encouraging and lends 
support to the view that firm level unobservables do not substantially bias our 
results for Southeast Asia. 
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests (subject to the potential biases mentioned 
above) that participating in international trade raises employment growth. After 
controlling for sector and country effects as well as differences in firm and 
individual characteristics employment growth in firms that export and also import 
inputs was about 3 percent higher than in all other firms. The results are robust to 
variations in the trade variable and also to variations in the countries included.
82
 
3.3.4. Who are the top performers in terms of employment growth? 
 
Firm characteristics 
In order to derive suggestions for policy measures, we now examine the 
characteristics of the firms that have grown the most since their foundation. We 
define top performers as enterprises in the top quintile of employment of each 
respective country.
83
 Table 3-5 shows differences in firm and individual 
characteristics between top performers and all remaining firms.  
Overall, the results show that top performers and the remaining firms differ 
significantly in all categories except for the education of the owner and the 
percentage of female owners.
84
 About every fourth top performer is participating 
in international trade, compared to every fifth firm that is not defined as a top 
performer. Also top performers started significantly smaller, which is in line with 
the findings of Tables 3-3 and 3-4. Again the median values for initial size are 
smaller than mean values, reflecting the skewed initial size distribution. The 
results also show that every third top performing firm started as an MSE (less 
than 5 employees). Top performers are on average about 10 years younger. This 
may reflect the better capability to adopt new technologies that increase 
productivity. However, this effect may also be caused by firms closing down if 
they did not grow fast enough.  
                                                 
82 We ran separate regressions including only Malaysia and Thailand and a separate regression including 
only Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Vietnam. The main findings were not altered. Results are 
available from the author on request. 
83 We also used the approach by Grimm et al. (2012) to define top performers. Our main findings are robust 
to using this productivity oriented definition of a top performer. Results are available from the author on 
request. 
84 The results are based in a T test assuming unequal differences between the groups. 
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Table 3-5: Characteristics of top performers 






























Top performers mean 25.50% 22.55 27.32% 8.47 11.04 59.98% 25.41% 20.76% 
 
median 0 10 0 7 9 1 0 0 
  N 1047 1047 1047 1047 1015 1047 1047 974 
Remaining firms mean 20.16% 73.68 9.45% 17.35 14.27 58.59% 24.67% 14.40% 
 
median 0 20 0 15 12 1 0 0 
  N 4212 4212 4212 4212 4101 4212 4212 3920 
T test result   *** *** *** *** ***     *** 
Total mean 21.22% 63.50 13.01% 15.58 13.63 58.87% 24.81% 15.66% 
 
median 0 20 0 13 11 1 0 0 
  N 5259 5259 5259 5259 5116 5259 5259 4894 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 of T test assuming unequal variances between groups 
testing hypothesis that the group means are equal. 
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
 
For top performers the experience of the owner exceeds the firm age, whereas for 
the other firms the firm age exceeds the years of experience of the owner, on 
average. So even if one assumes that the owner has worked in the top performing 
enterprise since its foundation she would have had on average about 3 years of 
experience when she started working for the company. For the remaining firms it 
could be that the recent owner who has fewer years of experience than the firm 
age took over the business from a family member. Such enterprises might find it 
harder to adopt new production technologies. The percentages of firms whose 
owner have a college degree or are female do not vary significantly between top 
performers and other firms. Finally, top performers have a significantly higher 
percentage of foreign ownership. This is plausible – being part of an international 
company may facilitate intra-firm knowledge spillovers. 
To learn more about the relative importance of the determinants of being a top 
performer we run a probit model of the following form: 
                 
                                                  (3.5) 
The dependent variable in Equation (3.5) is a dummy that takes the value 1 if firm 
  in country   is a top performer. The vector   includes the control variables that 
were used in Table 3-5. The coefficients and marginal effects from estimating 
(3.5) are reported in Table 3-6. The Pseudo R squared shows that the chosen 
indicators are able to explain a substantial part of whether or not firms are top 
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performers. The results show that the gender and expertise of the owner do not 
significantly influence the likelihood of being a top performer. 
Table 3-6: Probit estimates: dependent variable, being a top performer 
 
(1) (2) 
  Probit Marginal effects 
Participation in international trade     0.4325***     0.0941*** 
 
  (0.0688)        (0.0147) 
Firm size at foundation    -0.0072***     -0.0016*** 
 
  (0.0011)        (0.0008) 
Firms age    -0.0917***     -0.0200*** 
 
  (0.0045)        (0.0008) 
GM expertise     0.0028        0.0006 
 
  (0.0030)        (0.0006) 
Owner has college degree     0.2426***     0.0528*** 
 
  (0.0600)        (0.0129) 
Female GM    -0.0701        -0.0152 
 
  (0.0569)        (0.0124) 
% of foreign ownership     0.0021***     0.0004** 
 
  (0.0008)        (0.0002) 
Constant    0.5227*** 
    (0.1007)      
Country dummies yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes 
N 4751 4751 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.2261   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
Initial firm size and the percentage of foreign ownership show significant 
marginal effects, although the coefficients are very small. Furthermore, the results 
show that younger firms are more likely to be top performers. Since top 
performers and other firms do not differ substantially in terms of the owner’s 
education the positive and significant coefficient on the college dummy is 
unexpected. However, this effect only occurs when we also control for firm age. 
Hence, the reason for the change of significance in the education variable is that 
more educated persons tend to be owners of older firms. This means that not 
considering firm age ‘hides’ the effect of education. After controlling for firm 
age, having a college degree increases the probability of being a top performer by 
roughly 5 percent. The marginal effect of participating in international trade is 
even bigger. The results show that participating in international trade increases 
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the probability of being in the top quintile of employment growth by about 10 
percent.  
The country dummies show that, all else equal, the probability of being a top 
performer is highest in Malaysia, which was chosen as the reference category. 
This result may be driven by a rapidly expanding rubber sector in Malaysia. The 
results from the sector dummies show that being in the machinery or services 
sector significantly lowers the probability of being a top performer. These 
findings need to be interpreted with caution as the hypothesis that the sector 
dummies are jointly zero can only be rejected on 5 percent confidence level, 
according to a joint F test. 
The marginal effect estimates should also be interpreted with caution. The 
potential issues of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity discussed in 
the context of Table 3-4 apply also to the results presented in Table 3-6. Hence, 
the results are correlations rather than causal links. In addition, our data set only 
includes firms that survived until the date of the survey. Not accounting for 
unsuccessful business ventures biases our result upwards. Nonetheless, the 
findings that education and participating in trade substantially increase the 
probability of being a top performer are both interesting and relevant for policy 
makers in Asia. 
Sectoral distribution of top performers 
To design targeted policies to foster employment growth it is also important to 
know which sectors are home to successful entrepreneurs. To examine the 
sectoral division of top performers Table 3-7 shows the percentage of top 
performers by country group and sector. Sector definitions are identical in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam and very similar in Thailand and 




                                                 
85 The data for Lao PDR only distinguish between services and manufacturing. The top performers are 
approximately evenly distributed between the two groups.  
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Table 3-7: Top performers by sector and country group (percent) 
 
Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam Malaysia and Thailand 
 
sector 
% of top 
performers sector 
% of top 
performers 
1 Garments 14.70 Rubber 23.44 
2 Food Processing 14.53 Electronics 13.40 
3 Non metallic mineral products 11.66 Food Processing 12.92 
4 Textiles 10.64 Furniture 11.96 
5 Other manufacturing 9.97 Garments 9.81 
6 Rubber 9.12 Automobile and parts 9.57 
7 Chemicals 8.45 Machinery 7.18 
8 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 6.25 Textiles 6.22 
9 Retail 4.73 Chemicals 3.59 
10 Fabricated metal products 4.56 
Wood and wood 
products 1.20 
11 IT 1.18 
Office accounting and 
computing machine 0.72 
12 Machinery 1.01 
  13 Basic metals 0.84 
  14 Transport 0.84 
  15 Construction 0.68 
  16 Wholesale 0.51 
  17 Services of motor vehicles 0.17 
  18 Hotel and restaurants 0.17     
Total  100.00   100.00 
Source: Author’s computations based on WBES. 
In Table 3-7 we sorted the sectors in descending order according to the 
percentage of top performers. The concentration of top performers is highest in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam where about 20 percent of all sectors 
include 50 percent of all top performers. In Malaysia and Thailand about 30 
percent of all sectors account for 50 percent of the top performers. Note however 
that every fourth top performing firm is in the rubber sector in Malaysia and 
Thailand. In both country groups garment and food processing are among the top 
5 sectors. However, the share of top performers in high technology industries 
such as electronics is about 13 percent in Thailand and Malaysia. This is almost 
twice as high as in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.  
3.4. Conclusions  
 
The motivation for this paper stems from the empirical observation that, despite 
the severe constraints faced by MSEs in developing countries, an important 
number of them have the potential to grow (Grimm et al., 2012). In particular, we 
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examine the role of participating in international trade for employment growth. 
We use firm level data from the World Bank Enterprises Surveys in Indonesia, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam. Due to the cross-
sectional nature of our data set the findings should be interpreted as correlations 
rather than causal relationships. Although an IV approach was employed to deal 
with the potential endogeneity issues, the findings are inconclusive. We examine 
the following questions: 
- Can we observe employment growth in MSEs and if so, do firms that started 
small contribute to overall employment growth? 
Using a compounded measure of employment growth we find that firms in the 
bottom quintile of the initial size distribution grew on average by 20 percent per 
annum, which is significantly higher than the overall average employment growth 
rate of about 10 percent. Our results also show that 15 percent of all jobs created 
by firms in our sample were created by firms in the bottom quintile of the initial 
size distribution. Based on these results, we conclude that firms that started small 
contributed considerably to overall employment growth. 
- How does participating in international trade contribute to employment 
growth? 
We find that, after controlling for firm and individual characteristics, firms that 
export and also import inputs grew on average 3 percent faster than all remaining 
firms, after controlling for country, sector and individual characteristics.  
These results need to be interpreted with caution as the sample only includes 
firms that survived until the date of the survey. Not controlling for unsuccessful 
firms biases our results upwards. Furthermore, given the variables included in our 
data set, we cannot rule out the issue of endogeneity between participating in 
international trade and employment growth. However, the fact that firms start 
exporting quickly after the foundation lends support to the hypothesis that 
participating in international trade causes employment growth and not vice versa. 
The results of the IV estimation do not show a significant effect of trade on 
employment growth, possibly because the only available instrument is somewhat 
weak and the sample is small. However, they provide no evidence to suggest that 
endogeneity is driving the relationship. Also, the first stage estimation results are 
very similar to Park et al. (2010) who use exchange rate fluctuations during the 
Asian crisis as an instrument for trading. Further investigation using this IV 
approach with a larger sample and more precise data could be fruitful. Our 
findings are in line with other studies such as Dinh et al. (2010) and support the 
hypothesis that participating in international trade boosts employment growth.  
A panel data approach using data from Bangladesh between 2007 and 2011 
further confirms our result from Southeast Asia. Using first differences estimation 
The role of international trade for employment growth in micro- and small-




the results show that the correlation between participation in international trade 
and employment growth is significant and positive even after controlling for firm 
level unobservables. 
What are the characteristics of firms that grew particularly fast? 
We define top performing firms as firms in the top quintile of the employment 
growth distribution. The results show the high potential of MSEs, as every third 
top performing enterprises started with fewer than 5 employees. Using probit 
estimates we show that in addition to participating in international trade, which is 
associated with a 10 percent boost in the likelihood of being a top performer, the 
education level of the enterprise owner matters. After controlling for country, 
sector and other individual and firm characteristics, the results show that the 
owner having a college degree increases the likelihood of being a top performer 
by 5 percent. In addition to education of the owner and participating in trade 
younger firms have a higher probability of being top performers. 
What does this mean for policy makers? 
The findings that participating in international trade is associated with 
employment growth and that MSEs play an important role for employment 
growth suggest that policymakers could boost growth and therefore job creation 
by making it easier for firms to plug into international trade networks. A number 
of measures could be considered, such as simplification of customs procedures 
for MSEs or small volumes of exports, provision of information on customs 
procedures, or provision of export credit or guarantee products designed to be 
accessible to MSEs. 
Given the finding that education increase employment growth, these sorts of 
measures are likely to be most effective if they are combined with improved 
access to and quality of training. Training could cover issues such as the 
regulations and norms that are necessary to participate in international trade (e.g. 
quality standards for exports or import regulations to obtain raw materials that 
cannot be sourced domestically). The findings also suggest that entrepreneurs 
who are already educated and have some experience are more likely to initiate 
successful enterprises, and may therefore be more likely to benefit from training. 
Hence, training and information campaigns could be most effective if they are 
targeted at persons with a certain minimum of education. 
The finding that most firms start exporting soon after establishment also has 
policy implications. Advice and training on how to plug into international trade 
networks should be available to potential entrepreneurs even before the 
establishment of an enterprise. 
We observe that only every fourth entrepreneur is female. This may reflect the 
fact that due to, for example, social norms, potentially talented female 
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entrepreneurs lack the opportunity to establish enterprises in the first place. 
Overall, the data do not allow us to make specific recommendations for targeting 
either male or female entrepreneurs, but access to training or other interventions 
should certainly be open to both genders.  
Our results on the question of which sectors are promising are inconclusive. In 
general, targeting of specific gender groups and sectors needs to be decided case 
by case depending on a detailed analysis of the national context.  
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Appendix A-3 – First stage results 
Table 3-8: First stage estimation results 
Dependent variable Export intensity 
Exchange rate shock  -0.684** 
 
(0.262) 
Size at foundation 0.000 
 
(0.000) 






Firm age -0.005* 
 
(0.002) 




  (0.097) 
Country dummies yes 
Sector dummies yes 
R-squared 0.196 
N 308 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Appendix B-3 – Results using panel data from Bangladesh 
 
Table 3-9: Firm growth and trade – panel estimations 
 


































Exports (in 10,000 int. USD)   0.000***     0.001***   1.453*** 
 
(0.000)      (0.000)    (0.518)    
size at enterprise foundation 
 
  -0.000***  
 
  
 (0.000)     
 Firm age 
 
 -0.002***   
 
  
(0.000)      
 College 
 
    0.019***   
 
  
  (0.004)      
 Female GM 
 
    0.002      
 
  
  (0.011)      
 Constant  68.069***     0.070***    -29.009   
  (9.074)      (0.008)      (68.287)   
Country dummies yes yes no 
Sector dummies yes yes no 
N 1097 1089 200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041 0.203 0.017 
Notes: In the first two columns we correct for influential outliers using the methodology of 
Belsley et al. (1980). 
Source: Author’s computation based on WBES. 
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We examine the role of firm size dynamics in wage inequality in Thailand 
between 1995 and 2005 using data from the Thai Labour Force Surveys (LFS). 
Over this time period wage inequality rose, contrary to the trend for overall 
income inequality. The data reveal a ‘missing middle’ pattern in Thailand’s firm 
distribution and a clear correlation between firm size and wages, even controlling 
for other factors. A regression based decomposition analysis confirms that the 
firm size distribution plays a significant role in explaining wage inequality, which 
is significant even controlling for region, sector and education level of workers. 
The ‘missing middle’ became more accentuated between 1995 and 2005. 
Although wages converged at the bottom of the firm size distribution, the gap 
between wages paid by the smallest and largest firms increased. The overall 
effect of the change in relative wages was mildly disequalizing.  
  
                                                 
 The author would like to thank Nina Fenton for valuable comments. 






In this paper we examine the implications of firm size dynamics, including the 
role of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) for inequality, by examining the 
relationship between the firm size distribution and wage inequality in Thailand 
between 1995 and 2005.
86
 We use data from the Thai Labour Force Surveys 
(LFS) of 1995 and 2005.
 
 
Much of the academic and policy debate about the firm size distribution in 
developing countries has related to the phenomenon of ‘dualism’ or the ‘missing 
middle’. As discussed by Tybout (2000) and by Ayyagari et al. (2003) the firm 
size distribution in developing countries tends to be characterized by a large 
number of small and micro enterprises, which coexist with a small number of 
large enterprises (despite being small in number, these large enterprises may 
nonetheless be significant providers of employment). Medium-sized enterprises 
are found to be underrepresented, relative to developed countries. The reasons for 
this pattern and its implications for the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and employment have been the subject of lively debate, based on both theoretical 
and empirical work. 
Inequality is also a subject of keen interest. The so-called ‘Kuznets hypothesis’ 
suggested that developing countries are likely to experience rising income 
inequality alongside economic growth, with inequality beginning to fall only after 
they reach a particular level of per capita income.
87
 However, more recent 
evidence (see for example Deininger and Squire, 1998 and Fields, 1989) indicates 
that this relationship is neither universal nor inevitable. This raises the possibility 
that, with appropriate measures, policymakers may be able to reduce or limit 
inequality.  
Policies aiming to influence the firm size distribution have frequently been 
suggested as effective measures to reduce inequality or mitigate its rise, 
particularly in developing countries.
88
 A number of governments and 
development agencies have invested, directly or indirectly, in supporting MSEs 
with the explicit aim of reducing inequality or promoting ‘inclusive growth’.
89
 
These policies could have substantial implications for inequality, as well as for 
                                                 
86 Although the rest of this thesis focuses on informal enterprises, it is difficult to distinguish informal from 
formal enterprises using the data analyzed in this chapter, because the surveys focus on labour force 
participants rather than firms. As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the ILO uses firm size as one 
criterion in an operational definition of an informal enterprise. In practice there is substantial (although 
incomplete) overlap between MSEs and informal enterprises. Therefore, this paper focuses on the firm size 
distribution, regardless of formal registration status. We believe that the findings will nonetheless be relevant 
to the academic and policy debate on the informal sector. 
87 This hypothesis stems from the frequently-quoted work of Simon Kuznets (Kuznets, 1963). 
88 See for example: OECD (2013), which discusses inequality as a key topic for international policy debate. 
89 Inequality and the importance of MSEs for inclusive growth are stressed for instance in the strategy 2020 
of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (ADB 2010, 2008). Projects such as the ‘Inclusive Micro, Small, and 
Medium-Sized Enterprise Development Project’ (ADB) confirm that support to MSEs is seen as a priority 
development intervention by development partners and governments in Asia. 




growth and employment. Yet the links between the firm size distribution and 
inequality have received relatively little attention in the literature. The nature of 
the relationship cannot be understood a priori, but must be analysed using 
empirical evidence, providing the motivation for this chapter.  
Thailand was selected as a case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, although a 
number of existing studies examine firm size dynamics (Mead and Liedholm, 
1998, Wiboonchutikula, 2002, and OECD, 2002), labour market changes (ILO, 
2013) and inequality dynamics (Bird et al., 2011; Warr, 2004) in Thailand, there 
has been little or no analysis of linkages between the firm size distribution and 
inequality.  
Secondly, the pattern experienced by Thailand during the period analysed – 
relatively rapid growth with poverty reduction and stable income inequality – 
makes this an interesting example for both the academic debate and policy 
makers. Economic growth in Thailand was relatively robust, at 5 percent on 
average between 1990 and 2011 even though the country was badly affected by 
internal and external shocks such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998, the 
recent economic crisis that started in 2008 and floods in 2011. In July 2011 
Thailand’s income categorization was upgraded to upper middle-income by the 
World Bank. From a largely agrarian economy Thailand has developed 
significant industrial and service sectors, particularly manufacturing and tourism. 
Manufactured products made up 73% of exports in 2011 (World Bank, 2012) and 
Thailand is a leading regional hub for the automobile and electronics industries 
(Wignaraja et al., 2013).  
Alongside economic growth, Thailand has made substantial progress in reducing 
poverty. Poverty incidence (the headcount ratio) at the national poverty line fell 
from 58.1 percent in 1990 to 13.15 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). 
Impressive improvements were also made on non-income indicators, including 
those used in the Human Development Index (United Nations Development 
Program, 2013). For instance, life expectancy rose from 72.5 years in 1990 to 
74.3 years in 2012 and expected years of schooling rose from 8.4 in 1990 to 12.3 
in 2012.  
Economic growth has not benefitted everyone equally. Certain regional and 
population groups, particularly rural communities and ethnic minorities in the 
Northeast and South of the country, remain among the country’s poorest groups 
(Bird et al., 2011) and continue to lag behind on both income and non-income 
dimensions of poverty. Nonetheless, overall income inequality, measured by the 
Gini coefficient, fluctuated only slightly over time, from 0.429 in 1996 to 0.424 
in 2006. Since that time the Gini has fallen further, to 0.394 in 2010 (World 
Bank, 2013). The analysis is therefore likely to be of interest to policymakers 
from developing countries experiencing or seeking to emulate rapid growth and 




poverty reduction without rising inequality, especially those wishing to 
understand the roles industrial policy and support to small entrepreneurs can play.  
Thirdly, the Government of Thailand is committed to reduction of inequality as a 
policy objective, alongside economic growth.
90
 Since 2001, a dedicated 
government office has taken care of development and implementation of specific 
strategic plans for development of small and medium enterprises. In addition, the 
government hopes that more microenterprises, many of which are currently 
informal, can be formalized, adding to the tax base. The analysis of this paper 
may help policymakers to understand the implications of policies affecting MSEs, 
for inequality.  
Finally, data on firm size and wages, which are required for this analysis, are 
available for the period in question, specifically, from the Thai LFS of 1995 and 
2005.  
The findings of this chapter reveal a ‘missing middle’ pattern in Thailand’s firm 
distribution (4.3.3), and a clear correlation between firm size and wages, even 
controlling for other factors (4.3.4). A regression based decomposition analysis 
confirms that firm size plays a significant role in explaining wage inequality, as 
these two findings imply (4.3.6). The role of the firm size wage differential is 
significant even when controlling for region, sector and education level of 
workers.  
The empirical findings of this paper show that, contrary to our expectations, the 
‘missing middle’ became more accentuated between 1995 and 2005. The share of 
the largest firms in employment grew while the proportion in MSEs was stable. 
Over the same time period wage inequality rose, contrary to the trend for overall 
income inequality (4.3.5). This finding that wage inequality rose, while overall 
income inequality fell, could be explained by increased participation of workers 
in the wage labour market (Rendall, 2013) or by other trends that increase 
participation in wage labor, such as on-going industrialization and urbanization . 
In particular, the expansion of female labour market participation over this period 
is likely to have played a role. Although wages converged at the bottom of the 
firm size distribution, the gap between wages paid by the smallest and largest 
firms increased. The overall effect of the change in relative wages was mildly 
disequalizing. 
We find that MSEs are disproportionately located in the poorer regions of the 
country, and in the agricultural sector. The average education level of workers 
also rises with firm size. The decomposition results show that education and 
region play more important roles than the firm size distribution in explaining 
levels of inequality. Increased education has also played a highly significant role 
                                                 
90 See the Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012–2016), available at: 
http://www.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/news/plan/p11/Plan11_eng.pdf. 




in explaining rising wage inequality, as highly educated workers are paid above 
the average wage. However, the role of firm size is robust to controlling for these 
correlated factors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 develops a simple 
conceptual framework and derives testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are 
tested in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 concludes. 
4.2. Conceptual framework 
 
This section reviews the literature on the firm size distribution in developing 
countries, and examines the links between firm size and wages. Bringing together 
these two strands of literature allows us to draw hypotheses about the relationship 
between the firm size distribution and wages inequality, which we apply to the 
case of Thailand.  
4.2.1. The firm size distribution in developing countries 
 
Tybout (2000), drawing heavily on evidence from Liedholm and Mead (1987), 
identified a common pattern, which he calls ‘dualism’, in the firm size 
distribution of developing countries: large numbers of microenterprises coexist 
with a few modern, large-scale firms. By contrast the firm-size distribution in 
developed economies tends to be closer to log-normal (Cabral and Mata, 2003). 
This phenomenon has become known as the ‘missing middle’ and is confirmed 
by recent cross-country data. Ayyagari et al. (2003) find that, in high-income 
countries, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are responsible for over 50 
percent of GDP and over 60 percent of employment. But they account for less 
than half of that share in low-income countries, where microenterprises are more 
important. This gap in the firm distribution is often referred to as the ‘missing 
middle’. In theory, firms would adopt the most efficient production technology, 
and select the most efficient mix of labour and capital, so one would not expect 
heterogeneous firm sizes within industries. The observed heterogeneity of the 
distribution therefore requires some explanation, and a substantial theoretical and 
empirical literature has investigated the reasons behind this pattern 
 
A number of authors have generated models where differences in firm size arise 
because of differences in productivity. In the model by Lucas (1978) firms choose 
the most efficient size given their underlying production technology, so the firm 
size distribution depends on the distribution of productivity types. Differences in 
firm size could also arise, in a model without market imperfections, from 
differing risk preferences (Kihlstrom and Lafont, 1979). Likewise, if firms face 
differing productivity shocks then, over time, this could influence the firm size 
distribution (Jovanovic, 1982 and Hopenhayn, 1992). The distribution of 
productivity, risk preferences or productivity shocks, or other firm characteristics 




in developing countries would, in this class of models, explain the missing 
middle.  
 
On the other hand, the nature of markets and institutions in developing countries, 
rather than firm characteristics, could be the main factor behind the missing 
middle. Credit market imperfections, for example, tend to be most severe for 
small firms in developing countries (Dinh et al., 2010). Cabral and Mata (2003) 
find, using a sample of manufacturing firms in Portugal, that the firm size 
distribution changed, as the economy expanded, from a right skewed pattern (in 
line with a missing middle) towards a lognormal distribution. The authors find 
that credit constraints, which impact particularly severely on small and young 
firms (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), explain this pattern, preventing firms growing 
to a medium-size. In the model of Rauch (1991), larger firms are assumed to face 
higher unit input costs than smaller firms, if they are formally registered. This 
may occur in developing countries if the government fails to enforce regulations 
on small, informal enterprises. The most talented entrepreneurs operate large 
firms and benefit from returns to scale, which cover the higher input costs, while 
less talented entrepreneurs choose to remain small and informal in order to escape 
enforcement. This is consistent with a ‘missing middle’ pattern. Empirical 
findings from Tanzania and Sri Lanka by Levy (1993) show that bureaucratic 
burdens have the largest impacts on small firms, if such firms are formally 
registered. Alternatively, the largest firms may be able to lobby government for 
preferential tax breaks or other special treatment. It is also possible that small 
firms predominate in developing countries because of the different structure of 
demand – poorer households are more likely than wealthier ones to demand 
simple goods that can be produced easily by small firms (Tybout, 2000). 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the ‘missing middle’ pattern is 
widespread in developing countries and explained by a number of factors. In a 
comprehensive review Tybout (2000) finds that institutional entry barriers and 
imperfections in financial and labour markets are often present, but that small and 
geographically dispersed markets and the nature of consumer demand also seem 
to play a role, as well as factors such as uncertainty about demand and policies, 
corruption and lack of rule of law.  
 
4.2.2. The relationship between firm size and wages  
 
The links between firm size and wages will determine the effects of the firm size 
distribution on wage inequality, and these are therefore reviewed below.  
 
Many models have taken the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper and 
Samuelson, 1941), or similar models as a starting point for analysis of wages and 
wage inequality. In these models wages are assumed to be related to the 




characteristics of workers, and the main determinant of inequality is the relative 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers – the return to skills. In these models 
differences in wages between large and small firms would reflect the differences 
in skills of their respective employees, usually proxied by their education levels. 
Differences in skill level between firms of different sizes could arise because of 
differences in production technologies or for other reasons. For example, the 
model of Helpman et al. (2010) assumes that it is costly for firms to verify the 
ability of workers. Combined with the assumption of wage bargaining, the model 
predicts that the most productive firms invest more in screening, meaning that 
they are able to hire more able workers and pay higher wages. However, 
empirical evidence tends to contradict this theorem. In particular, as noted by 
Felbermayr et al. (2013), a far larger proportion of wage inequality can generally 
be traced to disparities within relatively narrow skill classes, often attributable to 
firm characteristics, including firm size, than to observed worker characteristics. 
Further evidence, using individual fixed-effects (Söderbom et al., 2005), indicates 
that the wage differences observed between firms of different sizes cannot be 
traced to differences in unobserved worker characteristics.  
 
A relationship between firm characteristics such as size and wages can occur 
without differences in worker characteristics. A number of relevant models have 
been based on the concept of fair wages or efficiency wages, in the context of 
imperfectly observed effort, inspired by Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990) and by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In all of these models firms pay their 
workers a ‘premium’ to exert effort, because effort is imperfectly observed. If 
workers’ wage expectations are related to the productivity or profits of the firms, 
more productive firms will pay higher wages – a form of rent sharing (e.g. Egger 
and Kreickemeier 2010, 2012, and Amiti and Davis, 2012). Evidence suggests 
that larger firms are more productive on average (van Biesebroeck, 2005a), so it 
is reasonable to expect a positive relationship between firm size and wages. The 
model of Davis and Harrigan (2012) introduces heterogeneity in the ability to 
monitor workers. If larger firms have a lower ability to detect ‘shirking’, they will 
pay higher wages. Higher productivity among larger firms can be an assumption 
of these sorts of models, but also an outcome, as in the case of Egger and 
Kreieckmeier (2010).  
 
Characteristics of the search and hiring process can also generate a relationship 
between firm characteristics, including size, and wages. In the model of 
Felbermayr et al. (2013) a relationship between firm size and wages arises 
because of convex costs to hiring new workers. Expanding firms fill their 
vacancies faster by increasing wages to make the jobs more attractive. Therefore, 
firm growth leads to wage dispersion, with a positive link between wages and 
firm productivity. The model of Coşar et al. (2011) is another example where the 
need to search for workers and the costs of adjustment lead to a positive link 




between wages and firm size. A relationship may also arise if larger firms have 
higher collective wage bargaining coverage.  
 
Overall, it is quite clear that a strong relationship between firm size and wages 
does exist, including in developing countries (Söderbom et al., 2005). Based on 
the evidence of Mead and Liedholm (1987) it seems plausible to expect wages to 
be higher in larger enterprises (with more than one person). Although empirical 
evidence has so far failed to conclusively identify the reasons for the relationship, 
the finding of Söderbom et al. (2005) that the relationship is robust to including 
individual fixed effects shows that it cannot be fully explained by worker 
characteristics, observed or unobserved.  
4.2.3. Implications for inequality: hypotheses regarding the firm size 
distribution and wage inequality 
 
The two streams of literature described above imply that a link between the firm 
size distribution and inequality will arise, because of two empirical regularities. 
Firstly, the distribution of firms by size is generally heterogeneous and, in 
developing countries, skewed towards a ‘missing middle’ pattern. Secondly, for a 
variety of reasons, many of which are unrelated to worker characteristics, firm 
size is positively related to wages.  
 
Conceptually, then, the wage distribution will be affected both by the nature of 
the firm size distribution – whether or not a ‘missing middle’ exists – and by the 
strength of the relationship between firm size and wages. The evolution of wage 
inequality over time will be impacted by two trends: the evolution of the firm size 
distribution as the economy develops, and whether the correlation between wages 
and firm size strengthens or weakens.  
 
Bearing in mind the rapid economic growth and industrial development that took 
place in Thailand during the period analysed, this conceptual framework allows 
us to draw the following hypotheses: 
 
1. A ‘missing middle’ pattern can be observed in Thailand, as in other 
developing economies – medium-sized firms account for a lower 
proportion of employment than would be expected in a developed 
country. 
 
2. There is a strong correlation, unexplained by observed worker 
characteristics, between firm size and wages in Thailand, as in other 
economies. 
 




Taken together, these two hypotheses imply that the firm size 
distribution in Thailand plays a significant role in explaining wage 
inequality. 
 
3. The ‘missing middle’ pattern became less pronounced over the period 
analysed, moving towards lognormal. In other words, the proportion of 
workers employed in medium-sized firms rose, while the proportion 
working in small and micro enterprises fell. A number of the institutional 
or market imperfections that are hypothesized to explain the ‘missing 
middle’ pattern in the literature reviewed above, such as poorly 
functioning capital markets or excessive burdens of taxation and 
bureaucracy, might be expected to have improved, either as a cause or as a 
consequence of economic development. An increased importance of 
medium-sized firms would be consistent with the pattern observed in 
Portugal by Cabral and Mata (2003) and with the fact that firm size 
distributions in developed economies tend towards lognormal. 
 
4. The correlation between wages and firm size has become weaker over the 
period analysed. In a number of the models reviewed above, the links 
between firm size and wages are related to market or institutional 
imperfections. As noted, we expect these problems to have improved as 
the Thai economy has developed. 
 
The two preceding hypotheses imply a fall in wage inequality, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 also imply that the importance of firm size as 
a factor explaining wage inequality will have decreased over time 
 
Although regional, educational and sectoral disparities are not the main focus of 
this chapter, they have been consistently found to play important roles in 
explaining inequality in Thailand. Understanding their impacts will help us to put 
the findings regarding firm size into context. We also expect these factors to be 
related with firm size. Therefore, we will also examine how these factors relate to 
firm size dynamics, what role they play in explaining inequality, and control for 
them where feasible and appropriate. 
 
4.3. Empirical analysis 
 
After a short description of the data used (4.3.1) and of the labour force context 
(4.3.2), this section proceeds in line with the hypotheses above. Firstly, we 
examine whether the firm size distribution is characterized by a ‘missing middle’ 




(4.3.3). Links between wages and firm size are explored in 4.3.4. The wage 
distribution is described in 4.3.5 and static and dynamic decomposition analyses 
are used to understand the links between wage inequality and the firm size 
distribution in 4.3.6. 
4.3.1. Data description 
 
We use household data from the Thai Labour Force Survey (LFS) 1995 and 2005. 
The LFS surveys are the most complete source of information about labour force 
dynamics in Thailand. The samples are representative of the entire population, 
which included about 31.1 million active labour force participants in 1995 and 
34.4 million in 2005.  
The LFS surveys did not ask self-employed workers to provide additional 
information about their firms, meaning that no information is available on firm 
size or other characteristics for firms without employees. This affects our 
understanding of the firm size distribution – workers from one person enterprises 
and from small or family-run businesses that don’t pay wages, are omitted from 
the analysis.
91
 However, the self-employed and employers earn no wages, so 
these firms could not, in any case, be included in an analysis of wage inequality. 
Further analysis would be needed to understand the impact of incomes from self-
employment and family businesses on overall income inequality. Government 
workers are also excluded. Although these workers report wages, the question of 
firm size is difficult to apply to the public sector.
92
  
Another limitation of the LFS is that the firm size variable is discrete, rather than 
continuous. This choice may well be justified, if respondents find it easier to give 
an answer within a range, leading to fewer missing values. But, it makes 
comparison with other sources, which use different cut-offs for firm size groups, 
difficult. This is particularly true for the 1995 LFS, where the upper group covers 
all firms with 100 or more employees. However, the analytical techniques used 
are compatible with discrete data, and we believe that the size categories provide 
sufficient detail to give a meaningful insight into the questions at hand. 
Throughout the analysis we use frequency weights, which reflect the number of 
workers represented by each observation. This means that our results reflect the 
importance of firms and firm size from the perspective of workers – this is 
considered most appropriate for analysis of wage inequality.
93
 
4.3.2. The context: the changing labour force structure 
 
                                                 
91 The same problem is acknowledged by other authors, for example Wiboonchutikula (2002). 
92 This question could be applied, in theory to state-owned enterprises. However, as these enterprises may 
differ in many ways from private sector firms we have excluded them from the analysis. As they account for 
a very small proportion of employment this makes no substantive difference to our results.  
93 The alternative option would be to weight the observations by the number of firms they represent.  




The changing structure of the Thai labour force is important context for our 
analysis. Table 4-1 shows the distribution of the labour force of Thailand by 
status, industry, and region in 1995 and 2005. It should firstly be noted that 
between 1995 and 2005 the size of the active labour force increased in all regions, 
from 31.1 to 34.4 million in total. Much of this change was likely related to the 
fact that the working age population increased faster than the overall population, 
so the country experienced a ‘demographic dividend’. Several sources have noted 
the contribution of demographic change to economic growth in Thailand (for 
example, Mason and Lee, 2006).  
Regional shifts between 1995 and 2005 do not appear large. Bangkok’s share in 
the labour force fell slightly, more than compensated by a rise in the share of the 
surrounding Central region. The share of the Southern region rose very slightly, 
while the other regions fell slightly. This relatively muted change over a ten year 
period seems surprising, given that substantial migration flows have been 
documented away from rural and remote areas and towards Bangkok and the 
surrounding region (as reviewed in Punpuing and Richter, 2011). It is likely that 
the financial crisis of 1997/8, which was felt disproportionately in Bangkok, 
played a role in slowing, and even reversing, migration during the period studied. 
Punpuing and Richter (2011) find evidence for a substantial rise in urban-rural 
migration during the crisis. These ‘reverse’ migration flows continued after the 
crisis and even increased in 2002. It is also possible that the LFS underestimates 
migration, if some unregistered or temporary migrants are excluded from the 
sample. Other factors, such as an increase in the rate of enrolment in tertiary 
education, could also have contributed to a fall in the economic activity rate in 
Bangkok. The finding that the share of the Central region rose is also consistent 
with the findings of Punpuing and Richter (2011) who found, using a national 
survey of migration, that workers migrated to the Central region rather than to 
Bangkok during this period.  
We also observe a substantial increase in the share of private employees in the 
labour force, by around 8 percentage points, and the decrease in the share of 
unpaid family members, by almost 10 percentage points. As the size of the labour 
force increased, the findings in Table 4-1 imply that more than 3.6 million 
additional jobs in private companies were added to the economy – new labour 
force entrants and, possibly, previously unpaid family employees have been 
absorbed into the private sector.
94
 About 1.2 million more people were self-
employed. Over the same time period, the number of unpaid family workers fell 
by 2.4 million. There was a slight increase in the proportion of individuals who 
reported being an employer or government employee and a slight decrease in the 
proportion of persons working in state enterprises.  
                                                 
94 It is not possible to tell, using these data, whether these jobs were provided by new firms entering the 
market, or through expansion of existing firms. 




Structural change was also pronounced. The proportion working in agriculture 
fell in all regions apart from Bangkok – where agricultural activity is insignificant 
– by seven percentage points overall. Industry and services expanded by 2 and 7 
percentage points respectively. Bangkok was the only exception to this pattern. In 
1995 the city already had a sizeable industrial base, accounting for 41 percent of 
the labour force. Between 1995 and 2005 the structure shifted towards services, 
which by 2005 accounted for 68 percent of employment.  
Table 4-1: Overview of labour force structure by status, industry, and region (percent) 
  All Bangkok Central Northern Northeastern Southern 
  1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
Share of employment (percent) 
Agriculture 50.9 41.1 0.4 0.5 34.7 23.5 59.7 51.1 72.9 61.7 52.2 44.5 
Industry 20.2 22.7 40.8 31.4 32.1 37.1 15.0 18.2 10.0 13.6 15.9 15.8 
Services 28.9 36.3 58.8 68.1 33.2 39.3 25.4 30.7 17.1 24.6 31.8 39.6 
Share of employment (percent) 
Employer 2.8 3.0 4.2 4.8 3.3 2.9 3.4 3.7 1.8 1.7 2.6 3.7 
Self employed 
w/o employees 
28.7 29.4 18.9 17.4 24.5 22.3 30.3 30.9 31.9 38.4 34.4 29.3 
Unpaid family 
worker 
31.4 21.6 9.1 7.2 21.6 15.0 31.1 24.5 45.7 31.2 30.4 18.5 
Government 
employee 




1.2 1.0 3.5 2.6 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.1 
Private 
employee 
29.2 37.1 57.3 59.9 42.0 51.3 27.7 32.0 14.6 20.6 23.5 38.1 
Education 
None 3.7 3.1 1.2 1.5 2.8 8.1 7.0 8.1 2.4 1.3 5.8 3.7 
Less than 
elementary 50.5 33.3 33.1 17.1 49.7 39.8 56.2 39.8 54.7 40.0 47.3 29.7 
Elementary 24.3 24.1 19.9 19.1 22.0 20.1 20.3 20.1 30.1 30.4 22.7 24.3 
Lower 
secondary 9.5 15.0 13.2 15.1 11.7 13.3 8.4 13.3 6.9 13.2 11.2 15.9 
Upper 
secondary 6.5 12.4 15.5 16.0 7.8 10.5 4.5 10.5 3.6 9.5 7.4 13.7 
Post secondary 5.5 12.1 17.1 31.2 6.1 8.3 3.6 8.3 2.2 5.5 5.5 12.6 
Share of the active labour force 
Share of the 
active labour 
force 
100.0 100.0 11.6 11.2 22.3 25.4 19.3 18.1 34.7 32.3 12.1 13.1 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005. 
The period was also characterized by a significant increase in the education level 
of the workforce. The share of the labour force with at least secondary education 
has increased in all regions, while the proportion with elementary or less than 
elementary fell across the board. There was a slight increase in the proportion 
with no education in Bangkok (from a very low base) and the Northern region, 
and a more substantial increase in the Central region, possibly because the area 
has seen an influx of uneducated workers from other regions. Bangkok saw a 




particularly significant rise in the proportion of workers with post-secondary 
education. By 2005 these made up about 31 percent of the workforce. 
4.3.3. The missing middle in Thailand: the firm size distribution 
 
Table 4-2 describes the firm size distribution using the LFS 1995 and 2005 and 
compares the estimates with others available from the literature. This comparison 
is intended as a plausibility check and in order to see how the distribution 
compares with those seen in developed countries. It should be noted that 
understanding the firm size distribution in Thailand is complicated by 
methodological inconsistencies between sources. Different government agencies 
use and report different firm size categories and employ different data collection 
methodologies (OECD, 2011). In particular, as noted above, the categories in the 
LFS do not overlap perfectly with the categories used in other sources, and we 
have no data on one-person or other microenterprises without paid workers. We 
should therefore bear in mind that the importance of microenterprises as sources 
of employment is understated.  
Our results represent the situation for private sector employees. These were 29 
and 37 percent of the active labour force in 1995 and 2005, respectively, but 79 
and 81 percent of all wage workers. 
Table 4-2: The firm size distribution in Thailand, percent of employment by firm size over 
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The results clearly describe a dualistic distribution. For small and medium-sized 
firms, the percentage employed declines monotonically with firm size category, 
despite the fact that the ‘width’ of the categories increases. In 1995, 31 percent of 
private sector workers worked in firms with 9 or fewer employees and 28 percent 
in firms with between 10 and 49. Only 8 percent of workers were employed in 
medium-sized enterprises, with between 50 and 99 workers, but a substantial 




proportion – 23 percent – worked in large firms, with over 100 employees.
95
 In 
the 2005 data we can distinguish firms with over 200 employees, which provides 
even more convincing evidence of the ‘missing middle’. Only 7 percent of 
workers are employed in the smaller group of large firms, with between 100 and 
200 workers, while 23 percent work in the largest firms, of 200 workers or 
more.
96
 When compared with developed countries (data on Germany and Japan 
from OECD, 2011, are provided as an example), this suggests a pronounced 
missing middle.  
Contrary to the hypothesis in 4.2.3, the firm size distribution has not moved 
towards a log-normal distribution between 1995 and 2005. The proportion 
employed in the smallest firms has stayed roughly static, but there has been an 
increase of around 7 percent in the proportion working in the largest enterprises. 
Our results differ from those of Wiboonchutikula (2002), who found, in 1996, a 
far lower share of employment in the smallest enterprises – just 6 percent worked 
in firms with 9 employees or fewer. Alongside this finding, the author found the 
share of large and medium-sized enterprises to be substantially higher than in 
most of the developing countries included in Tybout’s (2000) review. Firms with 
50 or more employees accounted for 78 percent of jobs, and enterprises with 
between 10 and 50 workers 16 percent.  
 
However, recent estimates by the OECD (2011) are in line with our results, as 
they also indicate a ‘missing middle’ pattern.
97
 The categories do not overlap 
perfectly with those of the LFS, and in particular do not permit detailed analysis 
at the lower end of the firm size distribution, but the aggregated results are quite 
close to ours. The OECD (2011) report shows little significant difference between 
Thailand and OECD countries in terms of the proportion of employment, GDP 
and exports accounted for by SMEs (here defined as enterprises with fewer than 
200 employees). These accounted for 77 percent of employment in 2005. 
However, SMEs with more than 50 employees are underrepresented compared to 
OECD countries and to other Asian non-OECD countries, accounting for just 12 
percent of employment.  
 
The comparability of our findings to those of Liedlholm and Mead (1987) is 
limited, as they date to 1978. However, they also appear a plausible fit with our 
findings, and suggest a missing middle pattern. We therefore conclude that the 
results of Wiboonchutikula (2002) are likely to have been affected by the 
methodological issues mentioned above and that the missing middle result is 
plausible.  
                                                 
95 As noted above, the LFS do not include full information on the smallest household enterprises, as they 
have no employees. If these enterprises were to be included the pattern of the ‘missing middle’ would be 
expected to be even more pronounced. 
96 In the analysis that follows we use the 1995 categories, for the sake of comparability. 
97 Although using a different definition of ‘medium size’ than Tybout (2000). 





Further insights come from examining the relationship between the firm size 
distribution and region (Table 4-3). The distribution of firm sizes in Bangkok is 
much more evenly spread than in other regions, closer to distributions observed in 
developed countries. In other words, it is not characterized by a ‘missing middle’. 
In all of the other regions a large proportion of workers are employed in micro 
and small enterprises, with very few in either medium-sized firms. The Central 
region differs from the other regions as it does have a relatively large share, 
exceeding that of Bangkok, of workers in the largest firms. However, medium-
sized firms are absent here too.  
Over the period studied the ‘missing middle’ became more pronounced in all 
regions, with the share of workers in firms with between 20 and 99 workers 
falling across the board. The overall rise in the share of the largest enterprises can 
be traced mainly to the Central region, where it increased by almost 13 
percentage points. The increase was somewhat smaller in Bangkok and the North 
and almost insignificant elsewhere. The share of the smallest microenterprises fell 
in all regions apart from the South, where it increased by over 10 percent.  
Table 4-3: Firm size distribution by region, 1995 and 2005, percent 
 
Bangkok Central Northern Northeastern Southern 
Firm 
size 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
1-4 14.15 13.40 23.65 16.97 31.17 26.57 29.49 25.62 34.20 44.91 
4-9 11.09 9.45 17.81 14.05 25.94 24.45 25.49 27.14 21.22 15.88 
10-19 12.73 12.27 11.54 10.66 18.39 19.52 15.37 18.79 14.15 11.68 
20-49 18.90 17.60 8.35 7.89 10.20 10.02 9.98 9.87 11.15 9.15 
50-99 13.35 12.19 7.32 6.15 4.79 4.31 6.02 4.05 6.85 5.89 
>100 29.77 35.09 31.34 44.27 9.50 15.14 13.66 14.53 12.44 12.49 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005.  
The firm distribution also varies by sector (results available from author upon 
request). MSEs are largely concentrated in the relatively poorly paid agricultural 
sector, and, to a lesser extent, services. Changes in the firm size distribution 
between 1995 and 2005 have served to accentuate this pattern. The proportion of 
large firms in industry (over 100 employees) grew significantly. It also increased 
slightly among service firms. In 2005, 45 percent of industrial workers and 23 
percent of service sector employees worked in firms with 100 employees or more. 
In other words, the character of these sectors changed significantly, from being 
made up mainly of smaller firms to being dominated by relatively large 
enterprises. This may be a reflection of changes in fast-growing industries such as 
automobiles and electronics. The change of firm size composition within the 
agricultural sector has been small.  




It is also worth noting that firm size is strongly correlated with education, with 
larger firms particularly likely to hire more educated workers (Table 4-4). In 1995 
the share of workers with post-secondary education was 14 percent in the largest 
firms, compared to just 2 percent in the smallest microenterprises. The share of 
workers with post-secondary education rose to about 25 percent in 2005 among 
the largest firms, but to just 3 percent in the smallest. 
Table 4-4: Education level by firm size, 1995 and 2005, percent 
 
1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-100 >100 Total 
   
1995 
    None 5.3 6.5 4.4 1.5 1.4 0.7 3.5 
Less than elementary 48.0 48.8 45.0 36.4 25.1 23.0 38.7 
Elementary 31.8 27.2 26.1 26.8 30.5 27.7 28.4 
Lower secondary 9.3 10.1 11.6 9.3 15.2 18.1 12.3 
Upper secondary 3.7 4.4 6.9 13.1 15.1 16.5 9.4 
Post-Secondary 2.0 2.9 6.0 12.8 12.6 14.0 7.7 
   
2005 
    None 6.0 5.0 5.1 3.5 1.4 0.9 3.6 
Less than elementary 32.4 32.3 28.0 21.7 15.9 11.0 23.2 
Elementary 32.1 31.1 29.5 23.4 21.9 18.0 25.8 
Lower secondary 17.0 16.8 15.9 16.0 18.5 22.1 18.3 
Upper secondary 9.2 9.5 10.7 15.4 17.9 22.8 14.8 
Post-Secondary 3.4 5.3 10.7 20.0 24.4 25.1 14.3 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005 
Overall, notwithstanding the problems of comparability between sources, we 
observe a clear ‘missing middle’ pattern in the firm size distribution in 1995 and 
2005. We find this result broadly plausible in comparison with estimates from 
other sources. The ‘missing middle’ is visible in all regions except for Bangkok, 
where the distribution is close to the patterns observed in developed countries. 
The LFS results indicate that, rather than declining as expected, the ‘missing 
middle’ has increased between 1995 and 2005 due to an increase in the 
proportion employed in the largest firms. This increase occurred mainly in the 
Central region, but also in Bangkok and the North of the country. Meanwhile, the 
share of medium-sized firms fell, slightly, across the board and the share of the 
smallest firms increased in the South.  
4.3.4. The relationship between wages and firm size 
 
In both 1995 and 2005 we see a correlation between wages and firm size (Table 
4-5), with wages rising monotonically with firm size category. The one exception 
to this relationship is that in 2005 wages in the medium-sized firms were slightly 
higher than wages in the largest enterprises.  




Table 4-5 Wages per enterprise group for employees in private enterprises (Int. USD) 
 






































1 to 4 194 161 22 261 213 22 35 67 
5 to 9 212 161 19 247 210 17 16 35 
10 to 19 246 188 15 321 240 14 30 75 
20 to 49 346 250 13 433 292 10 25 87 
50 to 99 330 237 8 503 312 7 52 173 
over 100 396 242 23 498 292 30 26 102 
Sector 
Agriculture 157 129 17 214 175 18 37 57 
Industry 283 220 52 354 266 49 25 70 
Services 351 242 31 492 301 32 40 140 
Region 
Bangkok 461 314 23 642 403 18 39 181 
Central 276 220 32 384 274 35 39 107 
Northern 185 161 18 227 187 16 23 42 
Northeastern 190 161 17 230 195 18 21 40 
Southern 234 194 10 338 263 13 44 104 
Education 
None 200 129 4 187 164 4 -7 -13 
Less than elementary 206 178 39 252 213 23 22 46 
Elementary 206 190 29 258 230 26 25 52 
Lower secondary 280 226 12 292 253 18 4 12 
Upper secondary 408 315 9 386 292 15 -6 -22 
Post secondary 807 603 8 897 584 14 11 90 
Total 282 210   372 263   32 90 
Notes: The estimated proportion of the labour force in each group differs from that of Table 4-1 
because this table covers only private sector employees.  
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005; Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
conversion factors from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013).  
These findings are put into perspective, however, by the importance of the 
correlation between wages and other variables, particularly education. Wages rise 
monotonically with education, in both years, with particularly sharp increases at 
the upper secondary level and post-secondary levels.
98
 The regional differences 
are also pronounced – in 1995 mean wages in Bangkok were more than twice the 
level of those in the lowest wage region, the Northeast. Average real wages were 
lowest in agriculture and highest in services, in both years, although the 
                                                 
98 Returns to education are not calculated in this chapter, but these results suggest that they are high. 




differences were less pronounced than those between regions or educational 
levels. 
We use regression analysis, with monthly wage in Int. USD as the dependent 
variable, to examine whether firm size has an effect on wages independent of 
region, sector and education, all of which are likely correlated. Results are 
reported in Appendix A-4. Using dummy variables for the six size groups 
described above, we find that firm size had a significant impact on wages in 
Thailand in both 1995 and 2005, even controlling for observable characteristics.
99
 
However, the coefficients on the firm size dummies are much small than the large 
coefficients on the upper- and post-secondary dummies, and also smaller than the 
coefficients on the regional dummies. Firm size has a significant impact on wage, 
but it does not influence wages as much as a worker’s education or of the area 
they live in. 
Wages rose by about 30 percent in real terms between 1995 and 2005 (Table 4-5). 
This implies that the average worker benefited from economic growth over this 
period. However, the pattern has varied by firm size. The medium-sized firms, 
with between 50 and 99 workers, saw an increase of around 52 percent. In the 
smallest ‘micro’ enterprises wages rose by 35 percent but in the slightly larger 
micro firms the increase was only 16 percent. As a consequence, wages in these 
size groups converged and in 2005 were roughly similar. Wages in the largest 
firms rose by 26 percent.  
Wages grew fastest in services, and in Bangkok, the Central and Southern 
regions. Workers with elementary or less than elementary education experienced 
the fastest wage group. Those with secondary education or above saw slower 
growth. However, as noted above, the proportion with these levels of education 
rose. 
The regression analysis in Appendix A-4 also allows us to quantify how the 
strength of the relationship between firm size and wages has changed over time. 
The catch-up of employees of the smallest microenterprises is significant – by 
2005 workers in enterprises with 5 to 9 employees were no better off, statistically, 
than this group. The coefficient on the dummies for the other small firm sizes is 
relatively stable, but the coefficient for the medium and large enterprises rose. So, 
while the convergence at the bottom of the distribution confirms our hypothesis 
that the relationship between firm size and wages would become weaker as 
Thailand developed, wage levels continued to diverge between the largest and 
smallest firms.  
 
                                                 
99 We used firms with fewer than 5 employees and workers with no education as reference categories. 




4.3.5. Wage inequality in Thailand 
 
Figure 4–1 plots the overall wage distributions for private employees for the two 
years analysed. In 1995 a large proportion of workers were clustered close to the 
mean value. In 2005 the mean wage had risen, and a larger number of workers 
were located above the mean, in the right hand tail of the distribution, with wages 
of 300 Int. USD or above.
 100
 This suggests a rise in wage inequality, which is 
confirmed in the measures of inequality summarized in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6 includes a number of commonly used inequality measures. The 
Generalized Entropy (GE) class of measures is included: GE(0), or the mean 
logarithmic deviation (MLD), GE(1), or the Theil Index, and GE(2), which is 
equivalent to half of the squared coefficient of variation. The Gini coefficient, and 
measures of the Atkinson class with different levels of inequality aversion are 
also provided.
101
 A higher inequality aversion factor (represented by the number 
in brackets) makes the Atkinson and GE inequality measures more sensitive to 
differences at the bottom of the wage distribution.
102
  
Figure 4–1: Wage distributions for private employees in Thailand in 1995 and 2005 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005 
                                                 
100 These main results are not altered when we plot the wage distributions by firm size (see Figure 4-2 in the 
Appendix). 
101 See Cowell (2000) and Atkinson (1970) for details on the different inequality measures. 
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The results in Table 4-6 show that the inequality of the wage distribution (for 
employees in private companies) increased between 1995 and 2005. This is in 
contrast to overall income inequality, which remained roughly constant, as noted 
above, and in contrast to our hypothesis in 4.2.3. This implies that other income 
sources, such as earnings from self-employment, social transfers or agriculture, 
compensated for the dis-equalizing effect of wages, or that the equalizing effect 
of the expansion of wage opportunities was enough to mitigate the rise in wage 
inequality. 
The biggest proportional increase occurred using the measures with high 
inequality aversion factors. These measures are highly sensitive to changes in the 
lowest part of the distribution. This implies that the increase in the deviation from 
the mean was most pronounced for the workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. It appears that, as the mean wage rose, a certain group of workers 
fell further behind the average.  














A(0.5) A(1) A(2) 
1995 0.2649 0.3342 0.6581 0.3959 0.1371 0.2328 0.3728 
2005 0.3115 0.3808 0.7345 0.4245 0.1570 0.2676 0.4359 
Inequality 







Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005. 
 
4.3.6. Linking the firm size distribution and wage inequality 
 
Table 4-7 decomposes the MLD and Theil index, two commonly used measures 
of inequality, into within and between group inequalities, examining firm size, 
sector, regional differences, and educational differences.  
In line with our expectations (4.2.3), differences in wages between firm size 
groups help explain inequality in both years. Their importance fell very slightly 
over time. In 1995 differences in average wages between different firm size 
groups explained 15 percent of inequality, as measured by MLD, and in 2005 
they explained 14 percent.  
The decompositions in Table 4-7 mirror the findings from the descriptive 
statistics, showing that education and regional differences are more important in 
explaining overall inequality than firm size. Sector, on the other hand, explains 




only around 12 percent of the MLD, less than firm size. It is also important to 
note that only a small proportion of total inequality is explained by differences 
between groups. Even differences in pay by education level can explain only 38 




Table 4-7: Inequality decomposition by sector, firm size, and region 
  
MLD (GE(0))  Theil   
  Within Between Total 
Between 
/Total Within between Total 
Between 
/Total 
1995 Firm size 0.224 0.041 0.265 0.154 0.294 0.041 0.334 0.121 
2005 
 
0.267 0.045 0.311 0.144 0.337 0.044 0.381 0.115 
     
     
1995 Sector 0.232 0.033 0.265 0.123 0.305 0.029 0.334 0.086 
2005 
 
0.273 0.038 0.311 0.122 0.345 0.035 0.381 0.093 
     
     
1995 Region 0.205 0.060 0.265 0.226 0.272 0.062 0.334 0.186 
2005 
 
0.244 0.067 0.311 0.216 0.312 0.069 0.381 0.180 
          
1995 Education 0.161 0.100 0.261 0.382 0.206 0.124 0.330 0.376 
2005  0.193 0.118 0.310 0.380 0.242 0.139 0.381 0.365 
Source: Author’s computation based on LFS 1995 and 2005 
Notes: Firm size: 1 to 4, 5 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 and above; Region: Bangkok, 
Central, Northern, Northeastern, Southern; Sector: Agriculture, Industry, Services; Education: 
None, Less than Elementary, Primary, Lower Secondary, Upper Secondary, Post-Secondary. 
As noted, firm size is strongly correlated with both region and sector. Larger 
firms are concentrated in the better-off regions and in the highest paying sector, 
industry. Size is also be correlated with education. In order to better understand 
these interrelationships we use a regression-based decomposition method, based 
on Fields (2002). We employ the STATA command ‘ineqrbd’ written by Fiorio 
and Jenkins (2008) and include region, sector, and education dummy variables as 
controls. The results are based on the regressions in Appendix A-4, and are 
displayed in Table 4-8. The estimated contribution of a particular variable to 
wage inequality is related to the strength of the correlation between the variable 
in question and wages, and to the variability of the variable itself among the 
population in question. Positive coefficients indicate that a variable has a dis-
equalizing effect on wages. For instance, a rise in wages in Bangkok would have 
a strong disequalizing effect by further widening the wage gap. A rise in wages 
for workers in MSEs would lead to a decrease in overall wage inequality. 
                                                 
103 The finding that within group inequalities account for most of the total wage inequality is unsurprising 
given the broad character of the groups. However, even when using 21 industry groups based on a 3 digit 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) by the UN the main findings of Table 4-7 are unaltered. 
Our findings are also in line with Jenkins (1995) who also finds that within group inequality accounts for 
most of the inequality. In the same study, this finding holds for all decomposition groups. 




The results indicate that the nature of the firm size distribution, together with the 
correlation between firm size and wages, accounts for about 2 percent of wage 
inequality in 1995 and 2005, controlling for other factors. The wages received by 
workers in small firms have an equalizing impact, but the high wages received by 
workers of medium and larger enterprises are disequalizing. The overall effect is 
disequalizing, although its importance decreased slightly between 1995 and 2005.  
Region and education in particular play a more important roles in explaining 
overall inequality. The unequal distribution of upper and post-secondary 
education, together with the apparently high returns already identified, explains 
around 22 percent of total wage inequality. This runs contrary to the argument of 
Felbermayr et al. (2013), that a larger proportion of wage inequality can generally 
be traced to firm characteristics than to education. Further, even when education 
is included, only around 30 percent of inequality can be explained by observed 
variables, according to the regression based technique. Differences in wages 
between workers with the same level of education, in the same region and firm 
size group explain around 70 percent of overall wage inequality.  
Table 4-8: Contribution of each variable to wage inequality, percent, estimated using 
regression based decomposition 
  1995 2005 
Firm size 
5 to 9 -0.2886 -0.0037 
0 to 19 -0.0852 -0.0988 
20 to 49 0.3265 0.1178 
50 to 99 0.1653 0.3065 
Over 100 1.8417 1.697 
Sector 
Industry 0.0157 0.0789 





Elementary 0.8076 -0.5936 
Lower secondary 0.0024 -0.3756 
Upper secondary 1.3913 0.1498 
Post-secondary 19.613 21.494 
Region 
Bangkok 6.3591 6.1881 
Central -0.0767 0.1813 
Northeastern -0.0955 -0.0722 
Southern -0.1206 -0.2193 
Residual 69.2082 71.3875 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005. 
 






This paper examined the role of firm dynamics for the development of wage 
inequality in Thailand between 1995 and 2005. The main findings are: 
1. A ‘missing middle’ pattern is observed in Thailand, as in other developing 
economies – medium-sized firms account for a lower proportion of 
employment than would be expected in a developed country. This pattern 
was present in both 1995 and 2005. Bangkok is the only region with a 
relatively even firm size distribution.  
 
2. There is a strong correlation between firm size and wages. Regression 
analysis showed that this correlation is unexplained by observed worker 
characteristics. 
 
As expected given these findings, the firm size distribution in 
Thailand plays a significant role in explaining wage inequality, in 
both 1995 and 2005, even when we control for the correlation of 
firm size with region, education and sector.  
 
3. Rather than moving towards a lognormal distribution over the period 
analysed the firm size distribution became more ‘dualistic’, with the 
proportion of workers employed in the largest firms rising slightly, while 
the proportion in the smallest firms remained roughly stable. The increase 
in the proportion of large firms was most pronounced in the Central 
region, which surrounds Bangkok city, while the Southern region saw a 
notable increase in the proportion of microenterprises.  
 
4. At the bottom of the firm size distribution wages in the smallest 
microenterprises have caught up with wages in slightly larger small firms. 
But the wages of these two groups have diverged from the wages received 
by workers at top of the firm size distribution.  
 
Contrary to our expectations, and to the trend in overall inequality, 
we observed a rise in wage inequality between 1995 and 2005. 
This is partly explained by the accentuation of the ‘missing 
middle’. Workers who gained opportunities in the largest 
enterprises gained access to higher wages than the workers in 
micro and small enterprises. As the ‘middle’ of the distribution 
remained absent, this increased wage inequality. The increase in 
wages at the top of the firm size distribution, which outweighed 
the convergence at the bottom, also explains part of the increase.  
 




Although regional, sectoral and educational disparities are not the main focus of 
this chapter, they have been considered in order to put the findings into context, 
and in order to understand the effect of firm size controlling for these correlated 
variables. Results from a regression based decomposition show that education 
and region play a far larger role in explaining wage inequality than the firm size 
distribution.  
Because of the difficulties of causal interpretation and certain other data 
limitations the implications of these findings for policy should be considered 
avenues for future investigation. They would need to be verified with further 
evidence and investigation of causal links. Fruitful avenues for future research are 
therefore as follows: 
 
As the accentuation of the ‘missing middle’ pattern between 1995 and 2005 
contributed to rising wage inequality, it would be worthwhile investigating the 
reasons why medium-sized enterprises make up a small and shrinking proportion 
of employment and what has constrained the numerous MSEs from making a 
transition to medium-size status. The factors identified by Tybout (2000), 
including institutional entry barriers, imperfections in financial and labour 
markets, small and geographically dispersed markets, the nature of consumer 
demand, uncertainty about demand and policies, corruption and lack of rule of 
law should all be considered. A comparison of the business climate in Bangkok, 
which is not characterized by a ‘missing middle’, with the rest of the country, 
might be a particularly fruitful avenue for investigation. 
 
The reasons for the link between firm size and wages deserve further 
investigation. The results of the chapter indicate that the higher wages in the 
largest firms are not explained purely by observed characteristics of their 
workers, such as education. In this context, an investigation of the factors 
determining access to well-paid jobs in larger enterprises could contribute to our 
understanding of wage inequality. 
 
The strong relationship between wages and education level, and the importance of 
education in determining inequality, are striking, even though they are not the 
main topic of this chapter. Although increasing education over this period 
actually increased inequality in wages, further increases, reaching a larger 
proportion of the workforce, may have the potential to reduce wage inequality.  
Part of the ‘return’ to education appears to come from improved access to jobs in 
larger enterprises. The reasons why better educated workers are able to access 
large firms, and what sort of skills and educational backgrounds these firms 
demand, could also be analysed. 
 
Overall income inequality, measured using household data, remained roughly 
constant over time. One possible explanation is that other sources of income 




became more equal. But it is also highly likely that the expansion of opportunities 
in wage employment, which is better paid than other income-earning activities, 
mitigated the increasing inequality within the group of wage workers. If this is the 
case, then the expansion of MSEs, by providing new employment opportunities, 
may well have prevented a rise in overall inequality over the time period in 
question. This hypothesis would need to be investigated with suitable household 
survey data. 
Finally it should be noted, as explored in the model of Gall (2005), that the causal 
relationship between the firm size distribution and wage inequality may run both 
ways, with inequality being caused by but also explaining or reinforcing the 
‘missing middle’. Further research could examine whether Thailand is prone to a 
self-reinforcing pattern where existing inequality prevents the firm distribution 
moving away from the dualistic pattern, towards the more even pattern that 









Table 4-9: OLS regression, dependent variable monthly wage in int. USD, used for 
regression based inequality decomposition 
                (1) (2) 
  1995 2005 
Size: 5 to 9 22.111*** 0.347 
 
(5.307) (6.676) 
Size 10 to 19 17.269** 28.746*** 
 
(5.811) (7.152) 
Size: 20 to 49 38.807*** 39.904*** 
 
(6.222) (8.065) 
Size: 50 to 99 43.821*** 73.343*** 
 
(7.306) (9.463) 
Size: Over 100 74.778*** 90.482*** 
 
(5.614) (6.763) 
Industry 18.541*** -19.687** 
 
(5.279) (6.362) 
Services 19.967*** 28.221*** 
 
(-5.715) (6.663) 
Less than elementary -19.138* 55.952*** 
                (9.533) (11.524) 
Elementary -38.998*** 41.488*** 
 
(9.796) (11.591) 
Lower sceondary 17.165 53.569*** 
 
(10.551) (11.969) 
Upper secondary 116.496*** 122.685*** 
 
(11.066) (12.334) 
Post secondary 500.632*** 581.444*** 
 
(11.471) (12.579) 
Bangkok 163.800*** 257.16*** 
 
(5.768) (7.418) 
Central 55.011*** 87.845*** 
 
(5.135) (6.453) 
Northeastern 6.168 5.670 
 
(5.720) (7.093) 
Southern 26.485*** 103.619*** 
 
(6.834) (7.773) 
Constant 140.692*** 104.2489*** 
  (10.089) (11.918) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3079 0.2858 
N 24392 34915 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Reference categories: Size: 1-4 employees; Education: no formal education; Region: Northern. 
Source: Author’s computations based on LFS 1995 and 2005 




Figure 4–2: Wage kernel density estimates by enterprise size 
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